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The purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework for research that will lead to a 
“technology of foolishness”, à la James March (1972). This is done by a) analysing the 
nature and b) evaluating the results of case studies that employ the garbage can theory within 
the field of organisational decision making. The garbage can is used since it was developed to 
describe decision making within organised anarchies. These are organisational contexts 
characterised by ambiguous goals, amongs other traits. Thus, one of the aims of the theory 
was to describe how decisions are made in the face of goal ambiguity. In this thesis nineteen 
case studies that were published between 1976 and 2010 are analysed. Only studies where the 
garbage can theory’s components are brought to bear on the data in a significant way are 
included in the scope of the study. This means that data has to be structured according to the 
theory, or that the authors’ conclusions address the theory specifically.  
It was found that the case studies produce very few insights on goal ambiguity which can be 
put to use in developing a technology of foolishness. Based on the analysis of the nature of 
the garbage can theory and the studies in the sample, a new way of doing research on goal 
ambiguity is put forth. Based on the insights on goal ambiguity that were produced, the 
themes that need researching are suggested. A core discovery is that although the garbage can 
in used as a process theory very often, the interpretivist tools that fit within this approach are 
seldom used. 
The normative strategy that is put forth includes incorporating the role of active decision 
making entities into the garbage can theory, or using the garbage can theory in conjunction 
with a model that does provide for the role of these decision making entities. It is important to 
note that these entities need not and should not be subjected to the principles of rational 
choice theory. It is also proposed that the garbage can theory be utilised as a process theory of 
decision making and that theoretical tools that are appropriate to this kind of theory be used. 
These tools would form part of theories designed for analysing and understanding 
organisational narratives. Themes that need to be researched include symbolic expressions 
(such as metaphors), tactile or visual experiences, the role of intuition and emotional 
expression in decision making processes, the role of identity (that of the focal decision 
makers and the people he comes into contact with) and, lastly, the idea that the world is 
enacted, rather than having to be predicted.  





Hierdie tesis het ten doel om ŉ raamwerk vir navorsing daar te stel wat sal lei tot die 
ontwikkeling van ŉ ‘tegnologie vir dwase optrede’, à la James March (1972). Dit word 
gedoen deur a) die aard en b) die resultate van gevallestudies wat die vullisdromteorie op 
besluitneming in organisasies toepas, te analiseer. Die vullisdromteorie word gebruik omdat 
dit ontwikkel is om besluitneming in ‘georganiseerde anargieë’ te beskryf. Georganiseerde 
anargieë word, onder anadere, gekenmerk deur dubbelisinnige doelwitte. Dus was een van 
die mikpunte van die model om besluitneming te beskryf wanneer doelwitte dubbelsinnig is. 
In hierdie tesis word negentien gevallestudies, wat tussen 1976 en 2010 gepubliseer is, 
bestudeer. Slegs studies waar die komponente van die teorie beduidend in die data neerslag 
vind, word ingesluit by die omvang van die studie. Dit beteken dat die data volgens die 
komponente gestruktureer is, of dat die navorsers die evaluering van die teorie eksplisiet by 
hulle konklusies insluit.  
Die bevinding is dat die gevallestudies baie min insigte rondom doelwitdubbelsinnigheid bied 
wat binne die raamwerk van ŉ tegnologie vir dwase optrede pas. Op grond van die analise 
van die oorhoofse eienskappe van beide die vullisdromteorie en die studies in die steekproef,  
word daar ’n nuwe normatiewe raamwerk vir die benadering tot navorsing omtrent 
doelwitdubbelsinnigheid voorgestel. Op grond van die insigte omtrent 
doelwitdubbelsinnigheid wat wel deeluitmaak van die resultate, word temas vir navorsing 
voorgestel. ŉ Kern-ontdekking is dat ofskoon die vullisdrom gereëld as ŉ prosesteorie 
aangewend word, die interpretivistiese instrumente wat tot hierdie benadering hoort, selde 
gebruik word. 
Die nuwe normatiewe strategie is dat die vullisdromteorie as sodanig aangepas word dat dit 
voorsiening maak vir aktiewe besluitnemende entiteite. ŉ Ander werkbare opsie is om die 
vullisdromteorie te same met ’n teorie wat wel vir hierdie entiteite voorsiening maak, aan te 
wend. Hierdie entiteite hoef en behoort egter nie gemodelleer te word volgens ’n rasionele 
keuse teorie nie. Daar word ook voorgestel dat waar die vullisdromteorie aangewend word, 
dit as ’n prosesteorie vir besluitneming aangewend word en dat teoretiese instrumente wat 
binne die raamwerk van prosesteorieë pas, benut word. Hierdie instrumente sluit metodes en 
teorieë wat geskik is vir die analisering en verstaan van narratiewe in organisasies in.  Temas 
wat nagevors moet word is simboliese uitdrukkings (soos metafore), ervarings wat tas- en 




sigsintuie insluit, die rol van intuïsie en emosionele uitdrukking in die besluitnemingproses, 
die rol van identiteit (van die fokale besluitnemer sowel as ander entiteite met wie hy in 
kontak kom) en, laastens, die idee dat die wêreld geskep word deur aksies, eerder as dat dit 
voorspel hoef te word.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The idea of studying ambiguity within the field of organisational decision making is fairly 
novel. The concept was introduced in the literature early in the 1970’s. This introduction 
evolved from the Carnegie model (Goodin, 1999: 71-72; Styhre, Wikmalm, Olilla and Roth, 
2010: 137; Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada and Saint-Macary, 1995: 262). However, it 
also indicated a departure from this dominant tradition (Pinfield, 1986: 365; Tsoukas, 2010: 
381). The Carnegie model portrays decision makers as being “intendedly” rational (Bendor, 
Moe and Shotts, 2001: 174, Simon, 1955: 114). This tradition is best represented through 
publications by Simon (1947), March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March (1963) 
(according to Pinfield, 1986: 365; Argote and Greve, 2007: 337, Bendor et al., 2001: 174). 
The authorship of these publications lead to the school of thought being known as the March-
Simon tradition (Bendor et al., 2001: 174).   
Prior to the Carnegie model becoming dominant, traditional rationality, in the form of 
rational choice theory (see Reed, 2003: 329-335) and classical micro-economic models (see 
Mankiw, 2004: 4-8) dominated how individual and organisational decisions were viewed. 
Traditional rationality, which also serves as a normative framework for making decisions, 
advocates the adherence to coherent application of the laws of logic, the correct calculus of 
probability and/or the adherence to the rule of maximising expected utility (Over, 2007: 3; 
Baron, 2007: 9-34)1. The Carnegie model started to challenge traditional rationality when 
Herbert Simon first argued for the idea of economically rational man to be replaced with an 
idea of man as limited in terms of knowledge and ability (Simon, 1955: 114). This shift in 
focus saw the economic firm substituted by the behavioural firm (Argote and Greve, 2007: 
337).  
                                                
1 It is important to note that the notion of rationality that applies to the purpose of this thesis and that is relevant 
to the disciplines and fields of knowledge that are that are explored, is not the same as “value rationality” à la 
Weber ; “moral rationality” à la Etzioni; “communicative rationality” à la Habermas or “emotional rationality” à 
la Goleman. The discussion is limited to the kind of rationality that dominates the decision theory discourse; 
therefore the starting point is the idea of rational choice theory.  
 




Ambiguity as a theme became popular in large part due to studies on sensemaking2 in 
organisations by Karl Weick in 1976, a renewed interest in the institutional school within 
organisation theory, and a series of publications on various forms of ambiguity within a 
variety of organisational contexts (March and Weissinger-Baylon, 1986: 12). These forms 
include ambiguity of experience and the past (Cohen and March, 1986: 199-201; March and 
Olsen, 1975), of power and success (Cohen and March, 1974: 197-199, 201-203), of 
relevance (March and Olsen 1976a: 26), of self-interest (March and Olsen, 1976b: 38-53), of 
deadlines (Weiner, 1976: 225-251), of intelligence and meaning (March, 1987: 163-164), and 
of purpose (Cohen and March, 1974: 175-179).  
Alongside the shift that saw ambiguity, as a theme, rise in popularity, another idea started to 
gain momentum within organisational decision making. This idea was the notion that 
decisions, within an organisational context, are not primarily the product of human intent. 
The garbage can theory, which was introduced by Cohen, March and Olsen in 1972, is the 
foremost advocate of this idea (Langley, et al., 1995: 262). The authors’ garbage can theory 
portrayed decisions as being the outcome of the intersection between four independent 
streams: solutions, problems, choice situations and participants (1972: 2). Pinfield argues that 
the original garbage can theory is different from the models of bounded rationality that 
preceded it (1986: 366), in that bounded rationality still conceives of human intent as the 
driver behind decision outcomes (1986:365).  
These two parallel shifts – the incorporation of ambiguity and non-intentional factors in 
researching and theorising on organisational decision making – are the pillars on which this 
thesis rests. The form of ambiguity of interest is that of goal ambiguity. What is at stake is 
how to research goal ambiguity if the intent is to produce a normative theory on decision 
making that embraces the absence of pre-existent, clearly defined, consistent goals.  
1.2 Problem statement 
There is evidence that suggests that that ambiguous goals are a common phenomenon. There 
is also speculation, and some instances of validation thereof, that fostering ambiguous goals 
could be sensible, intelligent behavior. The first problem is that little academic effort has 
                                                
2 Sensemaking, as a concept, refers to the way in which active agents construct sensible events. The act of 
sensemaking involves organising stimuli into a mental framework. These frameworks are what enable actors to 
understand and explain the phenomena which they perceive. Sensemaking takes place retrospectively (Weick, 
1995: 4-5).  




been devoted to refining the intelligence exhibited through ambiguous goals. Secondly, the 
existent research on goal ambiguity has delivered minimal insight that could be put to use in 
developing a normative theory that works from the assumption that goals are ambiguous and 
that they should be that way. This thesis will predominantly address the second problem. By 
doing so it hopes to indirectly contribute to the first problem, the need for the development of 
a normative theory. To achieve a clear understanding of the problem it is first necessary to 
clarify the meaning of the terms ‘goal’ and ‘ambiguity’. 
1.2.1 Meaning of key concepts 
1.2.1.1 Goals 
Various definitions of the concept ‘goal’ are proposed in the literature on decision making. 
Indeed, Scott recognises that: “the concept organizational goals is among the most slippery 
and treacherous of all those employed by organizational analysts” (2003: 292). March points 
towards the pervasiveness of the assumption of pre-existent purpose, by listing all the 
different terms used: "values", "needs", "wants", "goods", "tastes", "preferences", "utility", 
"objectives", "goals", "aspirations", "drives" (1972: 418). McCaskey points towards the same 
pervasiveness, but warns researchers against the elasticity of the concept: it has been used as 
a way of referring to broad purposes as well as specific measures (1979: 47).  
It has been argued that there is a difference between an entity’s values and its preferences or 
goals (March and Olsen, 1989: 118; Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1998: 39). Several 
researchers have shown that societal or organisational values guide decision making within 
organisations even though actions seem to be weakly connected to explicated intentions (see 
Rommetveit, 1976; Cohen and March, 1976; Stava, 1976; March and Romelaer, 1976; Olsen, 
1976a; Olsen, 1976b). This suggests levels of intentionality or different kinds of 
intentionality.  
The argument here is that the terms goals, aspirations, objectives, preferences, tastes and 
utility are closely related and are all relevant in addressing the current problem. A different 
form of intentionality – as it manifests in organisational and individual values – is excluded 
from the scope. The relationship between the various terms that are relevant to the study can  
be mapped clearly. Cohen et al. argue that organisations with problematic preferences need a 
theory as to how to act under circumstances of goal ambiguity (1972: 1-2). Thus, for the 
authors of the article, these two concepts, preferences and goals, may be equated to each 




other. Evans and Over also suggest a direct relation between the two terms; more specifically 
they conceive of preferences as that which determines goals (1996). In the same vein, it is 
posited here that goals, aspirations and objectives may be viewed as the explicated form of an 
entity’s preferences and/or tastes. Utility may in turn be understood as a measure of goal 
satisfaction (Over, 2007: 6).     
1.2.1.2 Ambiguity 
Goals of an ambiguous nature warrant a new normative theory (Cohen et al., 1972: 2; 
McCaskey, 1979). What ambiguity refers to needs to be demarcated, so that the possibilities 
for application are understood. ‘Uncertainty’, ‘ambiguity’ and ‘complexity’ are distinct 
terms, yet are often used interchangeably (eg. Styhre, Wikmalm, Ollila and Roth, 2010: 137; 
Moch and Pondy, 1977: 351; Olsen, 2001: 191; March and Olsen, 1988: 343) or are conflated 
(eg. Rommetveit, 1976; March, 1994: 192, Bendor et al., 2001: 171)3. March reports that 
ambiguity is sometimes treated as a special case of uncertainty (1994: 192). These 
phenomena complicate comparisons across texts and make it difficult for researchers to build 
on past efforts.  
A concrete illustration of an instance of confusion may be useful. In a discussion of a case 
study on the management of a project in a research and development company, McCaskey 
explains that this environment was selected because it seemed probable that it would be 
characterised by goal ambiguity (1979: 41). After having gathered evidence to the contrary 
within the specific case, the author cites two sets of research. One set asserts that an R&D 
environment was more uncertain. The other produced conclusions that more closely 
resembled his own, namely that the R&D environment had clear, well-defined goals relative 
to other departments. The author concludes that uncertainty or ambiguity could not reside 
within the environment: “…since both the task and the surrounding environment are the 
invention of human intelligence, the degree of uncertainty is dictated by an interaction 
between the human actor and what is ‘out there’…people higher in tolerance for ambiguity 
took simple tasks and made them more complex in order to stimulate…themselves” (1979: 
41)4. Here all three terms are used, at first glance as synonyms, but later seem to relate in a 
more complicated way. Yet, the relationships are not addressed within the article.  
                                                
 
4 The emphasis is my own.  




A number of texts (March, 1994; March, 1978; Cohen et al., 1972; Cohen and March, 1974; 
McCaskey, 1979) utilise goal ambiguity as an umbrella term to refer to goals that are:  
• vague (or ill-defined) 
• problematic in that preferences are inconsistent (either over time or in terms of each 
other, when they are multiple) 
• discovered after action has been taken 
Some argue that particular environments lend themselves more to the above described goal 
ambiguity (Lee, Rainey and Chun, 2009b: 458). Another argument is that most organisations 
exhibit ambiguous goals, to some degree, part of the time (Cohen, March, Olsen, 1972: 1). 
Thus, the concept of goal ambiguity is dense.  
The question remains as to how ambiguity, as explained above, is different from uncertainty, 
and whether the distinction is relevant. Zahariadis provides a lucid portrayal of the difference 
between the two: additional information may reduce uncertainty, but does not resolve 
ambiguity (2003: 3-5). March makes a similar distinction. He understands ambiguity is a 
fundemental lack of clarity or consistency, whereas uncertainty refers to imprecision in 
estimates regarding future states. Uncertainty assumes that a certain state does exist, despite it 
not being known, whereas ambiguity refers to states having multiple meanings and 
interpretation (1994: 178-179).  In essence the notion of uncertainty neglects the fact that 
states of the world are, to an extent, constructed through the ways in which individuals attach 
meaning to external stimuli. The implication is that multiple states exist, as people often 
interpret events differently.   
A commonality between the two concepts is a relation to the idea of bounded rationality. 
Some authors suggest that the experience of ambiguity, in part, is the result of the limitations 
of our rationality. People have different interpretations because they are not exposed to the 
same stimuli, due to lack of attentive capability (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 385-386; March 
and Olsen, 1988: 343). However, it is also suggested that the experience of ambiguity may be 
reduced, in a sense, by our incapacity to pay attention to many things at the same time 
(March and Olsen, 1989). This would mean that inevitable asymmetrical exposure gives rise 
to the experience of ambiguity (effect A) as well as mitigates the experience thereof by 
facilitating the interpretation of an ambiguous world (effect B). It is argued here that effect A 
illustrates ambiguity that is similar to uncertainty. Effect B illustrates ambiguity as a 




fundamental characteristic of stimuli. It is relevant for this thesis as the same distinction is 
applicable to the different forms of goal ambiguity. Goal ambiguity due to inconsistent 
preferences among employees can be seen as an ambiguity that could be reduced if 
employees had the same exposure, or if there were less uncertainty. The second and third 
forms of goal ambiguity are more clearly examples of the way in which the world is made up 
of stimuli that necessarily need to be interpreted.   All three forms of goal ambiguity – 
inconsitency, vague formulation and post hoc creation – are relevant in terms of the current 
purpose.  
Having made clear the forms and nature of goal ambiguity, traditional normative theories’ 
treatment of this specific phenomenon will be discussed. It is the dissonance between this 
stance and empirical research on goal ambiguity, that gives rise to the problem.  
1.2.2 Rational choice as a poor descriptive theory  
Descriptive theories are aimed at providing an account of what people do when they actually 
make decisions (Over, 2007: 3). Normative theories, on the other hand, prescribe rules. They 
are concrete explanations of how to realise an ideal state (Baron, 2007). Although the nature 
of these rules are disputed (see Cohen, 1983; Stein, 1996; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich and 
West, 2000), theories of formal logic, probability theory, statistics, utility theory and decision 
theory applications5 are traditionally understood to denote normative theories. Traditionally, 
the standards that are set by these theories are understood to communicate the level of 
‘rationality’ of a certain judgement or instance of behaviour (Baron, 2007: 19; March, 1987: 
588; Bazerman and Moore, 2009: 4-5). The implication is that a rational choice theory should 
be applied if the aim is to judge well.    
As suggested earlier, rational choice theory, is the proposition that human beings should 
make decisions by going through a process consisting of calculating the outcomes that result 
from human action, and weighing those outcomes against what one wants to achieve (March, 
1972: 418; Miller and Wilson, 2006: 469;  Over, 2007: 3).  
From a management theory perspective, Drucker (1955), for example, saw the decision 
making process as consisting of five different phases, starting with the formulation of a 
problem, then analysing the problem, developing alternate solutions, deciding among these 
options – exercising a rational choice – and, finally, putting the chosen solution into action. In 
                                                
5 Here taken to refer to decision analysis, multi-attribute value analysis, game theory, and  tools such as decision 
trees.  




this instance, the presupposition that goals are known is so deeply entrenched that it is not 
even considered a step in the process. Anderson phrases the same core argument differently 
by stating that the traditional way of viewing choice is consistent with goal identification, the 
search for alternatives, predicting the consequences of each of the alternative actions, the 
evaluation of each of the alternatives in terms of their consequences for goal achievement, 
and, finally, the selection of the alternative that most optimally serves the goal (1983: 201). 
This form of rationality has also come to be referred to as pure or formal rationality, so as to 
distinguish it from bounded rationality (March, 1994: 3). 
Thus, within rational choice, ambiguous goals are viewed as pathological: they prevent the 
decision maker from engaging in a process of rational choice. The entities and different kinds 
of processes that rational choice theory may be applied to will be discussed in depth in the 
second chapter. Only through evaluating these applications will the need for an additional 
normative theory will be thoroughly substantiated. At present it is important to note that 
rational choice assumes pre-existent goals that are clear and consistent. 
Over the last half century, since Simon (1955) suggested shifting our focus from the 
economic man to the administrative man, it has become all the more commonplace to accept 
rational choice theory as limited in terms of its capacity to describe decision behaviour 
(Dyckman, 1981: 299; Kingdon, 2003: 77; Pinfield, 1986: 365; Langley et al. 1995: 260; 
French, Maule and Papamichail, 2009: 27). March and Simon (1958), Lindblom (1959), 
Georgiou (1973), Benson (1977), Wildavsky (1979), Green and Shapiro (1994) and Chia 
(1994) have all systematically criticised rational choice theory. However, Andersons states 
that although legitimate critiques of rational choice are widespread, critics have been less 
successful in proposing empirically-based alternatives (1983: 201). Since this statement was 
made, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) has made progress towards establishing a 
framework for biases and heuristics as a systemic means through which we actually make 
decisions. Gerd Gigerenzer (1999; 2007) has turned research on heuristics into a normative 
theory for making decisions. However, neither of these branches of research is well aligned 
with the deviation from rational choice theory which is at stake here. This deviation, or 
critique, relates to the volume of research that shows that goals are often either unclear, 
inconsistent, only known after action has been taken, or a combination of these options.  
March summarises the behavioural trend with regard to preferences (1987: 596-597):  




• Decision makers actively manage their preferences, in that future preferences are 
anticipated and action is sometimes undertaken to moderate them. This means that 
preferences are expected to change.  
• Preferences are actively constructed, sometimes with strategic intent. This is due to 
the anticipation that external actors and oneself might infer characteristics of the 
decision making entity by observing their goals. This implies that preferences and 
actions are in fact chosen at the same time, as decision makers are aware that 
preferences or goals might be perceived to have meaning apart from their instrumental 
function6. 
• Decision makers knowingly act in ways that are inconsistent with their preferences, or 
are reluctant to voice them, depending on the situation7. 
• Lastly, preferences are conflated and contradictory at the same time.    
Cohen and March (1994), Weick (1976), March and Olsen (1976a), Crozier and Friedberg 
(1980), McCaskey (1979), and Lindblom (1959) and Chun and Rainey (2005) have all 
studied the ways in which decision makers confront ambiguous circumstances. The first four 
and the last of these publications specifically studied ambiguous preferences. March reports 
that the first four in the list attest to the sensibility of acting within a context of goal 
ambiguity, and that these authors are aligned in arguing for a new formulation of the 
normative problem that confronts decision engineers (March, 1978: 590). 
March summarises possibilities why fostering ambiguous goals might be sensible (March, 
1987: 598-599):   
• Decision makers are aware of limitations in terms of integrating personal and 
institutional (or organisational) goals and manage their prefernces accordingly. 
• Decision makers might, to an extent, be aware of that preferences are constructed. 
This realisation implies that goals are important regardless of their action 
consequences, as they also have symbolic consequences.  
• Decision makers might know and calculate for the fact that some people are better at 
standard rational argument than others and that these skills are not well correlated 
with morality or sympathy8.  
                                                
6 Empirical proof for this is presented by McCaskey’s study (1979) March and Olsen (1989: 39-52), Staw and 
Ross (1978) and Anderson (1983).  
7 See Brunsson (1982) for empirically based arguments. 




Numerous empirical studies show support for these ideas. Brunsson (2006; 1990; 1982) 
argues extensively for why hypocrisy, in this case referring to action being unaligned with 
“speaking”, is a necessary attribute for an organisation to function well. Anderson (1983) 
showed that by discovering goals in the process of making the decision, the need to specify 
all goals at the outset was avoided, leading to less conflict. Lindblom (1959) illustrated that 
clarifying goals could be counterproductive within a political setting, as building coalitions 
involves persuading various participants to commit to a certain proposal without their goals 
necessarily being aligned. Kreps (1979) specified conditions under which intelligent decision 
makers would prefer to have changing preferences. Winsten (1980; 1985) proved that not  
placing the same value on one thing consistently to be generally sensible. March alluded to 
the fact that decision makers recognise action as a way in which new preferences may be 
discovered and/or developed (1988a: 399). Finally, Weick (1995) showed that it is sensible 
for members of an organisation to act and then rationalise their actions post factum.    
The detail of how ambiguous goals are exhibited by different entities and how they make a 
difference in various organisational procedures will be discussed in chapter two. At present it 
is sufficient to take note that ambiguous goals are common and that there is systematic 
speculation and proof that fostering these ambiguous goals might be sensible. 
1.2.3 From accurate description to normative formulation: research is 
needed 
Why is the fact that rational choice is poor at describing behavior relevant to normative 
theorising? The answer is that normative theories can be improved if more heed is paid to 
descriptive accounts of decision making (March, 1978: 588). Within the field of choice itself, 
it has been a trend for normative and descriptive theories to influence each other dialectically, 
rather than growing in isolation. Gigerenzer (1999; 2007), for example, turns descriptive 
insights into normative theory by relating the former to evolution theory. Normative theories 
have responded to Simon showing that behaving more “rationally” would not necessarily lead 
to better decision making (March, 1987: 589). Due to Simon’s behavioural take on economic 
judgements, satisficing is now considered sensible under fairly general circumstances 
(March, 1994: 9). 
                                                                                                                                                  
8 See Clegg, Corpasson and Phillips’ discussion on the role of rational choice and techniques in the excecution 
of the ‘final solution’ (2007: 160). 




Due to the past dialectic relations between descriptive and normative theories on decision 
making (March, 1978: 589), the suggestion to adapt normative theories according to 
descriptions of behaviour should not seem unfitting. Both George (1980) and Newman 
(1980) advocate an approach to prescription that is connected to the way in which decision 
makers actually approach the task. When utilising this approach the first priority is to develop 
in-depth understanding of decision behaviour and the decision questions that people face 
(March, 1988a: 397).  
There are some, like Baron (2007: 21), who argue that normative theorising should be the 
task of philosophy, and should not be contaminated by behavioral considerations. However, 
the current argument is that in addition to goal ambiguity being ubiquitous at the individual 
and organisational level, reasons for why this would be sensible have been explored. These 
explorations attest to the idea that operating under conditions of ambiguity may be intelligent. 
Under such circumstances, ignoring the ambiguity or trying to remove it by making use of 
rational tools, such as multi-attribute value analysis, might lead to misstating the normative 
problem that confronts the decision maker or organisation (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 385-
386; March, 1978: 596-599)9. It is antiquated and insufficient to ignore ambiguity. 
The normative toolkit needs to be extended. Theories that prescribe rules, tools and models 
for circumstances within which pre-existent, clear and consistent goals are axiomatic, need to 
be supplemented with theories that offer prescription in situations characterised by goal 
ambiguity.  
Thusfar, there are few attempts at formulating normative theory that would fit into ambiguous 
contexts. Relatively little research has been done on decision making in conditions of goal 
ambiguity specifically (Thompson, 1967: 136; Thompson and Tuden, 1964; Lee, Rainey and 
Chun, 2009a: 284). The most recent set of studies on goal ambiguity aim to develop 
dimensions of goal ambiguity. These include target specification goal ambiguity, program 
evaluation goal ambiguity and time specification goal ambiguity. However, these studies are 
not supportive of goal ambiguity as they are conducted from a rational choice perspective. 
Also, goal ambiguity is understood to refer to goals allowing room for interpretation and thus 
                                                
9 It is emphasised that rational tools are not to be substituted altogether. Indeed, managers, economists, decision 
theorists and organisations theorists use many of these tools, which have been developed to the extent of being 
very sophisticated (March, 1972: 419). These tools, such as OR techniques, decision analytic tools, and micro-
economic models have been useful (March., 1978: 588). The argument is that these tools are not suited to or 
valuable within situations characterised by goal ambiguity, as they assume the existence of a set of consistent 
goals (March, 1972: 419).   




excludes the other relevant forms (see Chun and Rainey, 2005; Lee, Rainey and Chun, 2009; 
Lee, Rainey and Chun, 2009b; Jung, 2011). 
Lindblom’s theory on the ad hoc comparisons made by managers within public organisations, 
and Henri Mintzberg’s studies on strategy, that emphasise the incremental nature of decision 
making and encourage the use of intuitive and metaphorical processes, are examples of the 
normative theories that are needed (McCaskey, 1979: 31-32). However, Kingdon argues that 
incrementalism is poorly reflected in twenty-three case studies he conducted (2003: 79-83).  
Consequently, the notion of a technology of foolishness (March, 1972) is nominated as the 
starting point for normative theorising on goal ambiguity.  
March, both in an article entitled ‘Model Bias in Social Action’ (1972) as well as in chapter 
five in Ambiguity in Choice in Organisations (1976a), contrasts a technology of foolishness 
(TOF) with a technology of reason10. The former are theories, tools, and principles that apply, 
and should be executed, where goals still need to be developed. These tools induce action that 
precedes a clear purpose. Plainly stated, they should motivate people to act before they think.  
1.2.4 Deeper features of the problem  
The problem is that normative responses to the behavioural discussions of ambiguous 
preferences have been conservative (March, 1987: 599; Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 386). 
This is not surprising: even though research on goal ambiguity does exist it is not of 
substantial volume and parts of it are conducted from the perspective of rational choice 
theory.  
The reason for this delay possibly relates to the strong resemblance between traditional 
theories of choice and cultural ideas about intelligence. The two ideas share three 
assumptions (March, 1972: 415-418): entities have pre-existing purpose, behavior that is 
consistent with this purpose is necessary and virtuous and, finally, rationality is superior to 
other processes, like intuition and faith, through which judgements are reached. The idea of 
intelligence, in turn, is central to modern ideology (Clegg, Corpasson and Phillips, 2007: 8).  
Related to this explanation is the reason Loewenstein (1999) offers as to why certain types of 
motivation relating to the symbols and the construction of meaning have been left out of 
economic utility theory: they are not readily quantifiable. This quality leads to unclear 
relationships between variables (1999: 338).   
                                                
10 This distinction has since been adopted by Saranvathy and Dew (2005) and Jacobs and Statler (2006).  




The deep roots of the notion that rational thinking should precede action may have had a 
negative effect on researchers’ capability to gather insight on goal ambiguity. Researchers 
themselves may have to fight against ideological predisposition and decision makers, 
especially those in corporate environments, may be hesitant to disclose information that 
shows they do not act rationally (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 386)11. Also, studying goal 
ambiguity poses a significant challenge to those that want to advance the knowledge on 
decision making via quantitative modelling. 
1.3 Objective and aims 
1.3.1 Overall objective 
The overall objective is to establish a prescriptive framework for doing research on goal 
ambiguity that would be fruitful in terms of developing a TOF. This will be achieved by 
evaluating empirical applications of the garbage can theory (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972) 
to organisational decision making. This thesis will report on the success of the various case 
studies. A case study is deemed succesful if it produces insight on goal ambiguity that could 
be utilised in developing a TOF. The nature of the studies, alongside the garbage can theory 
itself and the way in which it is applied, will be analysed. From this threefold analysis, 
depending on the studies’ relative success at producing insight on goal ambiguity, a way of 
doing research will be inferred. From the content of the results on goal ambiguity, the themes 
that need researching will be inferred. 
1.3.2 Specific aims  
To be able to meet the stated objective, the following sub-questions need to be answered: 
1. What is the state of the art regarding a technology of foolishness?  
2. What is the connection between goal ambiguity and a technology of foolishness, and 
what kind of insights on goal ambiguity could be put to use within the frame of a 
technology of foolishness?  
3. What can we take to constitute the garbage can research programme? 
4. Did such a programme produce insights on goal ambiguity through the application of 
the theory to empirical data?  
                                                
11 Feldman and March (1981) illustrate this point by proving that decision makers often collect information but 
do not use it in the process of making the decision. The information serves as a symbol for the fact that a person 
is an intelligent decision maker.  




5. Did studies that apply the theory empirically, but have been conducted in a way that is 
independent of the garbage can research programme, produce insights on goal 
ambiguity? 
6. With reference to questions five and six – what is the dominant character of these 
studies, or applications?  
7. With reference to question six – based on the case studies, their results and the nature 
of the garbage can theory, can we deduce research methods and themes that are either 
more or less likely to produce the sought after insights? 
1.3.3 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter two is a detailed discussion on a TOF, and makes a more in- depth, structured 
argument for why such a technology is needed.  Regarding to the aims listed above, questions 
one and two will be answered. 
Chapter three centres around the garbage can research programme. It aims to determine 
which publications to include in the programme. Furthermore, it aims to analyse the case 
studies and evaluate the insights produced. Answers to questions three and four, as well as a 
partial answer to question six, will be provided. 
Chapter four sees the aggregation of insights produced by applications that were done 
independently of the garbage can research programme. Question five, and the outstanding 
part of question six will receive attention.  
Chapter five will present the conclusions and the contributions of the research. 
1.4 Research design and methodology 
1.4.1 Research design 
To develop a prescription for research on goal ambiguity case studies that apply the verbally 
formulated garbage can theory, will be scrutinised and analysed according to their theoretical 
frameworks, the nature of the data, and the nature of the analysis. The Poole and Van de Ven 
(2010) distinction between process theories and variance theories of decision making will be 
brought to bear on the data. Thus, all case studies on organisational decision making which 
apply the garbage can theory form the target population of the study.  
The following discussion addresses the choices that shaped the research design.   




1.4.1.1 The first choice – using data that the garbage can theory is applied to 
The argument for incorporating the garbage can theory 
The garbage can theory (GCT) was identified as being in line with the raison d’être of the 
TOF. Firstly, the model was developed to describe decision making within organisations that 
could be described as organised anarchies. The notion of organised anarchies has an affinity 
with goal ambiguity as these are organisations, or parts thereof, that exhibit the following 
characteristics at least part of the time: 1) the participation by decision makers is fluid, 2) the 
goals are ambiguous and 3) the technology with which goals are to be achieved is unclear 
Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972: 1). Based on this premise alone, it could be argued that the 
GCT should, theoretically, be able to describe decision making in such terms that insight on 
goal ambiguity stands to be gained through its application. This inference is supported by 
Moch and Pondy via their statement that the GCT could be taken to predict that when goals 
are ambiguous, decisions will be made while preferences are constructed after the fact (1977: 
355).  
Secondly, by incorporating this specific theory into the study, a significant research 
programme within the literature on organisations and, more specifically, organisational 
decision making, is being drawn from. The garbage can has been described as “the mainstay 
of the literature on organisational decision making” between the 1970’s and the 1990’s 
(Levitt and Nass, 1989: 190). The original GCT is immensely influential within multiple 
disciplines such as political science and institutional theory (Bendor et al., 2001: 169). The 
studies by March and Olsen that are compiled in Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations 
(1976a), and that have built on the original model, are seen as the first sustained post-
modernist study of organisations (Perrow, 1986: 137-138). In a major study on approaches 
toward studying decision making at the top of organisations, Hickson (1987) identified the 
model as one of three main theories on high level decision making in organisations.  
The reader might question the effectiveness or legitimacy of testing for only one of the 
attributes that the theory sets out to describe. However, it is very unlikely that a single study 
could cover all of the relationships in a situation as it is described by a specific theory (Black, 
1999: 7). Events are usually too complex. Many studies therefore test for limited subsets of a 
body of theoretical propositions (Black, 1999:19). The decision to only evaluate for insights 
on goal ambiguity is thus not only plausible, but also conducive to results of a higher quality.    




It is clear that the GCT forms a large part of the basis of this thesis. It is therefore necessary 
that the GCT, in its original form, be discussed in more depth. It is also necessary to discuss 
the theory because its history and original postulation present certain challenges in terms of 
researching the applications of the theory.  
An introduction to  ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice’ (1972)  
Cohen et al. aim to develop a theory on behavioural decision making that applies to organised 
anarchies (1972: 2). Some organisations, like public and educational organisations, are more 
likely to cultivate decision making processes that reflect this notion, however the authors 
claim that most organisations are organised anarchies some of the time (1972: 1).  
Organised anarchies are characterised by three properties: problematic preferences, unclear 
technology and fluid participation (1972: 1). When the authors elaborate on the first 
characteristic it becomes clear that “problematic” includes preferences that are not properly 
defined, that are inconsistent12 and that are discovered after action has already taken place. 
Unclear technology is explained as referring to a poor understanding of the means-ends 
relations within the organisation’s processes.  
In order for behavioural theories to accommodate this phenomenon, the authors propose 
investigating the manner in which organisations make decisions without consistent, shared 
goals. (1972: 2). They recognise that organised anarchies imply shifts in normative theory, 
however their attempt is focused at describing decisions as they take place in anarchic 
situations (1972: 2). 
The authors claim that decisions are fundamentally ambiguous (1972: 2). This is motivated 
by stating that organisations provide opportunities through which members of the 
organisation arrive at an interpretation of what they are doing (1972: 2). From this, the 
authors seem to logically deduce that an organisation can be viewed as a collection of choices 
looking for problems, issues looking for decision situations and solutions looking for issues 
to address. Essentially, the decision situation is as a garbage can into which decision makers 
dump problems and solutions. The specific combination in a can at any point in time is 
dependent on the availibility of other cans at the same point in time. However, decision 
makers first have to recognise other cans (1972: 2-3). 
                                                
12 It is not clear whether the authors are referring to inconsistency over time or amongst different members or 
units of an organisation.   




The authors claim that the primary proposition of the garbage can model (1972: 2-3) is that a 
decision can be equated to an outcome or an interpretation of independent streams within an 
organisation (1972: 2-3). A stream of problems is made up of concerns of individuals, 
whether they are internal or external to the organisation. Problems are understood to require 
attention. A solution is explained to refer to a product. The example provided is that a 
computer is not only someone’s product but also a solution that is actively looking for a 
problem to address.  The third stream is that of participants in the process. The variations in 
participation are understood to stem from other demands made on the time that participants 
have at their disposal.  Lastly, choice opportunities are the situations in which it is expected 
that the organisation produces behaviour that could be recognised as a decision. 
Appointments that need to be made, budgets that need to be set and contracts that need to be 
developed are all examples (1972: 3). 
The authors construct a computer simulation model based on the basic ideas of the streams 
and their temporal intersections, although the basic idea undergoes some change to 
accommodate the simulation. The stream of choices and the stream of problems intersect with 
a rate at which solutions flow, and a stream of energy from the participants (1972: 3). In the 
case of choices, problems and participants, a fixed amount is assumed. Each problem and 
each choice is characterised by an entry time, whereas each participant is characterised by a 
time series of energy that can be spent on organisational decision making. As for the rate at 
which solutions flow, a solution coefficient is specified for every time period which operates 
on the potential decision energies to determine problem solving output (1972: 3).  
These variables are then related to each other via certain organisational structures, namely the 
decision structure and the access structure. The former specifies which participants have 
access to which choices, whereas the latter reflects problems’ access to choices.  As a result, 
each choice is also characterised by who can take part, and each problem, in turn, is 
characterised by a set of choices to which it has access (1971: 3-4). The last characteristic to 
note is that each of the fixed number of problems, in addition to being defined in terms of an 
entry time and an access structure, is also understood to require a certain amount of energy to 
be solved (1972: 3-4). Thus the concept of energy is conspicuous in the computer simulation, 
as no mention of it is made in section on the ideas on which the simulation builds.    
For the simulation to work, three additional assumptions are built in. The additivity of energy 
requirements within every choice situation is assumed. The authers also conceive of ways in 




which energy (or participants) is allocated to the different choice situations and the way in 
which problems are attached to choice situations (1972: 4). The authors ran the simulation, 
under different kinds of decision and access structures, as well as different variations in 
energy distribution (1972: 4-8).  
Results, implications & conclusions 
The authors decided to test for different decision styles, problem activity, problem latency, 
the decision maker activity and, finally, the decision difficulty (1972: 8). In summary, how 
they conceived of these performance indicators looks like this (1972: 8-9):  
• A decision is made by resolution, when a choice situation resolves a problem, by 
oversight, when a choice is made quickly and no problem is solved, or by flight, when 
a choice does not resolve a problem and original problems have moved on to other 
choice situations..  
• Problem activity is measured by the total number of time periods that a problem is 
active and attached to some choices, summed over all problems. This reflects the 
degree of conflict in the organisation.  
• Problem latency is measured by the total number of periods during which a problem is 
active, but not attached to a choice, summed over all the problems.  This indicates the 
extent to which problems are recognised and addressed through choice.  
• Decision maker activity is presented by the total amount of times a decision maker 
shifts from one choice to another. This is significant as it reflects decision maker 
energy expenditure, movement and persistence. Decision difficulty is simply 
measured by the total number of periods that a choice is active  
Based on 324 simulated situations, Cohen et al. find that (1972: 9-11):  
• Decisions are mostly made via oversight and flight. Resolution rarely takes place.. 
• Important problems are more likely to be solved than unimportant ones. 
• Important decisions are less likely to resolve problems. 
• Choice failures that do occur are situated among the most important and the least 
important choices. 
• The process is sensitive to variation in energy load.  
• Specific decision makers and problems track each other through choices  




The process is sharply interactive (in that the nature of both the access structure and the 
decision structure impact the outcomes). The major feature of the garbage can process is the 
partial uncoupling of problems and choices (Cohen et al., 1972: 16). Viewing processes as 
garbage can-like is potentially beneficial as it could lead to a deeper understanding of the 
organisational decision making processes. Organisational design and efforts to engineer for 
good decision making could take the existence of garbage can processes into account, so that 
these processes may be managed, albeit only to a certain extent (Cohen et al.,1972: 17).  
Now that the garbage can theory’s suggestion are clear, and the reasons for incorporating this 
specific theory into this attempt are clear, what is meant by using a certain version of the 
theory needs to be explained.  
1.4.1.2 The second choice – the verbal formulation of the theory 
As may be deduced from the discussion on the garbage can theory, there is a distinction 
between the formulation of the ideas that precede the construction of the simulation model, 
and the simulation model itself. Bendor et al. express this difference as one version being the 
verbal theory or informal theory and the other being the formal model deduced from the 
(verbal) theory (2001: 170). The authors of the original article refer to “The Basic Ideas” 
(Cohen et al., 1972: 2) and “The Garbage Can” (Cohen et al., 1972: 3), where the former 
presents the content on what Bendor et al. understand to be the verbal theory and the latter 
discusses the computer simulation model. Cohen et al. use the term ‘theory’ when they 
discuss their basic ideas (1972: 2). The term model is used numerous times in their discussion 
on the computer simulation (1972: 3 - 4). These two sets of authors seem to present the 
distinction in a very similar way.  
Bendor et al. go further in explicating that the verbal formulation should be treated as the 
fundamental theory and that the computer simulation should be treated as the model derived 
from the verbal theory (2001:170)13. They also argue that although the formal computer 
simulation is the theory’s testable scientific core, it is not in keeping with the basic ideas or 
the verbal formulation of the theory (2001: 169). For them it is clear that the verbal 
formulation of the theory does not exhibit relationships between components that are rigorous 
enough to be tested for formally (2001: 170). 
                                                
13 The sharp distinction as well as the verbal theory being fundamental is supported by Anderson and Fischer 
(1986).  




A problem presents itself in that other authors have not illustrated the same understanding 
when it comes to the distinction between theory and model. For example Levitt and Nass 
(1989: 190),  Weiner (2007:873), Mucciaroni (1992: 489), Lipson (2007: 79) use the term 
‘model’ to refer to the verbal formulation of the theory. Others such as Dorta-Velazquez, De 
Leon-Ledesma and Perez-Rodriguez (2010: 24) and Pinfield (1986: 366) refer to the verbal 
theory as the anarchic perspective or anarchy theory. A third group refers to the verbal 
formulation as a metaphor (eg. Styhre, Wikmalm, Olilla and Roth, 2010: 137).  
‘Garbage can theory’ should here be taken to refer to the verbal formulation of the theory, as 
Bendor et al. (2001) distinguishes it.  
Additionally, as will become clear, others have not shared Bendor et al.’s sentiment that the 
verbal formulation hasn’t enough rigour to be imposed onto data and tested for. Indeed, case 
studies that have applied the garbage can theory in its verbal form, form the empirical basis 
of this thesis. Case studies that apply the garbage can theory, as opposed to the garbage can 
computer simulation model14, are precisely what present the opportunity to harvest secondary 
data for insights on goal ambiguity. This is the case because goal ambiguity does not feature 
in the simulated model.  
The reasons for limiting the scope to studies that involve empirical data on cases of decision 
making in organisations will now be addressed. 
1.4.1.3 The third choice – case studies  
Empirical studies15, and more specifically case studies, are evaluated for three reasons. These 
reasons relate to the normative-descriptive distinction between theories on decision making, 
and to the particular phenomenon which needs to be understood.  
The difference between normative theories and descriptive theories, and the relationship 
between the two strands, is significant here. The main aim of this thesis is to profile the kind 
of descriptive research that is likely to lead to insights that in turn will give rise to the 
development of a normative theory of choice. In the discussion on the problem, past dialectic 
                                                
14 For studies on and adaptions of the computer simulation see Fioretti and Lomi (2008, 2010); Padget (1980); 
Carley (1986a, 1986b); Anderson and Fischer (1986); Masuch and LaPotin (1989); Warglien and Masuch 
(1996); Takahashi (1997); Wei and Sagaragi (2004); Kaneda and Hattori (2005); Lai (2006); and Inamizu 
(2006).  
15 For conceptual studies within which the garbage can theory is merged with other theories see Das and Teng 
(1999); Ellström (1983); Cray, Inglis and Freeman (2007); Dyckman (1981); and Greene (2001). 




relations between the two strands were discussed. It should thus be clear why succesful 
description can contribute to normative theorising. 
But why should case studies, specifically, contribute to normative theorising? Deriving 
theory from case study research16 is viewed as particularly appropriate in a situation where 
little is known about a phenomenon, as theory building from case studies does not rely on 
voluminous existent literature or prior empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989: 532). Other 
strengths of this approach include the high likelihood of the emerging theory being testable as 
well as valid, as a result of theory-building being so closely tied to empirical evidence 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 547-548). Based on these arguments it is inferred conceptually that case 
studies would be a good way of gaining a certain kind of insight into goal ambiguity. Case 
studies should potentially be able to produce insights that are useful for formulating a novel 
theory. Therefore, the scope of the study is limited to case studies, as opposed to other forms 
of empirical research.   
A second reason for scrutinising case studies is the assertion that ambiguity, and the less 
common forms of order that govern processes where it is present, are best studied by utilising 
data that has been produced through (participant) observation. The subtle characteristics of 
such a choice environment are usually not adequately captured via survey research (Moch 
and Pondy, 1977: 353).  
In summary: a) it is sensible that descriptive accounts of decision making should, to an 
extent, influence normative theories on decision making, b) case studies are good bases when 
attempting to formulate a novel theory that targets a subject on which little is known and c) 
observation is better at capturing phenomena characterised by ambiguity. Taken together, 
these three assertions make case studies the logical focus in terms of data to evaluate when 
developing prescriptions for research. 
How the sample is compiled and how the studies will be analysed, will now be elucidated. 
The preceding discussion on the GCT should illustrate that isolating the studies that rely 
solely on the verbal formulation involves some analysis already – most authors writing on the 
theory do not recognise the difference between the two versions.  
                                                
16 For an account of what the process of building a theory according to this method would constitute, see 
Eisenhardt (1989).   




1.4.2  Research methodology 
The study is in keeping with the behavioral approach to generating knowledge on decision 
making: various cases studies on behavioral decision making in organisations are analysed. A 
largely quantitative approach is adopted in terms of collecting the studies. The instances of 
research that fit into the scope of the study are divided into two sets: those studies produced 
as part of the garbage can research programme and those produced independent of the 
programme. For the first set, the aim was to incorporate all of the studies that fit into the 
scope. Thus, no sampling technique was used, rather the entire population is evaluated.  
Regarding the second set of studies, two approaches to collecting the studies for the sample 
are followed. Firstly, the recent and self-proclaimedly unique critique of the theory and its 
lineage (Bendor et al., 2001) was consulted. Incorporating the studies referred to or made use 
of tin this text, would ensure that the most prominent applications of the GCT are included. 
However, this approach by itself would not suffice, as the authors claim that there have been 
few attempts at empirical application (Bendor et al., 2001: 186). Furthermore, they report that 
the few existing applications are loosely coupled to the theory (Bendor et al, 2001: 186), yet 
they do not provide the reader with a list or even examples of the attempts referred to. The 
only two applications referred to within the study that do not form part of the work 
considered to be part of the garbage can research programme are those of Kingdon (2003) 
and of Sproull, Weiner and Wolf (1978). As a representation is sought after, the first of the 
two is included in the sample. 
The second approach was to make use of a reputable database, or citation index. The 
Thomson Reuters Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) database was selected. The SSCI 
includes articles from 3000 journals with the highest ISI17 ratings, and that are representative 
of 50 fields within the social sciences (Thomson Reuters, 2013). The rationale behind the 
choice comes down to Thomson Reuters, after acquiring ISI in 1992, being the authoritative 
institution in terms of the impact ranking of academic journals. Klein and Chiang verbalise 
ISI, and therefore Thomson Reuters’ prominence: “ISI is the only serious producer of citation 
data, so the term “citations” is synonymous with citations as recorded by ISI in its various 
products (such as SSCI)” (2004: 134). 
                                                
17 ‘ISI” stands for Institute of Scientific Information. This was the name of the company that pioneered the idea 
of rating and measuring an academic text’s impact by using the number of times an article is cited. The acronym 
ISI has become synonymous with impact rating despite ISI having been sold to Thomson in 1992 (Klein and 
Chiang, 2004: 134). 




The SSCI was searched for articles that would fit within the identified scope. The search was 
conducted for the period between January 1973 and and August 2012. The phrase ‘garbage 
can’ had to feature in the title of the article. ‘Garbage can’ is used so as to allow for studies in 
which both ‘garbage can model’ and ‘garbage can theory’ are used.  It was shown earlier that 
both terms and even others such as ‘garbage can paradigm’ or ‘garbage can metaphor’ could 
refer to the same set of ideas. The phrase had to feature in the title as this serves as strong 
indication that the GCT played a prominent role in analysing and interpreting the data. The 
scope requires that the GCT gives structure to the data, or that the validity of the theory be 
commented on in the conclusions. 
The search produces thirty articles, ten of which fit within the scope. The remaining articles 
are left out for different reasons: some do not relate to decision making in organisations, 
some utilise the computer simmulated model, some engage with the GCT on a conceptual 
level18. The twelve studies that were found, along with the work by Kingdon (2003) 
constitute the sample analysed in chapter four.    
Of course, sourcing the sample from the SSCI is not a perfect strategy. The SSCI has been 
critisised for being biased towards articles that are published in English (Archambault, 
Vignola-gane, Cote, Lariviere and Gingras, 2006: 329) and for eschewing some of which is 
important within a specific field by strict (and even arbitrary) compartementalisation of what 
belongs within a given field (Davis, 1998: 61). The latter of the two points of cririque is less 
significant for the current attempt since all of the fields were covered in the search.  The first 
point of critique would translate to the study ignoring articles that could possibly be relevant, 
but were not written in English.  
This risk of the sample being biased towards English articles is relatively small, compared to 
the risk implied in alternative strategies. Using an online search engine, for example, was also 
considered. Since search engines are more dynamic and consistent of more variables, it is 
highly likely that the same search parameters would start delivering different results. Also 
search engines can produce a vast array of journals, without weighting them against a quality 
indicator, such as ISI-rating.  
                                                
18 The studies by Bitektine (2009) and Larsen (2001), for example, utilise the theory as an evolutionary process 
theory in an attempt to explain trends, or “fads”, in social and management research, respectively. The fourth 
article that does not fit the scope of the thesis relates the garbage can theory to changes that take place within 
tourist destination trends in Switzerland (Beritelli and Reinhold, 2009).   




Using specific journals is an option often executed in studies that come down to meta-
research. The nature of the GCT renders this strategy unsuitable. Not even the journals in 
which prominent articles on the garbage can were published have published a substantive 
amount on the theory. The Administrative Science Quarterly, for example, published only 6 
studies in the period between the start of 1973 and the end of 2012 in which the phrase 
‘garbage can’ features in the abstract of the article. The American Political Science Review 
delivers only two studies if all of the same search parameters are used. The nature of the GCT 
leads to applications in a wide variety of organisations, processes and academic fields.  The 
applications of the theory is spread across a range of journals.  
The dual strategy followed lead to a sample consisting of highly ranked papers, that represent 
a range of fields and that includes the seminal application by Kingdon (2003). 
Not only the compilation of the data, but also the approach towards analysing the data, 
determines the outcome of the study. A discussion on different theoretical perspectives as 
well as on different types of study, will precede the presentation of the data (in chapter three).  
Apart from these classifications, another important distinction is made. Whether the garbage 
can theory is applied as a process theory of decision making or a variance theory of decision 
making is a fact that may disclose reasons for its performance in terms of goal ambiguity. 
This distinction, as it is less familiar and has not yet been put in the same context as the 
garbage can theory will now be discussed. The distinction serves as a conceptual tool with 
which the data is analysed.  
1.4.2.1 Different theories on decision making within organisations19 
The most essential difference between process and variance theories is the respective notions 
of causation that underlie them (Poole and Van de Ven, 2010: 546-547). The entire 
discussion on the distinction eminates from work done by Poole and Van de Ven (2010). 
Variance theories explain the change from one situation to the next in terms of the relation(s) 
between elements, or variables, that represent the attributes of the subject of analysis. In 
contrast, process theories explain how the sequence of events brings about a certain outcome. 
In the case of variance theories, the extent to which results may be generalised depends on 
                                                
19 The purpose of this sub-subsection is in no way to provide the reader with an exhaustive typology of theories 
within the field of organisational decision making. Such a typology would include a discussion of the 
differences between macro and micro theories, and structure and process theories, for example. Such an 
overview is provided by Nutt (2010). The purpose here is simply to elaborate on a distinction that is currently 
relevant .  




the ability of the theory to be applied, across the board, in a uniform way. In the case of 
process theories, the explanations offered by the theory become more general as the theory 
becomes more versatile.  
Regarding causation, the essentialist concept of causation typically applies to variance 
theories. This means that proving causation requires showing that the independent variables 
are both necessary and sufficient conditions for an effect to occur in the dependent 
variable(s). In other words: x fully causes y. The probabilistic notion of causation, on the 
other hand, rejects an essentialist view, as it is perceived to be unrealistic. Probabilistic 
causation requires an independent variable to probably cause a certain effect in the dependent 
variable. In other words: x probably, amongst other factors, causes y (Poole 2010: 544-549).   
The temporal order of events is a key driver within process theories; efficient causality does 
play a role but is less important. The decision is thus understood to be comprised of a series 
of micro-level events, or actions, that are organised into macro-level events, or phases. 
Traditionally, the particular decision under study is explained in terms of the theoretical 
narrative that consists of phases that denote the necessary and specific progression through 
which a high quality decision will be made. Effectiveness is measured by adherence to the 
sequence. Process theories provide explanations that are necessary, although not sufficient 
and these explanations can only be tested for after a process has been completed. Ultimately, 
the goal of process theory might be summarised as the description and explanation of 
underlying narratives, by making use of systematic observations and analysis. Establishing 
narrative models is reported to require different reasoning and evidence than variable based 
research, although both quantitative and qualitative approaches may be used in process 
research (Poole and Van de Ven, 2010: 576-577).     
Based on the discussion in the preceding paragraph and the one on the garbage can theory in 
section 1.4.1.1, there is a strong resemblance between the postulations of the garbage can 
theory and those of process theories. Poole and Van de Ven do not refer to the garbage can 
theory as an example of a process theory. However, despite the garbage can being a 
descriptive theory with no normative implications,  it is in keeping with the idea of process 
theories as temporal order is the most important form of order within the garbage can. 
Furthermore, the way in which process theories are reported to be developed and utilised20 
matches the history of the original garbage can theory and some of the first applications 
                                                
 




thereof. Process theories are often derived from observations, but are also utilised as 
hypotheses regarding change in organisations (Poole et al. 2000: 115-117) 
The proposition that the garbage can theory could be seen as a process theory of choice is 
supported indirectly by Pinfield when he claims that the garbage can theory advocates that 
the best way of understanding organisational decision making is not to study the outcomes, 
and that processes are at least as important as outcomes (1986: 367-368). The proposition is 
supported more directly by Moch and Pondy. They state that the foremost compilation of 
case studies that relate to the garbage can theory, Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations 
(1976a), will be of interest to those who advocate the decision process school of thought. 
Moch and Pondy also assert that as a result of the theory’s broad conceptualisation of choice, 
scholars across a broad spectrum of fields would be interested in its application (1977: 351). 
Being widely applicable is one of the strengths of a process theory, according to Poole and 
Van de Ven (2010: 576).    
1.4.2.2 Motivation for and tensions around classification 
The purpose of classifying the respective studies according to the research approach and 
whether the garbage can is being utilised as a process theory or a variance theory is simple: it 
needs to be determined whether studies that have produced insights on goal ambiguity have 
design characteristics in common. Through determining whether there exists a pattern 
amongst studies that produce the sought-after insights, suggestions may be made regarding 
productive future research on goal ambiguity. The opposite notion also applies, in that a 
pattern amongst studies that did not deliver insights on goal ambiguity may by implication 
indicate directions not to pursue in future research. The aim is to use the results of past 
studies to identify ways in which goal ambiguity might be studied in future.  
These classifications are not simple to execute. This is due to researchers often combining 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. Combinations of different methods of analysis and 
different types of data often result in a study that is difficult to situate within a single 
theoretical frame or perspective (Wilson, 1983: 5). Very close attention has to be paid to the 
data and to the language used by the author, in each case. The author’s terminology may not 
be taken at face value, since theoretical perspectives, and the garbage can theory are 
interpreted in different ways. What each author means by a certain term will be compared 
with discussions on the garbage can theory (in this chapter and in chapter three), the 




discussion on differences between theoretical perspectives and approaches (in chapter three) 
and the distinction between variance and process theories (in this chapter).  
1.5 Conclusion 
This study was designed to be able to contribute to a technology of foolishness by developing 
a prescription for future research on goal ambiguity. Thus: the literature on goal ambiguity 
within organisational decision making is expanded through this attempt. The expansion is of 
such a kind that it should benefit future normative theorising on decision making in 
organisations. 
By exploiting the results of studies that have employed the garbage can theory, conclusions 
reached by evaluating these studies will also contribute to the literature on the garbage can 
theory. By arguing for the reasons as to why the garbage can is either successful or 
unsuccessful in terms of producing insights on goal ambiguity, the study will contribute to 
the way in which research on ambiguous goals within organisations are understood and 
researched. Hereby it will also enhance understanding of actual decision making behaviour.  
A large part of the thesis is dedicated to aggregating and analysisng secondary data. The 
reader might deduce that the contribution of such an effort is limited. Two points need to be 
made in this regard. Firstly, Black argues that considerable original thinking is required when 
testing aspects of already existing theories, finding their limits and contributing towards 
modification (1999: 22). The question posed when analysing the data on organisational 
decision making has not been brought to bear on this specific data before. Secondly, viewing 
the garbage can theory from the perspective of the variance theory/process theory distinction 
has not been done up to this point. By looking at the garbage can from the perspective of goal 
ambiguity and process theories, new knowledge on the garbage can theory can be generated. 
Secondly, relating research that applies the garbage can theory to need for a TOF will 
produce a novel framework for researching goal ambiguity in future. 
Having presented the aims and the design, and before the data is presented and analysed, it is 
necessary to elaborate on the notion of a technology of foolishness. This elaboration will 
provide a clear understanding of why fruitful research on goal ambiguity is necessary.  
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 Chapter 2: A Technology of 
Foolishness: Distinctive 
Character, Origin and Use 
2.1 Introduction 
For the need for an extension on normative theories to be clear, it is necessary to first provide 
an in-depth account of the status quo when it comes to decision engineering, namely rational 
choice theory. After discussing the applications and implications of rational choice, the 
argument for an extended normative theory will made. This will be done by pointing out 
possible applications and a staring point for this additional theory. The starting point is the 
concept of a technology of foolishness (March, 1972). Lastly, empirical research that has 
built on this idea will be discussed.       
The argument being made is not for an alternative normative theory that aims to replace the 
framework of rational choice. It is more useful to assume that different theories of 
organisational decision making are not opposed and that the value of a specific theory’s 
application depends on a) the nature of the situation within the organisation and b) the kind of 
phenomenon that is being studied  (Olsen, 1976a: 82-83). There is also empirical proof that 
people, who are capable of causal reasoning and employing traditionally rational techniques, 
are also capable of operating within a different mode that is not powered by a logic of 
consequence (Sarasvathy, 2001:1). 
The content of this chapter is relevant in two ways. The work discussed at the end of this 
chapter sketches the existing research context within which insights on goal ambiguity – as 
produced by case studies that apply the garbage can theory – could be of use. At the same 
time, without the first part of the chapter the motivation behind the pursuit of such a 
technology remains vague, and not entirely justified.  




2.2 The application and implications of rational choice  
2.2.1 The reach of rational choice: individuals, organisations, society 
The rational framework has become entrenched in the way in which human behaviour is 
perceived. Consequently, it is also entrenched in the formulation of theories on human 
behaviour such as micro-economic models, theories on political decisions, public policy 
formulation and statistics, amongst others (March, 1994: 3-5). The entity acting rationally 
could either be an individual, an organisation, or even a society. It is for this exact reason that 
research which both challenges the assumptions of rational choice theory and is able to put 
forth an alternative will be widely applicable.   
A well-known manifestation of rational choice theory at the individual level is modern 
economic utility theory. According to Loewenstein, within this theoretical framework, it is 
assumed that human beings rationally calculate their maximum utility before deciding on a 
certain course of action. Despite an earlier Benthamite form having been more 
psychologically robust, the way in which the concept of utility has been treated for the largest 
part of the 20th century has culminated in utility being viewed as equivalent to ‘revealed 
preference’. The main insight of this thread of research is that people simply choose what 
they prefer (1999: 315). Thus, knowing his or her preference is a prerequisite for an 
individual to be able to choose.  
Research done over the past few decades has attempted to add new dimensions to the utility 
concept, transforming it into something that once more resembles Bentham’s original idea 
(Loewenstein, 1999: 315-316)21. Despite these recent efforts to account for a more diverse 
range of determinants of utility, human motives that have been codified into utility functions 
and incorporated into economic analysis remain inadequate: they mostly involve 
consumption (Loewenstein, 1999: 335). The implication is that preferences that do not clearly 
pertain to consumption are left out of what is studied when economic decisions are evaluated. 
Within this view, individuals know their preferences, and only preferences of a certain nature 
are taken into account.   
                                                
21 Bentham (1789) did not view consumption to be the only determinant of the experience of utility. In his 
understanding, utility has nine sources, only two of which pertain to consumption: pleasures of sense and 
pleasures of wealth. The other sources include pleasures of skill, self-recommendation, a good name, power, 
piety, benevolence and malevolence.   




There are also theories that address the rationality of organisations. Organisations are 
understood by some – such as Gouldner (1959), Alisson (1971), and Georgiou (1973) – in an 
instrumental way: they are designed to pursue a set of goals and thus act with intent. From 
this perspective, organisations are defined by their preferences, which are expressed in terms 
of clear and consistent shared goals (Giesecke, 1991: 60; Kingdon, 2003: 78; Reed, 2003: 
329-331). Ellström pointed out that others, March and Simon (1958), Thompson (1967) and 
Pfeffer (1981), have elaborated on the theme of these goals being linked to the means of 
achieving them in an unproblematic way (1983: 232-233). Means for achieving 
organisational goals in rationalised procedures include cost-benefit analysis, division of 
labour, job descriptions and evaluation and reward systems (Weick, 1976: 11).  
Most modern theories portray political systems as fulfilling an aggregating function by 
channelling diverse individual and group interests into collective choice (March and Olsen, 
1989: 119). The people who require representation within the political system are individuals 
that have preferences, which are distinct and jointly inconsistent. The political problem is 
therefore to establish a procedure through which scarce resources may be divided between 
members of the population (Sen, 1970; Pattanaik, 1971). Within this aggregative view of a 
political system, political organisations, as instruments of this aggregation, would be 
evaluated in terms of their allocative efficiency relative to the preferences of citizens (1989: 
120). In other words: in order to fulfil their purpose, political organisations a) act rationally 
when they aggregate preferences and distribute resources, as well as b) assume that the 
citizens act rationally, in that they have preferences and do pursue them.    
The idea of rational choice, in all its pervasiveness across entities, has not remained static. 
What it means to act rationally has undergone some change. These changes, as well as their 
relevance to goal ambiguity in organisational decision making and a TOF, will now be 
discussed.              	  
2.2.2 Various conceptions of rationality 
Within the field of organisational decision making, different forms of rationality that have 
been conceived include bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1958; Lindblom, 1959), 
contextual rationality (Long, 1958; Schelling, 1971; Weiner, 1976; Cohen et al., 1972; 
Sproull, Weiner and Wolf, 1978), process rationality (March, 1994), substantive rationality 
(March, 1994), ecological rationality (Gigerenzer, 1999; 2007) and instrumental rationality 
(Over, 2007). Although these ideas differ from that of the original rational choice theory to 




varying degrees, they could still be argued to belong to a group of theories that view a 
decision as the act which connects action to goals that were known and understood prior to 
the act of deciding (March, 1978: 592). Over provides a powerful description that attests to 
the perceived fundamental nature of goal-directedness, regardless of whether or not the 
stance is one of pure or formal rationality: “Beliefs and desires are just those mental states 
that work together to produce action. And action…has to have goals… In fact, if we could 
not identify some successful goal activity in a ‘creature’, we could not call it a living thing at 
all...” (2007: 8).  
A discussion on all the various notions of rationality that have been conceived of and 
researched is not necessary. However, in light of goal ambiguity’s relation to rationality 
being bounded (March and Olsen, 1988: 340; March and Olsen, 1989: 21-52; Weissinger-
Baylon, 1986: 38-40; Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 385-386), a brief elaboration of bounded 
rationality is warranted.   
Herbert Simon’s introduction (1947) of bounded rationality did alter the way decision making 
was understood, albeit to a limited extent. The process through which a decision is reached 
remained the same; however, it was recognised that the decision maker, in situ, experiences 
both cognitive (such as computational and attentional) and informational constraints 
(Tsoukas, 2010: 381). Consequently, decision problems are simplified in reality (Pinfield, 
1986: 365; March, 1987: 591). 
The concept of bounded rationality gave rise to a strand of descriptive and experimental 
research within decision making that focusses on how human beings actually make decisions 
under circumstances of uncertainty (see Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). It was 
suggested that individuals satisfice, rather than maximise, in that they do not choose the best 
option, but instead settle for an option that is good enough (March, 1994: 18-23). Other 
heuristics, or short cuts, are understood to help people reach decisions in terms of their goals, 
in spite of cognitive and informational constraints (Bazerman and Moore, 2009: 4-6; Over, 
2007: 6).  
The theoretical assumption regarding perfect knowledge in terms of possible courses of 
action and related future states is challenged by the literature on forms of bounded rationality, 
however the axiomatic nature of known, pre-existent preference remains intact. Otherwise 
put, the work on bounded rationality still depends on decision making entities wanting to 
reach a certain end state.    




2.2.3 Summary of the treatment of preferences within rational choice 
and bounded rationality 
The way in which preferences, or goals, are portrayed within pure, or formal, and bounded 
rationality has been summarised by March (1978) in an abstract way. The following aspects 
are addressed in his summary (1987: 596):  
• Preferences are viewed as ‘absolute’ in the sense that actions are moral or correct in 
terms of the preference of the specific decision making entity22.  
• Preferences can only be relevant when actions are taken in terms of them.  
• Preferences are stable over time in that by the time the foreseen outcome has been 
realised, the preference that drove the decision would be unchanged.  
• They are consistent – mutually inconsistent preferences cannot be held by one 
decision making entity. 
• Preferences are seen as being precise, in that ambiguity regarding the extent to which 
an outcome would match a certain preference is ignored 
• Preferences are exogenous as they are not influenced by the decision making 
processes which they govern. 
From the discussion in this section it is clear that the idea of rational choice, and its 
implication that behaviour is instrumental, is entrenched in a variety of academic 
perspectives, including economics, management theory, organisation theory and political 
science. Purposeful action is assumed for individuals, organisations and political systems 
alike. And although bounded rationalitty made a big impact on how choice is understood, it 
did not change the way the role of goals within decision making is understood.        
2.3 The need for treating ambiguous goals differently 
2.3.1 Introduction  
Speculations and validation regarding ambiguous goals being a form of intelligent behaviour 
have already been addressed in the introduction. Enough ground has been covered to address 
the possibilities of an additional normative theory in more depth. The way in which different 
entities and different organisational processes might benefit from a theory that embraces goal 
                                                
22 Herbert Simon expressed the same idea by stating that reason is wholly instrumental; it may be viewed as a 
gun for hire in the service of any kind of goal (1983: 7-8). 




ambiguity will now be discussed. These various possible applications are meant to illustrate 
the need for and utility of the theory more vividly.    
The theory that should be developed will ultimately require a different understanding of 
intelligence and rationality. It will be shown that conceptions of rationality within which the 
theory would fit, already exist.  
2.3.2 Ambiguous goals and individual intelligence 
March’s summary of why it could be intelligent to foster ambiguous goals (see section 1.2.2), 
resonates with Loewenstein’s account of the weaknesses of utility theory, which we have 
seen is a specific manifestation of rational choice theory. Based on a study of why people 
partake in mountaineering, Loewenstein (1999) argues for a model of motivation behind 
human behaviour that allows for non-consumption aspects (see section 2.2.1) to be taken into 
account. Mountaineers engage in this activity not because of the thrill or beautiful scenery, 
but because it is a reliable medium through which signalling to others and to oneself – 
regarding identity – can occur (Loewenstein, 1999: 321-325). Similar to the signalling 
motive, mountaineering also provides individuals with the rare opportunity to gain 
perspective and a good understanding of “what they want out of life” (Loewenstein, 1999: 
331). This perspective is purportedly connected to near death experiences or experiencing 
primal fear. This last reason is dubbed “meaning-making” (Loewenstein, 1999: 332). March’s 
point that individuals actively construct preferences as they are aware that goals serve as 
symbols which are interpreted by themselves and others, is strengthened by Lowenstein’s 
account. Thus, if it is assumed that some behaviour is driven by orders that do not rely on 
pre-existent goals, these behaviours would not stand to grow or progress by relying on tools 
based on rational choice. A theory that identifies the actual drivers, and which is geared for 
manipulating these drivers in order for a better outcome to be reached, is needed.    
2.3.3 Ambiguous goals and organisational intelligence 
2.3.3.1 Intelligence redefined within political organisations 
The utilitarian perspective on decision making within political organisations and systems has 
also been criticised. March and Olsen (1984) argue that, despite the idea of utilitarianism 
being widespread within modern approaches toward studying political phenomena, an 
institutionalist model better describes behaviour within this context. Institutionalist theories 
portray a political structure, a concept defined as the “collection of institutions, rules of 




behaviour, norms, roles and physical arrangements, buildings and archives that 
are…invariant in the face of turnover…and resilient to idiosyncratic preferences…of 
individuals” (March and Olsen, 1984: 741). The understanding is that this structure drives 
behaviour. In this view a decision maker seeks to determine what is appropriate, given the 
situation and the way in which the individual sees him or herself, as opposed to determining 
what is optimal, given a certain preference (March and Olsen, 1984:741). 
According to the rational model, political organisations fulfil an aggregative purpose. This 
aggregation comes down to firstly allowing for collective choice and, secondly, facilitating 
the distribution of resources based on this choice. However, political systems could also be 
viewed as made up of integrative processes and, consequently, as comprised of organisations 
that are aimed at integration (March and Olsen, 1989: 117-119).  
Whereas aggregative theories conceive of citizen preferences as mutually inconsistent and 
exogenous to the system, integrative theories see the preferences of members as something 
that is discovered within the system, through deliberation and reasoning aimed at establishing 
general welfare (Mill [1862] 1950; Pateman, 1970; Pitkin, 1981). Theories regarding 
jurisprudence, for example, see institutions as not only aggregating but shaping individual 
preferences, in that they provide opportunities for these preferences to be developed 
(Selznick, 1957).  
An important feature that distinguishes integrative processes from aggregative, or rational, 
ones is the idea of reasoned debate and deliberation as the means through which with a sense 
of the common good is achieved (March and Olsen, 1989: 124). Conflicting preferences are 
treated as a basis for deliberation, rather than a basis for bargaining, and a logic of exchange 
does not apply. A process from which a mutual understanding, trust or sympathy could 
emerge, is presumed (Follet, 1918; Habermas, 1975; March, 1988b). In order to achieve this 
trust or shared preference, activities such as “thought, discussion, debate, education, coercion, 
the exploitation of accumulated social experience encoded in expertise and rules” are 
proposed (March and Olsen, 1989: 126).  It is thus assumed that in the face of ex ante 
disagreement, public discussion and private thought will lead to better ex post solutions than 
solutions reached by exchange in an attempt to serve prior preferences. An integrative 
political process would thus benefit from a normative theory that prescribes guidelines for the 
act of developing goals.  




When evaluating the political institutions in terms of their integrative capacity two issues are 
relevant. First there is the question of whether the process develops the expertise involved in 
elaborating on the meaning of goals and deliberating on tensions so that shared understanding 
may be achieved. This competence has both technical elements and elements that pertain to 
‘wisdom’, or an understanding of the community’s needs (March and Olsen, 1998: 127-128). 
More specifically, occasions where deliberation does or does not help, in terms of 
clarification and finding suitable alternatives, need to be considered (Taylor, 1984; 
Stinchcombe, 1990). The second question pertains to integrity: does the process ensure that 
citizens act in accordance with the common good, as opposed to being corrupted by their 
personal preferences (March and Olsen, 1989: 128). Integrity could stem from organisational 
arrangements that work towards accountability, as well as training and personal commitment 
(Friedrich, 1940; Finer 1941).  
From this discussion it is clear that the assumptions that underlie integrative theories on 
political systems and political organisations, as well as the ideas of how integrative processes 
are evaluated, validate the use of a normative theory that does not assume the pre-existence of 
goals. By validating the use of such a theory, it validates the need for research on goal 
ambiguity. 
2.3.3.2 Intelligence redefined within profit-driven organisations 
In a 1997 study aimed at determining whether entrepreneurs think in a distinct way, 
Sarasvathy found that successful entrepreneurs have the ability to act without depending on a 
pre-existent goal. The author brands the reasoning that precedes action, but does not depend 
on goals, as “effectual reasoning” (2001: 1). Effectual reasoning stands in contrast to causal 
reasoning or, rational thinking. The author states that the latter begins with the presupposition 
of a pre-determined goal, and seeks to identify the best way to achieve this end. Effectual 
reasoning, on the other hand, begins with a set of means “and allows goals to emerge…over 
time” (2001: 1). This emergence is understood to relate to the varied imagination and 
aspirations of entrepreneurs. Effectual thinkers are explained, metaphorically, to be explorers 
setting out to discover unchartered spaces and creating the future rather than trying to 
accurately predict what will happen (2001: 1). The author is clear on the fact that successful 
entrepreneurs are capable of both effectual and rational, or causal, thinking. Effectual 
reasoning is given precedence in the early phases of a venture, and most entrepreneurs 
struggle to switch from the initial effectual mode to the “first wave” of causal reasoning 
(2001: 1).    




It could thus be argued that ‘start-ups’, or entrepreneurial ventures, would benefit from 
research on goal ambiguity that would produce a new normative theory.         
2.3.3.3 Intelligence redefined within educational organisations 
In 1974, Cohen and March put forward an argument for an alternative approach to viewing 
decision engineering in educational organisations. They explained that the leadership in 
universities is confronted by four kinds of fundemental ambiguity, the first of which is 
ambiguity of purpose. They elaborate on this notion by stating that both the terms in which 
action may be justified and the goals of the organisation are unclear. Goals are unclear due to 
the need for them to phrased in a general way. This, in turn, is so that they may gain wide 
acceptance within the organisation (1974: 195-196).    
When purpose is characterised by ambiguity, utlising rational choice theories become 
problematic (Cohen and March, 1974: 195). The importance of utilising rational choice tools 
under different circumstances is recognised, however techniques that involve discovering 
“real” goals, by observing behaviour, have also proven to be largely inefficient. The reasons 
that are offered for the failure of these approaches include producing inadequate answers as 
to whether the goal is uniquely consistent with the behaviour, and whether a goal inferred 
from past behaviour is still useful in predicting behaviour in the future (Cohen and March, 
1974: 196).             
The basic argument is that too often a model of intent is imposed on organisations that act in 
another way (Cohen and March, 1974: 197). It is therefore necessary to develop a perspective 
that may provide guidance to leaders within “ambiguous organisations” (Cohen and March, 
1974: 203). These findings are supported in a more recent publication on the different forms 
of educational organisation, in which the author argues that in the situations that are best 
described by an ‘anarchistic model’23 (Ellström, 1983: 234), theories that incorporate play 
and foolishness are necessary (Ellström, 1983: 237). This model would be useful in 
circumstances where goals are unclear or cause disagreement (1983: 237).      
From this it follows that educational organisations are in need of a normative theory that does 
not presuppose the existence of clear goals, and that they would therefore benefit from 
research on goal ambiguity that is able to produce this theory.  
                                                
23 The three notions that constitute this anarchistic model are those of organised anarchies (for which Cohen et 
al., 1972 as well as Cohen and March, 1974 are cited), garbage cans (à la Cohen et al., 1972) and loosely 
coupled systems as Weick conceived of them in 1976.   




2.3.3.4 Intelligence redefined in order to enable organisational change, 
organisational learning and information sharing 
Specific processes in organisations can be discussed to show, in a concrete way, that a new 
normative theory could make a difference. Organisational change, as one example, is best 
enabled when rational processes, such as long-term planning and cost-benefit analysis, are 
supplemented by processes that do not comprise a forward-looking logic. Any innovative 
actions are bound to be perceived as involving high risk when analysed with expected value 
calculations. This means that introducing new ideas at a rate which is sufficient to sustain the 
organisation, becomes a problem (March, 1981: 572). The introduction of new ideas is more 
likely to be fruitful when other ways of evaluating the change can, in a sense, protect new 
ideas from rational cynicism. Fostering goal ambiguity may lead to additional evaluative 
forms, because the perception of the reliability of rational processes decreases when it is 
recognised that goals are ambiguous. This recognition will allow for action to be taken 
without the aid of rational calculation (March, 1981: 572-574). 
Another process that may be improved by a normative theory that embraces goal ambiguity is 
learning. The idea of rational choice implies a certain kind of learning within organisations. 
This idea describes preferences, the behaviour of individuals, organisational choices and 
environmental responses as forming a closed cycle of connections: each element causing 
some form of change in the next (March and Olsen, 1988: 337). However, research has 
shown that these linkages are often not how learning takes place (March and Olsen, 1988: 
340). One example of how behaviour deviates from the rational learning cycle can be seen in 
the ways in which different individuals develop different interpretations of a common 
experience (March and Olsen, 1988: 343). Another factor that impacts the cycle is decision 
makers’ ability to hold an abundance of preferences at the same time: which of these 
preferences are viewed as being most important at a certain point in time determines the 
lesson (March and Olsen, 1988: 345). The authors themselves explicate that a theory that 
recognises the ambiguity faced by decision making entities, will be of use to those wanting to 
engineer for learning (March and Olsen, 1988: 357).   
The third example deals with the function of communication in organisations. Most 
treatments assume that for choices to be executed rationally, the relevant, most accurate 
information needs to be shared effectively. The sender must fully comprehend the message 
and then transmit the message with great precision (March, 1988a: 400). However, where 
preferences are ambiguous, selecting the information contained in a message is more 




difficult. Decision makers do not know what they will have to know (March and Sevon, 
1988: 435). In such a situation, information gathering may be significant both as an 
investment, the future pay-offs of which are uncertain, and as an aid in the process of 
defining preferences (March, 1988a: 400). 
From the three arguments above it follows that theories on the engineering of change, 
learning and communication could benefit from research on goal ambiguity. This research 
would have to be conducted in such a way that goal ambiguity is understood to the extent that 
normative theorising becomes possible.   
2.3.4 Appropriate conceptions of rationality 
 If one can accept goal ambiguity, as exhibited by individuals and a range of different kinds 
of organisations, as an indication of intelligence, it means that rationality could be conceived 
of in a less narrow way. Of course the acceptance is not encouraged blindly, but rests on 
behavioural evidence and viable speculation on why individuals and organisations need to 
foster ambiguous goals under certain circumstances.   
Indeed, notions of rationality that do not presuppose the existence of (consistent) goals have 
been developed as the result of behavioural research (March, 1978: 592-593). Adaptive 
rationality (Cyert and March, 1963; Day and Groves, 1975) emphasises experiential learning 
and thus focusses on backward looking reasoning. Posterior rationality (Hirschman, 1967; 
Weick, 1969; March, 1972) views the discovery of intentions as an interpretation of action, 
rather than something which is conceived of or exists prior to action being taken. When 
trying to engineer for decisions based on these forms of rationality, the majority of existing 
tools are rendered useless. Traditional tools rely on calculation and pre-existent preferences, 
whereas these notions of rationality do not (March, 1987: 593). It is clear that a normative 
theory on goal ambiguity, especially those aspects that pertain to the post hoc inference of 
goals, would enhance posterior rationality.  
2.3.5 Summary 
It is clear that a wide range of organisations would be able to put a normative theory that does 
not assume the pre-existence of clear goals to good use. It also becomes more reasonable to 
accept, since it is clear that such a theory could potentially impact processes that are key in 
most organisations: innovative processes, learning processes and communicative processes. 
However, such a theory can only be developed once a rich volume of valid insights into goal 




ambiguity have been achieved. Once research that grows these insights has been done, the 
knowledge produced would fit in with existing forms of rationality, such as posterior 
rationality.  
It is now necessary to discuss existing attempts at building an extended normative theory of 
organisational decision making. Through this discussion it will become clear that this thesis is 
not isolated or removed from academic development. The discussion will also produce 
themes that have been developed and that need to be researched in more depth.            
2.4 Starting point of a new theory 
March’s idea of a technology of foolishness (TOF) is a good framework from which to 
develop a normative theory accepting of goal ambiguity. The argument around this point was 
presented in the introduction chapter. The TOF will now be discussed in more depth, so as to 
achieve a better idea of the research that is needed. Research that has followed from a TOF 
will also be discussed. Finally, themes that need to be researched will be identified from the 
existing attempt, so as to enable a convergence of research energy. 
2.4.1 A technology of foolishness explained 
We have already seen (section 1.2.3) that a TOF, as conceived of by March (1972), would 
embrace goal ambiguity and would, amongst other things, induce action that is independent 
of a rational thought process. The need for a TOF has been discussed in the preceding 
sections of this chapter. The focus now falls on what exactly March means when he refers to 
a TOF. 
Two themes could be said to form the backbone of the idea. The first theme is that of sensible 
foolishness. Multiple foolish options are available. Consequently, a decision making entity 
needs ways of determining which of the foolish options could lead to the creation of 
worthwhile, or as March calls them, ‘interesting’ goals. March goes on to suggest three ways 
of coming across sensible foolish options (1972: 422-424):  
• Imitation; where or who to imitate is important to establish.  
• Coercion; circumstances suited to ethically acceptable coercion need to be specified. 
• Rationalisation, which takes place retrospectively; where and when it is appropriate to 
test for the feasibility of goals needs to be determined.   




March argues that after having sufficiently challenged the primacy of pre-existent goals, 
imitation, coercion and rationalisation would seem less problematic or undesirable (1972: 
424).   
The second important theme is play. This concept is contrasted with reason. Play presents the 
opportunity to adopt an attitude or mode of thinking that is conducive to experimentation and 
the relaxation of the assumptions of a rational thought process. March defines playfulness as: 
“the deliberate, temporary relaxation of rules in order to explore the possibilities of 
alternative rules” (1972: 425). Play and reason may be behavioural competitors that require 
different mental modes; however, they are functional complements. Not all organisations or 
individuals will be equally competent at both. Thus, the problem is  to establish the optimal 
combination of both styles (1972: 424-425).  
To induce a playful attitude, or to motivate organisations to experiment, March suggests the 
following (1972: 425-428):  
• Goals need to be treated as hypotheses, rather than something which is unmalleable. 
• Intuition needs to be treated as ‘real’, as opposed to being treated as something that 
skews judgement, something that should be ignored and eliminated from the process. 
• Hypocrisy – a situation where actions and verbal formulations are asymmetrical – 
should not be viewed as ethically problematic, but should be treated as a transition. 
• The content of memory needs to be scrutinsed critically as different interpretations of 
how an organisation came to be in a certain position should be explored. This would 
enhance learning.  
A TOF would thus involve guidance regarding which of a great many foolish options are 
relatively worthwhile, as well as consisting of theories, models and tools that centre on how 
to induce “play” in organisations.   
It is advocated here that there are two ways of interpreting the relationship between these 
themes. Firstly, they may be seen as dimensions of a TOF. If this view is adopted, March 
could be understood as suggesting highly abstract courses of action, (imitation, coercion, 
rationalisation), alongside engineering for playful attitudes. In this case, the combination of 
the two would induce acting without having to think rationally. Another way in which 
sensible foolishness and play could relate is that a playful attitude is that which has to be 
adopted when utilising one of the three mentioned courses of action. Play could be seen as 




the attitude than enables the operationalisation of the higher aim of acting before you think, 
achieved through imitation, coercion or engaging in rationalisation. Within this view, the 
frames that help people to adopt this playful attitude are treating goals as hypotheses, etc.  
Regardless of which of the two interpretations is closer to March’s intention, the author’s 
conception of this new technology, as well as his speculations on how theories and models 
that make up the technology may develop, remain highly abstract. In order to establish a 
sense of the practicalities involved in researching goal ambiguity, empirical research that has 
since built on his formulation will be discussed.  
2.4.2 Empirical attempts 
Very few studies that are aimed primarily at contributing towards a TOF exist. When the 
phrase “technology of foolishness” is searched for on the Google Scholar search engine, 
along with the specification that the term must feature in the title of the article, three articles 
are found, two of which overlap in content and have been written by the same authors. This 
search was conducted for the last time on 31 October 2012. Presumably, more research has 
been done on the concept of “serious play” or “serious playfulness” as a feasible strategy 
within organisational context. As this thesis focusses on how to research goal ambiguity in 
such a way that a TOF might be developed, texts that are simply on the topic of play are 
considered to fall outside the scope. The two studies that were found will now be discussed in 
depth..  
2.4.2.1 ‘Toward a Technology of Foolishness: Developing Scenarios through 
Serious Play’ 
Objectives and theoretical concerns 
In this article Jacobs and Statler seek to develop a new conceptual framework for scenario 
planning by incorporating serious play. They argue that this incorporation will transform 
scenario development in such a way that it becomes part of a TOF (2006:79). Traditionally, 
scenario planning is used to address both the ambiguity and the uncertainty which arise due 
to contingencies within the focal organisation’s environment. It is defined as “focussed 
descriptions of fundamentally different futures presented in coherent script-like or narrative 
fashion” (Schoemaker in Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 78). Although scenario planning involves 
conceiving of diverse versions of the world, this is usually done via coherent narratives that 
reduce ambiguity rather than embracing it (Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 79).    




The theoretical work being built on in the process of conducting the research also includes 
the concept of play. It is stated that the motivation for researching play relates to March’s 
speculation around the way in which play relates to foolishness (Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 
80).  
The authors simply present the reader with the concept of a TOF as conceived by March 
(Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 80). The idea of play, on the other hand, is discussed by viewing it 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, as well from the perspective of educational psychology. 
These theoretical frameworks essentially suggest that play is important in terms of 
developing cognitive skills that relate to the creation of meaning, the application of logic, as 
well as social adaption (Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 81). By integrating these perspectives with 
the theory on scenario development the authors arrive at two insights. Firstly, scenario 
planning might be considered a form of play, even though this possibility has not yet been 
explored academically. Secondly, if being good at adopting a playful mode impacts adaptive 
variations, scenario planning that is playful might aid the development of knowledge and skill 
in the organisation (Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 82 - 83).  
 In the process of developing an operationalisation of play within the process of scenario 
planning, the authors report on findings related to play that were produced by studying 
organisations. Roos, Victor and Statler (2004) are credited with conceiving the notion of 
serious play: “a mode of activity that draws on the imagination, integrates cognitive, social 
and emotional dimensions of experience and intentionally brings the emergent benefits of 
play to bear on organisational challenges (Roos, Victor and Statler in Jacobs and Stattler, 
2006: 82). Previous empirical studies have shown that (2006: 83):  
• Playful action on a strategic level is conducive to innovation and the creation of 
meaning. 
•  Utilising dimensional objects and thinking analogically have had positive effects on 
strategic processes.  
The case study 
The authors report on a case study performed in a wireless telecommunications company. 
Due to market changes and a merger with another company, the corporate strategy team of 
the company experienced ambiguity in terms of its post-merger identity, as well as regarding 
its role within the company. In February 2002, the corporate strategy team arranged a two 
day long intervention that would serve the purpose of exploring the company’s identity and 




challenges in relation to the environment and strategic options. The researchers facilitated a 
playful process that included utilising “more than 3000 toy construction materials” (Jacobs 
and Stattler, 2006: 84). Participants constructed models of their organisation, both 
individually and jointly, by using these objects, resulting in mental models being externalised 
to a certain extent (Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 83- 88).  
Conclusions 
Creative interaction and symbolic expression with the physical pieces of the model aided 
understanding of problems. It also facilitated the critical reflection on and change in 
understanding of crucial aspects, such as the company’s brand values. Apart from this 
outcome, participants experienced future scenarios in a multi-dimensional way, thereby 
tapping into kinds of knowledge and sensory experiences that are not usually capitalised on 
during strategic thinking or conversations. This, according to the authors, enhanced the 
experience of ambiguity in the situation (Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 86-87). 
The main conclusion drawn may be summarised as follows: playful activities, utilised within 
a process largely guided by reason, become a space within which adaptive variation can 
emerge. “A modus of intentionality that does not privilege necessary conclusions, 
but…remains…open to emergent possibilities contributed to the effectiveness of this scenario 
planning intervention” (Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 88). 
The authors suggest that the following phenomena be researched so as to enhance the 
understanding of playful processes: the impact of a variety of different media (simulation, 
three dimensional objects, flip charts) on scenario planning; the varying intentional modes – 
from purely rational to foolish – at different stages of the process of developing scenarios; 
whether novel scenarios can, in general, be constructed through serious play; and the 
importance of organisational identity for scenario planning, as what we consider inside and 
outside of ourselves becomes ambiguous during play (Jacobs and Statler, 2006: 88-89).   
2.4.2.2 Reflection on ‘Toward a Technology of Foolishness: Developing 
Scenarios through Serious Play’ 
Despite this thesis not being focussed on the best means and processes for scenario building, 
there are clear implications of this study for the interest in ambiguity in decision making. 




March’s concept relates to the content of the article in that his justification for the need of a 
TOF seems to provide the researchers with a rationale as to why a different approach within 
scenario planning might be fruitful. 
The authors do not explicitly utilise March’s suggestion of keeping foolish behaviour sensible 
by paying heed to imitation, coercion or rationalisation. From the data it is inferred that the 
participants in the study did at one stage engage in rationalisation as they were reconsidering 
the role of their brand value. The brand value which once was held to embody sacred 
objectives they were meant to strive towards, was perceived very differently after participants 
had argued about how it motivates them, but also prevents them from making progress (2006: 
86). Had the authors’ primary objective been to contribute to a TOF, rather than to expand on 
the literature on play or scenario planning, they might have expressed this point themselves.  
Lastly, even though the authors of this article rely on March situating the concept of play 
within his idea of a TOF, they pay no attention to his suggestions regarding how to induce 
play. In a sense, they outsourced the theory and mechanisms around play to psychoanalytical 
and educational psychology perspectives. This strategy seems to have worked, as it provided 
a more detailed and academically grounded framework within which they could interpret the 
data.  
In summary, Jacobs and Statler have contributed to a TOF by showing how an adjusted 
approach towards scenario planning may form part of such a technology. Adjustments 
include:  
• The adoption of a certain modus of intentionality in which necessary conclusions are 
not assumed, thereby allowing for the emergence of possibilities;  
• The use of physical objects during the process of planning;  
• The incorporation of metaphors as aids to understanding problems.   
• The perception and expression of (organisational) identity is impacted and exercised 
during play. 
2.4.2.3 ‘Entrepreneurial logics for a technology of foolishness’ 
Objectives and theoretical concerns 
Sarasvathy and Dew aim to contribute to a TOF by determining the kind of logic is echibited 
by successful entrepreneurs. They seek to contribute as they side with March on the fact that 
ambiguous goals could be considered sensible: “…viewing ambiguity as a necessary cost 




imposed by the information processing attributes of individuals fails to capture the extent to 
which similar styles in preferences would be sensible, even if the human organism were a 
more powerful computational system” (2005: 386).  The aim is to describe the logics that are 
embedded in a means-driven process through which goals are generated (2005: 392). 
The empirical work 
Two separate studies on the behavior of entrepreneurs are synthesised to form the empirical 
data from which the thinking patterns are inferred. Sarasvathy and Dew found that 
entrepreneurs are capable of switching from traditional economic ways of thinking to ways 
that do not adhere to a rational choce framework whatsoever. Indeed they often act in the 
absence of clear goals (2005: 386-387).  Apart from simply presenting this as a descriptive 
argument, the authors also explain that it is being able to act without having clear preferences 
that enables these entrepreneurs to innovate (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005 387). 
The first study (Sarasvathy, 1998) is a protocal analysis of what expert etrepreneurs would do 
to establish a new firm within an existent market (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 388).  This 
study is referred to in section 2.3.3.2. Think out loud verbal protocals were used to develop a 
model that describes entrepreneurial expertise. 27 founders of successful companies, ranging 
in size and residing within different industries were given the same problem set to solve. The 
set consisted of 10 typical decisions (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 388). What resulted was a 
model referred to as effectuation (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 388). The differences between 
effectual thinking and rational thinking were discussed in section 2.3.3.2 and will therefore 
not be discussed in detail here again.  What should be added is that effectuaters typically 
think in terms of affordable losses as opposed to focussing on expected return when it comes 
to financial decisions. Effectual thinking entails being open to surprises instead of avoiding 
them. It emphasises partnerships and pre-commitments over competitive analyses 
(Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 388). 
The second study sought to determine the nature of the strategic action that lead to the 
development of a new firm in a new market. Four threads of technological development – 
that started in 1945 - are analysed historically to produce an understanding of how the RFID 
wireless barcode tags were invented (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 388). Interestingly enough, 
apart from the model of effectual produced by Sarasvathy in 2001, the GCT was also used. 
What emerged from an initial garbage can situation was temporal networks between different 
actors (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 388). The historical data as well as the interviews yielded 




the insight that: “…ambiguity allowed a variety of stateholders to come together in a variety 
of ways” (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 388).       
Conclusions 
Based on the data from the two studies, the authors conclude that entrepreneurs exhibited all 
of the elements of March’s original notion: goals were treated as hypotheses, intuition was 
taken seriously, hypocrisy was tolerated, what memory provided was not treated as the only 
truth, experience was treated as a theory (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 392).    
The entrepreneurs exhibited the tendency to rely on a logic of identity as opposed to a logic 
of preferences. Action was explained in terms of identity, rather than in relation to 
preferences (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 393). This kind of reasoning is reported to work well 
even if action is vaguely related to outcomes, and can be performed without ordering 
preferences (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 393). Expert entrepreneurs are good at bulding and 
sustaining strong identities (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 397). 
Entrepreneurs also followed a logic of action. Sarasvathy and Dew constrasts this with a logic 
of belief (2005: 397).  This means that the subjects relied on “direct action upon the world” 
(Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 398). The tendency is to act and learn, impact and learn from 
what happens, as opposed to investing in determining probabilities and producing accurate 
predictions (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 398).   
Lastly, a logic of commitment is employed, instead of a logic of transaction. Transaction 
implies contract between parties that have pre-existent goals (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 
401). Succesful entrepreneurs do not assume that people they engage with hold pre-existent 
goals. They assume docility on the part of other actors and focus on stakeholders as opposed 
to resources (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005: 401).    
2.4.2.4 Reflection on ‘Entrepreneurial logics for a technology of foolishness’ 
The work by Sarasvathy and Dew builds directly on March’s idea of TOF, and also does so 
explicitly. Of the four ways is which March suggests organisations can experiment, 
Sarasvathy and Dew choose to focus on the statement that goals need to be treated as 
hypothesis.  
The contribure to a TOF by showing that succesful entrepreneurs use a strong sense of 
identity as opposed to a strong sense of what they want, or what their goals are, to make 
decisions. The authors also show that the perception that an infividual can make an impact on 




world exists. This perception leads the world to be viewed less as an externally determined 
entity, the conditions within which need to be predicted. Lastly, entrepreneurs do not assume 
that the people they collaborate with have lear fixed goals. Therefore, flexible commitments 
are favored over contracts. 
These assertions are practical manifestations of how goals can be treated as hypotheses and 
that this behavior is beneficial in a certain context. Sarasvathy and Dew succeed in providing 
some of the first bulding blocks for a TOF. 
2.4.3 Synthesised understanding of a TOF 
After having discussed March’s initial formulation and having incorporated the limited 
research that has been done thus far, the important themes that have emerged and need to be 
researched in more depth can now be inferred. These themes will be used to judge whether an 
insight on goal ambiguity fits within the framework of a TOF. The themes distilled from the 
discussion in this section are: symbolic expressions (such as metaphors), tactile or visual 
experiences, and/or the role of intuition and emotional expression in decision making 
processes, the role of identity (that of the focal decision maker and the people he or she 
cooperates with), the idea of enacting the world.  
2.5 Summary 
It has been argued that there is a need for a normative theory on goal ambiguity, where this 
ambiguity is not sought to be removed, but is to be embraced. What is meant by goal 
ambiguity has been clarified in order to establish an understanding of the phenomenon which 
needs to be researched. The main thrust of the argument is that although ideas of rational 
choice, and therefore the idea of pre-existent goals, pervade social theory, behavioural 
accounts have shown that decision making entities make decisions and take action despite 
goals very often being ambiguous. This finding has sparked speculation as to whether this 
might be intelligent behaviour. Empirical studies have tested for these speculations, with the 
consequence that at least some of them have been confirmed. Despite the way in which 
ambiguity has contributed to new conceptions of rationality, such as posterior rationality, and 
despite there being proof that a need for a TOF exists in many different organisational 
settings, relatively little effort has been invested in researching a TOF and its take on goal 
ambiguity. Until this research has been conducted fruitfully, a fully fledged TOF cannot be 
developed. The limted attempts that exist do provide insight on how to engineer for the 




adoption of playful attitudes and the suspension of traditional consequence-based ways of 
thinking.  
The following themes were found to be a good starting point in terms of research on goal 
ambiguity that is in keeping with a TOF: the role of emotional expression, or intuition; the 
incorporation and exploitation of visual and tactile experience; and symbolic expression as a 
vehicle for conveying multiple meanings; the cultivation of a strong identity as opposed to 
the cultivation of strong goals; the decision maker’s ability to effect the world, or to enact it.  
It is now necessary to systematically account for and analyse the sample of case studies that 
apply the GCT. Through this account, it will be established whether insights that a) pertain to 
goal ambiguity were produced and b) whether they may be related to the dominant themes 
within a technology of foolishness. The answers to these questions will be illuminated in an 
attempt to establish whether the nature of a study and its approach to research, makes it more 
or less likely to produce insight on goal ambiguity. 
 




Chapter 3: In Search of Insight on 
Goal Ambiguity I 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the focus shifts to the pursuit of insight on goal ambiguity that is suited to a 
technology of foolishness (TOF). The necessity of the development of a TOF, and by 
implication the research needed to understand goal ambiguity, was addressed in chapter two. 
The reasons for evaluating case studies in which the garbage can theory (GCT) is applied 
were presented in chapter one. In turn, this chapter will provide a systematic account of case 
studies within which the GCT is applied to organisational decision making. This chapter 
focusses specifically on the studies that form part of work that constitute the garbage can 
research programme (GCRP). Therefore, a second, enabling aim of the chapter is to argue 
and conclude on publications that should be viewed as part of this programme.  
After analysing the studies, their distinct contributions will be aggregated. This aggregation 
will clearly illustrate whether the application of the theory was fruitful in terms of goal 
ambiguity.  
3.2 What constitutes the garbage can research 
programme? 
Bendor et al.’s definition (2001: 185) of what constitutes the GCRP includes: 1) the original 
1972 article, ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice’; 2) Ambiguity and Choice in 
Organisations (1976a); 3) Ambiguity and Command (1986); 4) ‘The New Institutionalism: 
Organisational Factors in Political Life’ (1984);  and 5) Rediscovering Institutions 
(1989).  Leadership and Ambiguity (1974) is not included in the grouping. This section serves 
as a verification of this definition. 
Bendor et al. argue for these specific publications to be viewed as part of this package due to 
the causal relationships between some of these publications. The 1972 article, ‘A Garbage 
Can Model of Organisational Choice’, is argued to have led to the 1976 book on ambiguity 
and choice (2001:169). The same idea applies to the relation between the 1984 article on new 
institutionalism and the 1989 book, Rediscovering Institutions (2001: 169). Rediscovering 




Institutions is also reported to be connected to Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations. 
Firstly, some of the content within Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations features directly 
in Rediscovering Institutions, and, secondly, Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations is said 
to be the most cited publication within Rediscovering Institutions (2001: 185). In addition to 
these quantitative measures, Bendor et al. point towards the thematic thread, namely the 
“juxtaposition of ambiguity and socially constructed order” (2001: 184), running through 
these publications. Despite also referring to the titles of the publications as being a binding 
factor (2001: 184) they do not treat Cohen and March’s 1974 book, Leadership and 
Ambiguity, as part of their grouping.   
To verify the validity of Bendor and his colleagues’ definition, the extent to which all the 
mentioned publications build on the GCT as well as the nature of this dependence was 
studied. Diverse measures, or indicators, are taken into account to produce a granular 
analysis. These indicators include thematic trends, citations and the use of garbage can 
language. As the nature of the publications and their relation to the GCT differ, different 
indicators are important when analysing each of the respective publications. It is more 
complicated to situate the GCT within the two publications on institutionalism.  
By isolating the garbage can’s influence in each of the publications and looking at the 
theoretical body of each publication in its entirety, it may be determined whether viewing 
these publications as garbage can research is, in fact, apt. The publications are dealt with in 
chronological order. 
3.2.1 Leadership and Ambiguity 
It is clear, albeit in a superficial way, that the GCT features in this volume, as terms like 
‘garbage can’ and ‘anarchy’24 are used in the titles and subtitles of some of the chapters. To 
make sure that nothing on the theory has been left out of the study, further assessment of the 
content of the chapters was done to see whether these ideas feature in other chapters. The 
publication has nine chapters, three of which contain these indications of relating to the GCT: 
chapter five, ‘The Process of Choice’; chapter six, ‘The Logic of Choice in American 
Colleges and Universities’; and chapter nine, ‘Leadership in Organised Anarchy’. An in-
depth study of these chapters allows conclusions to be drawn as to whether the volume can be 
labelled garbage can research. 
                                                
24 The relation between the concepts ‘garbage can’ and ‘organised anarchy’ was addressed in the introductory 
chapter.  




Chapter nine has been found not to rely on the GCT for the majority of its arguments and 
content. Within this chapter, the authors discuss four kinds of ambiguity that confront leaders 
– those of purpose, power, experience and success (Cohen and March,1974: 195); extend 
advice on tactical administrative action within an ‘anarchic’ situation; and then go on to 
present and discuss the idea of a TOF. As for the tactical advice, two points relate to the 
GCT: “overload the system” and “provide garbage cans” (Cohen and March,1974: 210-211). 
The third prominent section on a TOF is made up of content that features in an article titled 
‘Model Bias in Social Action’ (March, 1972). Exactly the same content on this topic is also 
presented in chapter 5 of Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations. Apart from the theme of 
post hoc rationalisation, the ideas have nothing in common with the GCT.  
The content of the two remaining chapters deals with the GCT. Chapter five presents exactly 
the same ideas and empirical research as discussed in ‘A Garbage Can Model of 
Organisational Choice’ (Cohen et al., 1972: 17; Cohen and March, 1974: 88-91). The authors 
recognise this to some extent (Cohen and March, 1974: 87). The content of chapter six 
centres on the verbal version of the GCT, and contains the same research presented in chapter 
nine of Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations. It is taken for granted that the particular 
environment being studied, namely American tertiary education organisations, embodies 
organised anarchies, and therefore exhibit garbage can decision processes. The authors then, 
in a sense, extend the GCT by examining the theory’s implications for power, or formal 
authority, as well as less significant decisions, in these settings.  
Based on three measures used by Bendor et al., the direct overlap of content, the title of the 
publication and the theme of socially constructed order25, this publication should have 
qualified to be part of their definition of a GCRP. It has also been recognised elsewhere that 
the work in Leadership and Ambiguity “builds on” that which is reported on in the 1972 
article and that Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations, in turn, is built on Leadership and 
Ambiguity (Moch and Pondy, 1977: 353). However, despite these measures and a perceived 
causal relation contributing positively to the publication’s inclusion, it is argued here that 
other theoretical claims contribute significantly to the content of the publication – as has been 
shown by discussing the content of chapter nine and by showing that the bulk of the content 
does not relate to the GCT. It would therefore be a misnomer to view the publication as a 
whole as garbage can research.    
                                                
25 See chapter nine for examples. 




3.2.2 Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations 
The volume is made up of seventeen chapters, twelve of which each contain a report on a 
case study. To be able to conclude whether the volume, as a whole, can be described as 
garbage can research, all of the chapters that report on case studies have been studied closely. 
The five theoretical chapters are not considered in depth. The main reason for this decision is 
that one of the five, chapter two, presents the same research reported on within ‘A Garbage 
Can Model of Organisational Choice’. It is thus clear that, to some extent, the garbage can 
has been brought to bear on the theoretical section.    
Dyckman found that the volume essentially constitutes an exploration of how non-intentional 
factors lead to actions and outcomes of decision making processes (1981: 292). Moch and 
Pondy agree as they view the content as illustrative of non-rational aspects of organisational 
choice. They also state that the publication, at least in part, serves the purpose of testing for 
the GCT (1977: 351). The same authors view the main themes to be the separation of process 
from outcome, the concept of slack, the determinants of participation, and time dependence 
(Moch and Pondy, 1977: 355). As has been mentioned, Bendor et al. see the juxtaposition of 
socially constructed order and ambiguity as an important theme (2001: 184).   
Ten of the twelve empirical studies reported on in the volume can be said to relate to the 
original version of the GCT in a direct way. A direct relationship refers to one of the 
following three options: 1) the data is structured according to the components of the theory; 
2) the presupposition that organised anarchy reflects the actual environment and/or garbage 
can processes are present underlies, or inspires, the study; 3) both options one and two. Six of 
the ten directly related studies – half of the total number of studies – make use of the GCT by 
imposing the components onto data. The data is mostly qualitative. In these studies, the data 
is ‘read’ through a garbage can lens, transforming it into a body consisting of solutions, 
problems, participants and choice opportunities. These six studies are reported on in chapters 
six (Olsen, 1976a: 82-139), seven (Rommetveit, 1976: 140-155), eight (Kreiner, 1976: 156-
173), eleven (Weiner, 1976: 225-250), fourteen (Olsen, 1976c: 314-337) and sixteen 
(Christensen, 1976: 351-385). The way in which the GCT relates to the two studies presented 
in chapters six and seven, respectively, is somewhat complicated. It is not clear whether the 
data gave rise to the theory, or whether the theory’s descriptive capacity is attested to by the 
data. The results of the study reported on in chapter six were first published by Olsen in 1971. 
It is cited as one of the works that contributed to the GCT being conceived (Cohen, March, 
Olsen, 1972: 2). Yet, at the end of the discussion, Olsen states that this study points towards a 




certain category of choice situations that the GCT is competent at explaining (Olsen, 1976a: 
134). From this it would seem that this study, in an earlier form, contributed to the theory 
being conceived and was then later presented as attesting to the same theory’s descriptive 
capacity. The same applies to research done by Rommetveit (Cohen et al. 1972: 2), which 
was later accounted for in chapter seven of Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations. 
Four other studies, those discussed in chapters nine (Cohen and March, 1976: 174-205), 
twelve (March and Romelaer, 1976: 251-276), thirteen (Olsen, 1976b: 277-313) and 
seventeen (Enderud, 1976: 386-396), also relate to the GCT in a clear way, but are less 
dependent on the theory. These studies use the idea of garbage can decision processes and/or 
the idea of organised anarchy as a presupposition, often one amongst others, in researching 
organisations. One could argue that the results of these studies can be viewed as an expansion 
on the GCT; however the authors do not explicate how the results could be built into the 
original theoretical framework. These findings resonate with those of Moch and Pondy who 
have argued that the theory is not explicitly linked to the case study data in many of the 
chapters (1977: 355).   
In both of the categories discussed above, the theory is married to the context by arguing that 
the empirical situation matches the description of organised anarchy. Some studies emphasise 
one of the three characteristics more than the others. As a result, the concept is not brought to 
bear on the various data sets in exactly the same way.  
On the grounds of ten out of the twelve studies pertaining to the GCT (six of them in a 
pertinent way) and the original 1972 article’s text having been reproduced within the volume, 
it is argued that this volume should qualify as garbage can research. This, however, is not 
argued because of a “causal relationship” between the two publications: 1) less than half of 
the chapters could be seen as building on the original article’s theory in a clear way, an 
assertion supported by Moch and Pondy (1977); and 2) it appears as if the causal influence, 
too an extent, flows from certain content within the 1976 publication to the 1972 article. 
3.2.3 ‘The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life’ 
The various sections within the article, including the problematic elements of modern 
political theories, the institutionalist suggestions in terms of shifting emphases, and, finally, 
suggestions on theoretical development, have been analysed carefully. A close reading of this 
publication is necessary as the GCT’s influence is less immediately visible within the 
publications on institutionalism.  




Of the three ideas that should be incorporated in the way political phenomena and 
organisations are studied, two are dependent on the GCT for their empirical legitimacy. The 
idea of political historical complexity builds on ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organisational 
Choice’ (Cohen et al., 1972) when the authors state that many elements are found interacting 
in unexpected ways – ‘solutions’ look for ‘problems’ (March and Olsen, 1984: 740). 
However, other sources are also cited to substantiate this claim. Ambiguity and Choice in 
Organisations  is cited as empirical proof for the fact that these interactions take place within 
an environment that is not value neutral (March and Olsen, 1984: 740). Furthermore, ‘A 
Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice’ is relied on when it is suggested that within 
this complexity, simultaneity groups different elements together, thereby creating order. The 
authors also present the reader with the idea of a structure that is heavily influential in terms 
of actions and movements within an organisation (1984: 740). They do not cite the original 
article, although it is clear that what they are referring to mirrors the concepts of ‘decision 
structure’ and ‘access structure’  à la Cohen et al. (1972).  
With the third idea, politics as an interpretation of life, the authors challenge the primacy of 
decision outcomes as the sole objective of decision making (1984: 741). The empirical thrust 
for this argument comes from work featured in Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations. This 
research purportedly shows that “pleasure lies in the process” (1984: 741-742). The garbage 
can does not, however, feature in their short account of the way forward when it comes to this 
idea.  
It is argued that of the six forms of institutionalist order that are suggested, the following 
forms were influenced by research done on the GCT: temporal order, normative order and 
symbolic order. This influence is recognised explicitly in one of the three cases.  
It is justified to view the idea of time or simultaneity as a source of order, as a direct 
derivative of the original garbage can article. The following quotations are presented as 
evidence: “Such a view of organisational choice focusses attention on the way the meaning of 
a choice changes over time. It calls attention to the strategic effects of timing, through the 
introduction of choices and problems, the time pattern of available energy and the impact of 
organisational structure” (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972: 2). Also: “The critical element of 
garbage can processes is that there are elements of temporal sorting. Linkages are formed, in 
part, because of simultaneity” (March, 1994: 204). In light of these statements from 
publications produced by the same authors, it is somewhat odd that the garbage can is not 




cited when the authors provide an account of temporal order (1984: 743). Others such as 
Dyckman (1981: 296) and Moch and Pondy (1977: 358) have also understood the garbage 
can’s key trait to be the importance of timing.  
A similar peculiarity is found when evaluating the account of normative order. From the 
description (1984: 744) it becomes clear that the authors should have refered to certain 
chapters in Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations. Normative order involves the impact of 
norms on decision making, the way these norms materialise into rules and roles in 
organisations as well as the way societal norms change over time (Rommetveit, 1976; Cohen 
and March, 1976; Stava, 1976; March and Romelaer, 1976; Olsen, 1976(a); Olsen, 1976 (b)).   
With regard to symbolic order, the authors cite Choice and Ambiguity in Organisations as 
proof that this form of order has an empirical base, although no mention is made of specific 
chapters or studies (1984: 744). This makes it difficult to infer the theory’s influence.  
The ideas of historical order, endogenous order and demographic order do not have 
significant ties with the GCT.  
In summary ‘The New Institutionalism’ article, when postulating a new way of studying 
political phenomena, depends significantly on the original GCT as well as on the research 
presented in Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations. Of the three attentional shifts – 
portrayed as forming the basis of new institutionalist theory – two rely on the original 
garbage can article’s main claims and subsequent research: the idea that political history is 
complex and the idea that politics must be seen as an interpretation of life. Of the six 
suggested forms of order, three rely on the GCT: temporal order, symbolic order and 
normative order. Bendor et al. support this summary (2001: 185).  In addition to this analysis, 
the authors cite the garbage can – both the original article and Ambiguity and Choice in 
Organisations (no specific chapters) – as an example of research that fits in with the shift 
towards recognising complexity and the importance of interpretation.  
Based on the stated relationships, it is clear that this volume could be considered to form part 
of a GCRP. However, whether it should be made to fit such a category is not clear. To an 
extent, by including this publication in what they deem garbage can research, Bendor et al. 
create the space to criticise the original article for having produced a “sprawling theoretical 
framework” (2001: 184). Olsen argues that Bendor et al.’s way of relating the new 
institutionalism to the GCT makes it difficult for dialogue to take place and that there exist 




significant differences between the two theories’ subject matter and the way in which they 
view organisations. The garbage can is argued to be more akin to bounded rationality26, 
whereas the new institutionalism proposes a different form of logic: rule based (2001: 193). 
It would be more productive to argue that the garbage can plays a significant role within a 
revitalisation of institutionalist perspectives on organisations (Selznick, 1996: 275), but that 
these perspectives have a history of their own, and have been shaped significantly by other 
publications, such as the Leadership in Administration (1957) (Selznick, 1996: 270). To 
argue that this study does not form part of the GCRP, notwithstanding the fact that the GCT 
plays a role in it, contributes to conceptual clarity. This is the option exercised here. 
3.2.4 Ambiguity and Command 
Similar to  Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations, the GCT is easier to locate within 
Ambiguity and Command. The titles of ten of the fourteen chapters (excluding the 
introduction) include either the concepts ‘garbage can’, ‘organised anarchy’, or both. The 
way in which the garbage can is utilised was studied carefully.  
Chapter two (March and Olsen, 1986: 11-28) serves as an introduction to the GCT, its 
underlying philosophy, and provides a wide-ranging oversight with regard to the theory’s 
development, utility and spheres of application. Chapters three (Weissinger-Baylon, 1986: 
36-51), five (Crecine, 1986: 72-117), six (Bromiley, 1986: 120-138) and eleven (Hughes, 
1986: 249-257) exhibit the structuring of qualitative data according to the components of the 
GCT. One of the studies (chapter three) also uses implications of the original computer 
simulation in its categorisation of the data. In all of these studies, with the exception of that 
reported on in chapter six, the theory is argued to be a good fit to data as the empirical 
context matches the definition of an organised anarchy.  
The research presented in chapters seven (Anderson and Fischer, 1986: 140-163), ten (Gray, 
1986: 195-226) and twelve (Hayward, 1986: 258-267) builds on the ideas that constitute the 
original GCT. The data is structured and simulations are built in ways that could be seen as 
derivatives of the original theory. 
Thus, it is argued that of the ten chapters identified, eight have been found to relate directly27 
and significantly to the original garbage can. In addition to this, the editors of the publication 
                                                
26 A connection also that has also been found by Moch and Pondy (1977), Cyert and March (1992), March 
(1996), March and Simon (1958), Goodin (1999) and Jones (1999).  




explicate that the GCT and garbage can perspectives are intended to be the golden thread 
running through the publication (1986: 1-2). Ambiguity and Command can undoubtedly be 
seen as belonging to the GCRP.   
3.2.5 Rediscovering Institutions 
Bendor et al. see Rediscovering Institutions as having built on ‘The New Institutionalism’ 
article (2001: 185).  According to the authors, the publication aimed to address the questions 
as to how, within the context of democratic ideology, political institutions function. They 
sought to establish how institutions influence political life, how they change, and how they 
might be changed intentionally (March and Olsen, 1989: 18). In terms of understanding 
political phenomena, the book is considered a “contemporary classic” (Goodin & 
Klingleman, 1996: 16). Similar to the analysis of ‘The New Institutionalism’, close reading is 
necessary to evaluate this publication for the GCT’s influence.   
The volume consists of nine chapters. The first chapter draws heavily on the ‘New 
Institutionalism’ article: exactly the same attention shifts and new forms of order are 
suggested. Two of the three shifts and three of the suggested forms of order have already 
been argued to rely on the claims of the GCT as well as its applications.  
Chapters two to four provide the reader with the conceptual research and conclusions that 
constitute the basic premises and theoretical claims of the institutionalist perspective. Rule 
driven behaviour is one of these premises. The GCT, as well as theoretical assumptions that 
are used in constructing the simulation, are key to understanding rule-driven behaviour. The 
authors argue that rules – in the form of routines and codes of conduct – are what govern 
actions within institutions. The way the GCT envisions organisational structure, along the 
dimension of employees’ access to choice situations, awards the theory a certain descriptive 
and predictive capacity in terms of decision behaviour (March and Olsen, 1989: 23-24). 
Apart from routines governing the outcomes of decisions, social or cultural norms explain 
outcomes that cannot be explained by intent. These norms are also part of what the authors 
view to be the ‘rules’ that govern behaviour (March and Olsen, 1989: 24). The authors cite 
Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations to prove that norms do in fact determine decision 
behaviour (March and Olsen, 1989: 29). By not incorporating human intent and by modelling 
at a macro level, the GCT plays a role in supporting the authors’ idea that individual intention 
is not the primary driver of decision outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                  
27 See section 3.2.2 for an explanation of what is meant by ‘directly’ in the way it is used here.  




The GCT’s axiom of fluid participation provides one account of why social rules, which need 
to be learned via interpretation and the inference of meaning, are ambiguous (March and 
Olsen, 1989: 40-41).   
The garbage can features, albeit in a more modest way, when it comes to the authors’ 
theoretical discussion on initiating change in organisations. Of the three suggested ways in 
which to initiate change, one rests squarely on the original garbage can article. The authors 
suggest that the GCT has the power to indicate certain areas within which change might be 
initiated (March and Olsen, 1989: 62). Also, garbage can related research aids the 
understanding of why intended change does not materialise (March and Olsen, 1989: 62). In 
this sense, the garbage can is viewed as useful because it allows the effects of broader norms 
and values to be deduced, as it makes no provision for individual or organisational intention.  
In terms of the empirical material on ad hoc and large scale reorganisations presented and 
discussed in chapters five, six and seven, the garbage can’s impact lies in the authors’ 
depiction of ad hoc administrative reorganisation. Three of the five ways in which ad hoc 
reorganisation needs to be viewed rely on the GCT and its applications (March and Olsen, 
1989: 74). Viewing reorganisations as rhetoric, as garbage can processes, and as related to 
social values, pertain to the GCT in more or less direct ways. The discussion of these various 
ways of understanding yields that only one, viewing reorganisations as garbage cans, relies 
solely on the GCT. Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations is one of seven sources cited in 
discussing reorganisation as rhetoric. It is cited in reference to empirical proof that the same 
group of people can employ multiple forms of rhetoric in an organisational context (March 
and Olsen,1989: 74-78). In the section on understanding reorganisation as relating to social 
values, the authors make the claim that action – including reorganisation – is tied to the 
discovery of meaning. Ambiguity and Choice, alongside one other source, is cited as 
providing empirical evidence for this claim (March and Olsen, 1989: 89).  
Chapter seven contains March and Olsen’s theory on the type of institution – integrative or 
aggregative28 – that will become dominant in the future. In the process of building their 
argument, they rely on the GCT’s idea of independent, time-bound streams. They hypothesise 
about the cyclical nature of shifts along the continuum of integration and aggregation (March 
and Olsen, 1989: 134-135). In addition to the GCT playing a significant role in their 
hypothesis that integrative institutions will become important, they also cite garbage can 
                                                
28 See chapter two of this thesis for an elaboration on this distinction.  




related research in Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations as examples of research focussing 
on institutions’ integrative capacity (March and Olsen, 1989: 124). Although the original 
article is cited only once in this chapter, the way in which it used to build the hypothesis leads 
the theory to be of paramount importance within the discussion on the characteristics of 
appropriate institutions. 
Three of the nine chapters are in no way indebted to the GCT: chapter six, chapter eight and 
chapter nine. 
From this summary, it is clear that the GCT’s presence in and influence on Rediscovering 
Institutions is significant. It is also clear that the garbage can is more or less significant 
depending on the themes and issues are addressed. Where rule driven behaviour is discussed 
the presence looms larger; where preferences and interests are discussed (the last two 
chapters) the theory fades into the background. It is argued here that the content of three of 
the nine chapters, namely chapter one, chapter two and chapter five, would be significantly 
altered, if the garbage can research (both the original article and the work in in Ambiguity and 
Choice in Organisations) did not exist. It is argued, however, that this publication is not to be 
considered part of a GCRP, for similar reasons to those explicated with regards to the 
exclusion of ‘The New Institutionalism’. Bendor and his colleagues’ understanding of 
Rediscovering Institution’s belonging to a GCRP (2001: 185) is too dependent on a perceived 
relationship between Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations and Rediscovering Institutions. 
This is problematic as it has been shown that the GCT is not dominant in all of the research 
instances reported on in Ambiguity and Choice29 and because such a perception neglects the 
relationship of Rediscovering Institutions to other publications (Olsen, 2001: 193; Selznick, 
1996: 270).  
3.2.6 Conclusion as to what constitutes the garbage can research 
programme    
The following publications will henceforth be taken to constitute the GCRP 1) the original 
1972 article, ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice’, 2) Ambiguity and Choice in 
Organisations (1976), and 3) Ambiguity and Command (1986). The definition is thus based 
on the definition by Bendor et al., but incorporates the writer’s own analysis as well as 
critical commentary by other authors.    
                                                
29 See section 3.2.2 of this chapter. 




3.3 Classification of the studies 
Before the studies are scrutinised, the classifications according to which they will be will be 
characterised will be introduced and discussed. These classifications form the profile of a 
study. In the end, it will be seen whether a certain profile is more or less likely to produce 
insight on goal ambiguity.  
3.3.1 Qualitative versus quantitative research in social science 
Quantitative studies usually focus on controlling the variables30 in the study and consequently 
determining the ways in which these variables relate to each other (Henning, 2004: 3). 
Observations are systematic in a way that has been determined before the study commenced. 
The goal of quantitative research is to test for certain hypotheses and to produce replicable 
studies. The most common way of collecting quantitative data is through survey research, in 
which the answers to the questions posed are quantified (Black, 1999: 4).    
In qualitative studies, variables are usually not controlled as the purpose is to capture the 
natural development31 of action and representation (Henning, 2004: 3-4), as well as to 
become aware of variables that were not known before the study commenced (Westbrook, 
1994: 195; Henning, 2004: 8). The main means of collecting data for qualitative research are 
observation, interviewing, and studying artefact objects such as official and legal documents. 
Interviews usually consist, at least in part, of open ended questions (Henning, 2004: 5). It is 
best to utilise all three channels as this triangulation leaves the researcher with a variety of 
data that works towards ensuring the integrity of the study (Henning, 2004: 6; Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985: 301). The probability of credible findings is also increased by prolonged 
engagement (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 306-307.) 
Henning argues that it is not the means of collecting the data but the analysis thereof that 
mostly clearly distinguishes quantitative and qualitative research. In qualitative study, the 
researcher’s capacity to integrate serves as the analytical instrument. The researcher creates 
meaning by turning the raw, empirical data, or the ‘thin description’ of what is being studied, 
into a ‘thick description’. These interpretations rely on information within the same study, as 
well as a certain theoretical framework. For Henning, qualitative research is superficial if a 
researcher merely arranges the data into categories or according to themes in a positivistic 
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31 The emphasis placed on the natural development of the working hypothesis has led to a certain approach 
towards qualitative research being labelled a ‘naturalistic approach’ (Westbrook, 1994). 




way (2004: 6-7). Quantitative studies analyse data by using a range of mathematical models, 
such as various statistical analytic tools (Black, 1999: 304). 
A simple and useful way to understand the distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
research is articulated by Mellon (1990: 24): the purpose of qualitative research is more to 
understand than to be able to predict. After having recognised this, the cyclical approach 
within which the collection of data and the analysis thereof is an integrated activity, and 
which is typical of qualitative research, becomes logical.  
3.3.2 Different theoretical perspectives 
Researchers within social science would agree that the purpose of theory is to explain facts, 
that theories should be testable and that a theory is a process without a single resting point 
(Wilson, 1983: 2; Black, 1999: 7, 8; Westbrook, 1995: 245). Concerning theories’ 
competence at explaining facts, a theory should be more than an empirical generalisation, or a 
proven statistical correlation. It should enable the members of the scientific community to 
“imagine new facts”. Also, a conceptual schema does not qualify as a theory, as concepts by 
themselves cannot provide explanation. Laws or principles are required to relate various 
concepts in such a way that explanation is made possible (Wilson, 1983: 2-3). The widely 
held notion that theories should be testable masks the differences regarding what constitutes 
proper testing. These differences pertain to the relation between the knowing subject, 
conducting the research, and the known object being researched (Wilson, 1983: 4).  
The different ways of understanding this relationship become clear when evaluating different 
theoretical perspectives. Positivist and interpretivist, or idealist, frameworks or ‘world 
pictures’ (Wilson, 1983: 7) are relevant for the current attempt. These world pictures have 
been interpreted in a variety of ways. Consequently, each world picture yields multiple 
traditions. The world pictures32 produce different kinds of theories, as they advocate different 
rules and processes for conducting research (Wilson, 1983: 7).  
Positivism, in its purest form, equates to a rejection of a metaphysical realm. Knowledge may 
be gained through measurement and observation, and thus a method of investigation similar 
to that of the natural sciences is employed. The implication is that feelings or thoughts cannot 
be studied from this perspective (Henning, 2004: 17; Wilson, 1983:8). Furthermore, a sharp 
                                                
32 ‘World pictures’, as Black refers to them, could also be referred to as ideological frames or ideologies. 
However, these could be considered loaded terms. Therefore, the synonym for world picture that will be used in 
this thesis is ‘theoretical frame’. 




distinction is made between the researcher and those who are investigated; these are seen as 
radically independent (Wilson, 1983:8). Methodologically, positivists conduct experiments or 
gather data through observation, from which general laws may be observed. The primacy of 
results that are objectively verifiable, generalisable and that can make accurate predictions, 
translates to methods that centre on experimental control, pre-determined structure and 
replicability (Henning, 2004: 17-18). Causation, within this picture, is connected to both 
necessity and sufficiency. The toolset of the positivist traditionally includes surveys and 
statistical analysis (Henning, 2004:18; Westbrook, 1995: 250).  
Historically, the interpretivist, or idealist, perspective followed the positivist perspective. By 
the mid 1900’s, a shift was seen away from positivist approaches towards an approach 
through which the meaning of the actions of subjects can be interpreted (Henning, 2004: 19). 
Thus the “directing, willing…acting individual” is the subject matter of the idealist (Wilson, 
1983: 8). Another quarter of a century after the first shift, a second shift occured: researchers 
set out to study the way in which social meaning is created through discourse (Henning, 
2004: 20). This implies that the social world is less like the natural world upon which 
experiments may performed, and more like a text, which needs to be read and interpreted 
(Wilson, 1983: 8-9).  
The realisation that observation limits the researcher to a certain kind of knowledge, stands 
central to the interpretivist, or idealist, perspective. Explanations provide motives and 
reasons, rather than producing general laws (Henning, 2004: 19). From this it may be 
deduced that scientific methods provide a mere approximation of the truth..  
Research within this theoretical frame is typically characterised by a variety of data sources 
and methodologies as variety is perceived to lead to greater validity. These different 
approaches are not usually taken to hint at a relativistic stance; rather it is held that different 
viewpoints lead to a multifaceted construction of the knowledge about the world. 
Methodological practices rooted in this approach include unstructured observation within the 
‘natural setting’, open interviews and ideographic descriptions (Henning, 2004: 19-20).    
From a thematic comparison of the above discussions on different approaches, theoretical 
frameworks, as well as the discussion on theories of decision making in the first chapter, one 
might be inclined to deduce that a certain classification will imply certain others. In other 
words, one might think that certain classifications will be grouped together, as shown in 
Figure A on the following page. 























Figure A: Expected grouping of classifications 
Wilson, however, extends a warning in response to this kind of inference when he states that 
the meaning of theoretical frameworks has been interpreted in different ways (1983: 7). 
All of the studies that form part of the sample will be classified according to: 
• The approach, which will be sub-categorised in terms of the nature of the data and 
the analysis thereof.  
• The theoretical framework within which the study fits best. 
• Process-variance theory distinction. 
• The credibility of the data used.  
These classifications, and value judgements, will be integrated with the reports on the various 
studies. The relevance of the classifications was addressed in chapter one, but will be 
revisited in both chapters four and five.  
The categories discussed above and utilised in the process of conducting the research 
presented in this thesis are by no means presented as exhaustive.      
3.4 Account of the case studies and their conclusions 
Having defined the research programme and discussed the classifications, case studies of 
organisational decision making that apply the GCT must be accounted for. Note that the 
purpose of these accounts is not to engage critically with every assumption, theoretical 
building block, or element of the research design, but rather to collect the insights from a 




series of instances. This works toward a holistic picture of the empirical contribution of the 
GCRP. 
3.4.1 Case studies from Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations  
3.4.1.1 ‘Decision making under changing norms’ (by Kare Rommetveit) – 
Study 1 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design  
This study examines a situation in which standard operating procedures are challenged. The 
author claims that all polities routinise some activities and that these activities are 
programmed in such a way that behaviour equates to the fulfilment of certain roles (1976: 
140). Standard operating procedures are thus characterised by the assumption of a simplified 
model of the world as well as a high level of predictability. However, when these standard 
operating procedures are challenged, the author claims to have found multiple, competing 
definitions of problems and solutions (1976: 140). 
The GCT is applied to data on a specific choice regarding the location of a new medical 
school in Norway. In March 1968, the Norwegian parliament decided to build two new 
medical schools in both Trondheim and Tromso (1976: 141). However, this decision was 
considered unexpected in terms of standard operating procedures. The events that preceded 
the decision represent a ‘break’ from what had been considered the likely outcome in two 
ways: 1) at first, when the idea was still to build a single new medical school in Norway, all 
indications testified to Trondheim being the city of choice. Instead Tromso was the city 
decided on; 2) eventually, not one but two schools were built:  the project in Tromso starting 
in 1973 with a similar project in Trondheim expected to start shortly after (1976: 142).     
The author states that the GCT has thusfar focussed on the effects of different access and 
decision structures (1976: 140). Rommetveit’s study is aimed at looking into the conditions 
for desegmentation of these structures. The author specifically attempts to investigate the 
relation between desegmentation and changes in normative structures, or basic value-
priorities (1976: 140).  
Data was collected over a period of 18 months, starting in the fall of 1969. The means of 
collection included an examination of major Norwegian cities’ newspapers over a period of 
10 years, 42 lengthy interviews with 36 prominent persons (prominence was measured by the 
appearance of names in the written material), examining letters and notes of participants, 




examining archives of the participating institutions, as well as participant observation at 
various meetings in 1969 and 1970. The data gathered is presented in a table that outlines 6 
different time periods within the decision making process. It is also structured according the 
streams of participants, problems, solutions and choice opportunities identified within the 
distinct time periods. Some of the subcategories, which pertain for example to the different 
kinds of participants and the specific time periods, emerged from studying the data (1976: 
143). Thus the components of the garbage can theory are used to categorise or frame the data, 
however the author did not limit his understanding to this framework.   
Conclusions and classification 
The decision (process) regarding the location of a new medical school in Norway was shown 
to (Rommetveit, 1976: 149 – 155): 
1. Indicate that under conditions where standard operating procedures are disrupted, the 
garbage can performs relatively well in terms of describing the situation. 
2. Illustrate that decisions are ambiguous stimuli, by proving the complexity of 
interactions between participants in the process. Consequently, processes where one 
participant or group of participants is dominant, the garbage can would not be as 
suitable, or useful.  
3. Indicate that standard operating procedures failed to predict the outcome of the 
decision, due to a change in the normative structure of the environment in which the 
decision had to be made. 
4. Suggest that the changes in the normative structure had varying levels of impact in 
different arenas within the same environment. 
 
The nature of the data is mostly qualitative; the approach towards the analysis is also 
qualitative. The data may be described as thick due to multiple streams of literature being 
brought to bear on the data in an attempt to analyse it. The integrity of the data, and thereby 
the merit of the study, is enhanced by the fact that the author used a variety of ways of 
collecting data. The GCT is seen, or applied, as a process theory. The study may be 
understood to be in balance between a positivist and an interpretivist theoretical frame. 
Mostly the behaviour of participants is observed, either indirectly or directly. These 
observations, along with behavioural models, are used to reach the conclusions. However, the 
author does recognise that these participants exhibit different interpretations of events and 
that they claim to attach value to the symbolic meaning behind the change detected. 




3.4.1.2  ‘Ideology and management in garbage can situations’ (by Kristian 
Kreiner) – Study 2 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
The aim of the study is to examine management success and failure, here treated as the 
effective implementation of plans, within the context of an “ideological organised anarchy” 
(1976: 157). The setting of the study is a free school in Denmark. The school was founded in 
reaction to the public school system in Norway at the time and was intended to be different 
from public schools in two ways: 1) parents had more influence in terms of managerial 
decision making, as a collective, democratic model was postulated as the ideal; 2) in terms of 
the curriculum, the development of intellectual capability received less emphasis, whereas 
social development through play was awarded more prominence (1976: 157-158).  
The specific plan that had to be executed pertains to a decision that was made by the ‘open 
assembly’, the formal governing body of the school, which is comprised of all 170 parents of 
the school as well as each of the 10 teachers. Up until that point, the pedagogical structure 
entailed that children be divided into six different grades. During most of the time spent at 
school, children were bound to a specific group (1976: 157 – 158). The assembly, however, 
voted (69 to 6) for the structure to be dissolved and to have most of the activities take place 
on a workshop basis. The decision presented a broad frame of what needed to be achieved, 
with no set of specified actions through which this could be achieved (1976:162).     
The author’s theoretical interest lies in the various loose relations between the ideology of an 
organisation and action that is produced within and by the same organisation. The aim is to 
study the relation between the degree of legitimacy of the leader’s behaviour and the response 
to this behaviour (1976: 156). Previous studies have shown this relation to be 
multidimensional: participants within the organisation respond to deviant leaders with some 
form of sanction, however, leaders with clout have been found to be criticised, yet accepted 
after having acted in an illegitimate way (1976: 156). Secondly, the author is interested in the 
effects of loose coupling between process and outcome with respects to organisational 
ideology (1976: 157).  
The components of the GCT are used to interpret the data gathered. The author argues that 
the GCT is well fitted to the empirical environment as the organisation in question exhibited 
the characteristics of an organised anarchy: 1) no consistent set of preferences could be 
applied to concrete choices that had to be made; 2) knowledge around technology, or the 




means through which problems were to be solved, was vague; 3) participants were not 
assigned to certain decisions based on rules, and it was hard to predict the nature of 
participation in each instance (1976: 159).   
Data was collected by observing the decision making processes at the free school during the 
year of 1971. The research group is reported to have been present at all but one of the 
relevant meetings. Extensive interviews were conducted. Conclusions also draw upon a 
detailed questionnaire completed by parents and teachers33 (1976: 157). The data produced 
during the course of the observation period was used to identify five different events that 
could be considered attempts at managing the decision process. The author discusses each of 
these events by making use of garbage can language34 (176: 159-170).       
Conclusions and classifications  
The decision to change the pedagogical structure of a free school in Denmark was shown to 
(1976: 171): 
1. Exhibit no signs of a positive relationship between the likelihood of implementation 
of certain aspects of the decision and their legitimacy in terms of the ideological 
purity of the attempts. 
2. Suggest that the debates over legitimacy were useful in terms of ‘training’ members in 
the value system of the organisation. 
3. Indicate that a) although phases of the process could be described by and understood 
through intentional models of choice, b) the whole process is understood best through 
theoretically applying the garbage can.  
 
The data on which the study is based, as well as the analysis thereof, is of a qualitative nature. 
Multiple theoretical perspectives are used to produce thick data. The integrity of the data, and 
thereby the merit of the study, is enhanced by the variety of data collection methods used. 
The GCT is applied as a process theory. With regard to the theoretical approach, what applies 
to study one also applies here – interpretative orders are recognised as being present, however 
the way in which the data is perceived remains largely positivistic. This is indicated by the 
fact that observed behaviour is made to “converse with”, or be seen in the context of, existent 
behavioural theories.   
                                                
33 The same data is used for another study that forms part of Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations and which 
is also reported on in this chapter. See section 3.4.1.5  
34 See page 160, for example, for references to “decision structure” and “access structure”.  




3.4.1.3  ‘Participation, deadlines and choice’ (by Stephen S. Weiner) – Study 3 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
In this case study, a decision made during the time period between 1960 and 1970 concerning 
the desegregation of elementary schools in the School State District of San Francisco is 
analysed by applying the GCT. The San Francisco United Schools District was put under 
pressure by various civil rights movements in the 1960’s (1976: 229). These movements 
intended to spur efforts to desegregate the public elementary schools in the city. Segregation 
was visible in terms of race and was understood to be a result of certain racial groups 
clustering in certain geographical parts of the city (1976: 228).  
Despite the district’s appointment of committees to research and unpack this problem as well 
as possible solutions, a civil rights movement filed a suit in the United States District Court in 
1970. The suit was aimed at establishing legal support for the immediate desegregation of all 
102 elementary schools in the city. Up until that point, the process had lacked substantive 
outcomes and, therefore, certain participants had become impatient (1976: 233). The result 
was the imposition of a deadline by Judge Stanley Weigel, who found that the district had not 
done enough in terms of countering segregation. Both the district and one of the civil rights 
movements had to prepare a set of plans for the desegregation of schools and these were to be 
presented on 10 June 1971 (1976: 233). Weiner emphasises the fact that ‘desegregation’ had 
not been defined by the ruling (1976: 233). 
The GCT is argued to fit the empirical context as the situation matched the definition of an 
organised anarchy (1976: 225). Other theories were rendered inadequate by the specific 
circumstances, which included the absence of consistent lucid goals. The author explains that 
this absence is the result of goals being phrased in vague or abstract terms to avoid being 
heavily criticised, as this kind of negativity would make the goals inoperable (1976: 225). 
The specific purpose of the study was to evaluate the effect of the imposition of a deadline on 
the garbage can processes. The authors pursued an understanding of the effects of the 
deadline, so as to be able to provide guidance on how deadlines may be used to affect 
participation and decision outcomes (1976: 226). Also, the original GCT does not include 
requirements in terms of problems being solved by a certain point in time. The author points 
out that this is a significant shortcoming as deadlines could serve as a cue to direct attention 
towards certain problems and choice situations and, consequently, away from others (1976: 
226).   




Although the design of the research is not explicated, it can be deduced that interviews were 
conducted and legal documents as well as newspapers were studied. It is unclear whether 
participant observation was used to gather data. The data is presented as a list of 
chronologically ordered, purportedly significant events (1976: 237-239). Also, the variance in 
the number of participants before and after the deadline was imposed is presented in tabular 
form (1976: 234). The data is then discussed and categorised according to the components of 
the GCT (1976: 239-245). Based on this, it may be concluded that although certain aspects 
were measured quantitatively, the majority of the data takes a qualitative form. 
Conclusions and classifications 
The decision to desegregate elementary schools in the School State District of San Francisco 
was shown to (1976: 233 – 248): 
1. Indicate that the GCT’s assumption that problems and solutions flow independently of 
participants is false, because problems and solutions, on the one hand, were found to 
track participants, on the other hand. 
2. Suggest that the imposition of a deadline affects the participation within a specific 
garbage can in three ways: highly active participants become even more active;less 
active participants become even less active or leave the choice situation entirely; those 
who are left to participate are coerced into doing so. 
3. Suggest that the deadline forces participants to calculate their energy deficit, thereby 
leading to the ejection of certain ‘garbage’ – participants and problems associated 
with them – from the can. 
4. Suggest that the garbage can ejects ‘garbage’ in a way that is aimed at conserving 
energy, in that problems that have attracted participants who are willing and able to 
spend energy are retained. 
5. Suggest that enhanced energy expenditure by the small number of active participants 
causes these participants to develop a monopoly on the competence required by the 
specific choice opportunity.  
6. Indicate that deadlines reduce goal ambiguity by drawing attention to certain 
decisions and away from others, but that ambiguity remains a factor at play since 
problems associated with the relevant decision might still be unclear.  
 
The author quantified observations by measuring participants’ energy expenditure in terms 
of, for example, time spent (1976: 234). The author thus occasionally quantifies data that 




originally took up a qualitative form. Observations are still largely expressed in qualitative 
terms. The garbage can is applied as a process theory. This is indicated by the emphasis on 
the order in which events took place. However, this instance of research also showcases the 
theory’s potential to be interpreted and used as a variance theory, due to the quantitative 
measurement of shifts in energy required and energy lost (due to the imposition of deadlines). 
The data is not as thick as in other studies as the garbage can is the only theoretical frame that 
is used to categorise and interpret data. The merit of the research – in terms of this thesis’ 
aims – is also impacted negatively by the lack of explication of the research design. Once 
again, the importance of interpretative order is recognised; however, the nature of 
interpretation or the processes that shape it are not discussed. The analysis of the data is 
approached in a strongly positivistic way. 
3.4.1.4 ‘Reorganisation as a Garbage Can’ (by Johan P. Olsen) – Study 4 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
The author examines the interplay between the substantive and symbolic outcomes of a 
reorganisation process. This particular attempt centres on understanding the drivers behind a 
reorganisation that took place at the University of Oslo. Until 1963/1964, whoever fulfilled 
the administrative position of departmental chairman in a Norwegian university operated in 
an autocratic way, with all formal authority and decision making responsibility associated 
with this role (1976c: 315). This model of departmental governance changed in the mid 
1960’s. The new model differed from the previous model in that decisions were to be made 
collectively, awarding participation rights to non-tenured staff, administrative staff as well as 
students. A board, council and chairman were to be elected by all those involved in the 
department. The Department of Physics at the University of Oslo was the very first 
department to adopt this system (1976c: 315-316). 
The author states that since organisation implies the intention to affect the world in a 
determined way, reorganisation is viewed to imply intention too. These processes usually 
initiate solutions to problems that keep organisations from operating optimally (1976c: 314). 
It is suggested that instead of viewing the reorganisation process as implying intent, it could 
alternatively be viewed as a ‘garbage can’ (1976c: 314). Terms associated with the GCT 
feature in the presentation of the qualitative data. The author postulates that reorganisation is 
a choice opportunity that collects a multitude of loosely connected problems, solutions and 
participants (1976c: 314). The author also relates the concept of reorganisation with less rigid 




access and decision structures. Reorganisation involves discussion on both practical and 
symbolic issues, new and old values, and consequently becomes a process of arriving at an 
interpretation of the organisation’s identity (1976c: 315). 
The data was collected by examining archival materials, conducting interviews, as well as 
conducting a general questionnaire. The data is structured according to the components of the 
GCT, in that problems, participants and solutions are identified and grouped together. The 
data is represented in terms of phases that were found to have split the overall process in two: 
1) discussion centred on enhancing the workings and efficiency within the organisation; 2) 
demand for participation among younger staff members becoming an issue (1976c: 315).  
Conclusions and classifications 
The decisions to initially reorganise one department and later to reorganise other departments 
at the University of Oslo were shown to (1967c: 334 – 336): 
1. Indicate that reorganisation was initiated because of frustration with administrative 
inefficiencies, both in- and outside the relevant department. 
2. Suggest that the idea that other garbage cans affect the participation within the focal 
can is valid35. 
3. Indicate that a) the reorganisation did solve some of the problems it intended to solve, 
however b) new problems were born in the process of reorganisation. 
4. Indicate that a) the reorganisation had a moderate effect on day-to-day workings 
within the department, that b) the reorganisation was celebrated publicly as a victory 
for democracy and that c) this celebration fit with similar movements outside the 
university at the time. 
 
The case study data is qualitative. The way in which it is analysed is also qualitative; 
however, a similar problem to most of the case studies is present regarding the distinction 
between a positivistic or interpretivist theoretical frame. Interpretation and symbolic values 
are recognised as playing a role in the decision making, but these phenomena are studied in 
the same way as any other kind of behaviour. The importance of the chronological order of 
events shows that the garbage can is applied as a process theory. The data is thick as both the 
garbage can and theoretical perspectives on reorganisation are used to interpret the data. The 
                                                
35 As more departments were considering reorganisation, less people became involved in the discussion around 
the Physics Department. 




variety of ways in which data was collected positively impact the integrity of the data, and 
consequently the merit of the study.  
3.4.1.5  ‘Decision making and socialisation’ (by Soren Christensen) – Study 5 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
The author uses the GCT as a general framework for observations of decisions making 
processes in a Danish free school from August 1971 to January 1972 (1976: 352). The 
highest decision making body within the school is the ‘house meeting’. All parents, students 
and teachers have access to this meeting; it meets at least once a month. The decision 
structure, comprised of the aforementioned highest body as well as the ‘teachers meeting’ and 
the ‘school committee’, is deemed very important as it reflects a part of the ideology of the 
school (1976: 352-353). 
During the time period of study, the house meeting made three decisions: 1) The decision to 
establish a Society of Friends of the School with the purpose of facilitating the construction 
of a new classroom. This decision was voted in unanimously; 2) The decision to change from 
a traditional grade-divided school to an open, free choice school with no grades. 69 people 
voted for this transformation whereas 6 voted against it; 3) The decision to rehire a teacher 
who had been fired by the group of teachers. 26 people voted for this change and 20 voted 
against it (1976: 355).  
Although these actions were decided on through a vote after considerable discussion, none of 
the three were implemented: the classroom was not built, the overall structure of the school 
did not change and the specific teacher did not return.  In a way the decision process was thus 
ineffective (1976: 355). 
The author aims to consider some of the complications in assuming that the prime concern of 
a decision making process is a decision. More specifically, the author attempts to show that it 
would be misleading to think of decisions as the primary product of decision processes and, 
secondly, that change occurs without decisions having been made (1976: 351). In addition to 
pointing towards the gaps in standard choice theory by making use of this particular case, the 
author also intended to study an alternative purpose of decision making processes, namely 
that of creating and discovering meaning (1976: 352). The author argues that one of the 
characteristics of garbage can decision making, namely unclear technology, leads to 
organisations utilising decision processes as arenas for coming to believe in a certain model 




of the world, and thereby achieving a better understanding of how goals should be reached 
(1976: 352). 
Data was collected through participant observation at the meetings held in the school over a 
six month period. The primary intention was to present and analyse the decisions made by the 
highest decision making body. Events are reported in the order in which they occurred. Only 
after this presentation are the components of the GCT brought to bear on the data in order to 
structure it differently. A series of interviews as well as questionnaires to all members of the 
school (parents, teachers and students), conducted in the spring of 1972, served as 
background material to the data (1976: 356). 
Conclusions and classifications 
The decision processes in a Danish free school were shown to (1976: 383 – 384): 
1. Suggest that choice opportunities are created to exercise problems. 
2. Illustrate how decisions get made in a formal way without ever being implemented. 
3. Suggest that processes and outcomes were separated in that processes served an 
additional purpose to being able to generate outcomes, namely that they establish 
collective belief, and that this is especially necessary in an organisation that does not 
share an ideology with the wider society. 
4. Suggest that if processes serve a strong symbolic purpose, decisions are less likely to 
be implemented. 
5. Illustrate that change does occur, despite loose coupling in terms of decisions and 
implementation, and that it was found to occur in technical contexts, rather than in 
prominent cans. 
 
This study draws on qualitative data, which is analysed in a qualitative way. The GCT is 
applied as a process theory. Arguably, the data is thick, due to multiple theoretical 
perspectives being brought to bear on it. Multiple means of data collection contribute to the 
perceived merit of the study. Once again, due to interpretation and the creation of meaning 
being identified as important drivers, but the means of analysis resting firmly on observing 
behaviour, it is difficult to situate this research within either an interpretivist perspective or a 
positivistic theoretical frame.  




3.4.2 Case studies from Ambiguity and Command  
3.4.2.1 ‘Defence resource allocation: Garbage can analysis of C3I 
procurement’ (by John P. Crecine) – Study 6 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
The author aims to produce a deeper understanding of the deficiencies of C3I36 performance. 
Prior to the time of writing, these deficiencies were understood to be a result of defence 
resources procurement processes (1986: 75). The aim of the study is served by exploring the 
implications of garbage can theories of choice. The author states that his approach is one of 
information processing (IP) – the garbage can is understood to belong to this category (1986: 
75).  
An assessment of the C3I capabilities of the US and NATO air-ground forces revealed the 
deficiencies referred to in the above paragraph. The author argues that the reason this is 
disconcerting and should therefore be researched is that increased mobility and lethality of 
modern military forces lead to high demands being made on C3I systems, especially during 
war time (1986: 73). Numerically inferior forces can only be successful if the situation is 
diagnosed in an appropriate and timely manner and if the appropriate forces are assembled 
and deployed at the correct time and place (1986: 73).  
The theoretical framework of the GCT is discussed within a part of the chapter that is 
dedicated to IP in loosely coupled systems. It is argued that the independent streams which 
form the components of the GCT, make it an appropriate theory within a discussion on loose 
coupling (1986: 85). A detailed account of the original theory is provided: the verbal theory is 
elaborated on and the characteristics of the first version of the computer simulation are 
discussed (1986: 83-88), although this distinction is not made by the author.. 
It is clear from the case discussion that official documents, such as The National Security Act 
of 1974 (1986: 88), as well as previous research, form the basis of the data. How the author 
chose amongst possible relevant texts is not explicated. It is argued that the process of 
defence procurement may be viewed as an organised anarchy (1986: 105-106). A few 
examples of choice opportunities are discussed, wherein the author points out that these 
opportunities are driven by both solutions and problems (1986: 106-109). The GCT is merged 
with the data in a conceptual way, via the discussion of the empirical context in terms of the 
                                                
36 Acronym for Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence systems. 




characteristics of an organised anarchy. The components of the GCT are referred to 
throughout the chapter, but the data is not structured according to these components.  
Conclusions and classifications 
In a study on the deficiencies of defence resource procurement the author found that (1986: 
112 – 116): 
1. a) The development of weaponry is weakly tied to military needs and that this is the 
result of certain structural traits within the organisation, of which researchers become 
aware when they apply the GCT.  
2. The current loose coupling could be rectified or addressed by a central military 
command structure or the involvement of commanders in service decisions regarding 
C3I systems. 
3. A viable tactic through which to gain control over outcomes would be to manipulate 
the energies spent by other participants.  
 
The garbage can is not applied as a process theory but rather as a variance theory. The theory 
is seen as delivering insights regarding organisational structure, rather than emphasising 
temporal order. The data is qualitative, and although the analysis is also qualitative, the 
emphasis on observable behaviour complicates the classification of the study as fitting within 
an interpretivist or positivist theoretical frame. The author has no significant references to 
interpretative orders, meaning and symbolic value. The study thus leans towards the positivist 
side of the spectrum. The data could be considered thick, as it is considered in the light of 
multiple theories. The lack of explication with regards to research design negatively impacts 
the value judgement regarding the integrity of the data.  
3.4.2.2  ‘Garbage cans at sea’ (by Wayne P. Hughes, JR) – Study 7 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
The study centres on the nature of operational decision making in the U.S. navy fleet. The 
author attempts to indicate that the GCT might be more relevant than one would initially 
expect and that if the theory were modified, it would be useful within the context of 
commanders’ decisions at sea (1986: 249). 




It is clear that the author studied the GCT as well as two other theories it is compared to, 
namely war games and the idea that naval decision making might be equated to decision 
making in the context of an American football match (1986: 254-256). 
As for the empirical data the models are weighed against, it is unclear how it was gathered. It 
is assumed that the author is reporting on personal observations, since this chapter forms part 
of the section within the book that represents the perspective of military officers. One can 
thus not reach a conclusion as to how representative the study is.   
Conclusions and classifications 
In a study on operational decision making within the U.S. fleet, the author found that (1986: 
249 – 251): 
1. During peace time, the GCT is useful as a result of the environment reflecting the 
characteristics of an organised anarchy, in that preferences are vague. 
2. During war time the environment slowly transforms so as to reflect these 
characteristics to a lesser degree.  
3. The theory is beneficial in that it is analytical, and consequently flexible and 
transparent, calculates for the fact that multiple problems all seek the attention of one 
decision maker and draws attention to the ways in which solutions, like problems, are 
active.  
4. The nature of wartime decision making lends itself towards study as results should be 
sharper in focus due to the high cost involved if failure is to occur. Such a situation, it 
is argued, requires a special model, because ‘ought to’ situations are in fact ‘must’ 
situations.       
 
Both the data and the analysis are qualitative. The GCT is viewed as a variance theory. The 
data could be considered thick, as a variety of theoretical perspectives are compared. No 
other form of analysis, except applying behavioural theoretical frames to the author’s 
experience, is executed. It is argued that although this instance of research does not slot in 
perfectly, it fits relatively well into positivistic theoretical framework. Triangulation in terms 
of data collection methods are absent. 




3.4.2.3  ‘Garbage can decision processes in naval warfare’ (by Roger 
Weissinger-Baylon ) – Study 8  
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
The author argues that naval warfare comes to resemble organised anarchy, allowing that a 
heavy load and deadlines characterise the situation (1986: 37). The aim is to illustrate the 
insights gained by applying a modified version of the GCT to the data of a computerised war 
game. Firstly, to ensure a better descriptive fit, the GCT needs to be adapted to account for 
standard operating procedures (SOPs). It is through these procedures that ambiguity is 
addressed or countered (1986: 37). Secondly, the extension of the theory should include 
normative considerations (1986: 38). 
The author discusses the manner in which naval warfare embodies an organised anarchy.  
The three-fold ambiguity – technology, preferences and participation – is stated to be present 
both before war starts and during wartime. The latter occurs due to ‘fog of war’. This would 
imply that the ambiguity is understood to emanate from a limitation on information and 
communication between different levels of the organisation (1986: 38). This translates to 
ambiguity being a result of bounded rationality.  
All the data that is utilised in the study comes from a week-long war game played at the 
Naval War College. Several hundred naval officers participated in the game, which was set 
up according to a pre-established scenario. The interpretation of the war game data was done 
by making use of other information resources, such as interviews with thirty admirals and 
general officers, observation of key decision makers as well as studies of historical accounts 
(1986: 43). The plan was to record certain triggers (such as a report on a location of enemy 
sonar detection systems), the decisions they caused, the time it took to make the decision, and 
finally, to list whether the decision resulted in resolution of a problem or flight (1986: 45).   
Conclusions and classifications 
In a study on naval warfare as an embodiment of organised anarchy, the author concludes that 
(1986: 51):  
1. Conditions of naval warfare do resemble the characteristics of organised anarchies, 
which cause the principles of coordination and control to be interfered with.  




2. SOPs are found to be the way in which the interference is minimised, in that they lead 
to energy requirements being spread more evenly across time and within the 
organisation.  
3. During wartime both prematched and unmatched problems form part of the flow of 
solutions.     
 
A qualitative approach towards gathering data is taken, however some of the data is of a 
quantitative nature. The analysis is qualitative, but cannot be classified as interpretivist. The 
roles of interpretation and the construction of meaning do not seem to be relevant – 
knowledge on the situation is created through matching observations of behaviour to existing 
theoretical frames. Furthermore, it is also difficult to discern whether the GCT is applied as a 
process theory or as a variance theory. The importance of timing in recording the data could 
suggest that temporal order is important within the authors’ view of the process. However, 
emphasis on the linear matching between outcomes and choice situations suggests variance 
theory. The data is thick, due to multiple theoretical considerations. Triangulation, with 
regard to collection methods, is present. 
3.5 Discussion of the findings 
The eight empirical studies produced 32 distinguishable conclusions, only three of which 
pertain to goal ambiguity. Of course, this quantification of the findings, in itself, does not 
convey a significant message. The paucity of insights into goal ambiguity needs to be 
interpreted in light of the type of studies. Additionally, the GCT needs to be discussed 
critically in order for the results to gain meaning.   
The visual representation37 of the results might serve as an aid in the process of viewing the 
findings within the context of the characteristics of the research. This representation may be 
                                                
37 Each of the case studies is represented by a row in the table (Figure B). The numbers correspond to the 
numbers allocated to the case studies in the accounts provided in sections 3.3 and 3.4. Each of the characteristics 
identified in chapter one and controlled for in the respective discussions (section 3.3) features as a column. If a 
cell is the colour green, this indicates that the specific characteristic represented by the column is present in the 
study represented by the row. The opposite holds for cells that have been coloured grey. The letters “P 
 and “I”, below the heading “Theoretical framework” refer to positivist and interpretivist, or idealist, 
frameworks, respectively. The letters “V” and “P” under “Theory of DM” indicate whether a study exhibited 
indications of having used the garbage can as either a variance theory of decision making or a process theory of 
decision making, respectively. Under the heading “Research approach”, “quant” stands for quantitative, whereas 
“qual” stands for qualitative. The last three columns indicate whether triangulation in terms of the data was 
found, whether the data is considered to be a thick description and, lastly, whether any insights that pertain to 
goal ambiguity were found. 




seen on the following page. The critical discussion on the GCT and how its characteristics 
might relate to the scarce nature of insights on goal ambiguity, will be presented in the 
following chapter. Currently, the focus is on a) extracting meaning from the visual 
representation below and discussing the conclusions that do give insight into goal ambiguity 
in organisational decision making.  
By looking at the columns that represent triangulation and the indications of whether data 
was thick or thin, it seems that there is reason to infer that the studies, in general, have 
characteristics that attest to their merit. It is also plain to see that qualitative approaches 
towards studying organisational phenomena dominated. What is striking is that the two 
studies, studies 3 and 7, which managed to produce insights on the topic of goal ambiguity 
have nothing special, except the GCT, in common. The one recognised the importance of 
interpretation and symbolic order, the other was found to embody a positivist theoretical 
perspective only. One showed indications of understanding the garbage can to be both 
variance and process theory, whilst the other utilised it as a variance theory only. One 
combined qualitative and quantitative data, the other only made use of qualitative data. 
Furthermore, it is disconcerting, in the light of the research aims of this thesis, that both these 
studies were found to have relied on thin descriptions and that one of the two lacked 
triangulation. This, of course, negatively impacts the integrity of the data.  
Another noteworthy fact is that all but one of the studies that applied the theory as a process 
theory of decision making, showed signs of recognising the importance or relevance of 
interpretative order. This suggests that according to this sample a study is roughly 60% more 
likely to recognise symbolic orders if the GCT is used as a process theory of decision 
making.  
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Figure B 
The first conclusion that is relevant to the specific purpose of this thesis arises from the study 
on the desegregation of primary schools in San Francisco (study three). The author found that 
deadlines reduce the experience of goal ambiguity as a deadline focusses participants’ 
attention on a particular aspect. Study seven, on operational naval decision making, 
concluded that preferences are vague – which qualifies as one of the three ways in which goal 
ambiguity manifests – during peace time, but that this ambiguity is eliminated during war 
time. These conclusions may be useful in formulating theories that form part of a TOF; 
however they do not pertain clearly to themes identified in section 2.4. One can conceive of 
these insights as contributors to theories on when goal ambiguity is likely to arise and when it 
is likely to be less prevalent.  





A carefully considered definition of what constitutes a GCRP has been established. The 
following publications are seen as part of such a programme: 1) the original 1972 article, 
‘Garbage Can Models of Organisational Choice’, 2) Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations 
(1976), and 3) Ambiguity and Command (1986). Case studies that form part of these 
publications and that have applied the GCT to data in significant ways were selected, 
accounted for, analysed in terms of their research design and, finally, their conclusions were 
presented. This aggregation served the purpose of establishing that very few insights on goal 
ambiguity have been produced by applying the GCT. The few that have been found, do not 
relate to the dominant themes within research on a TOF.  
Before any conclusions may be drawn with regard to the GCT’s capacity, or incapacity, to 
deliver insights on goal ambiguity, more studies need to be analysed. The next chapter 
explores case studies whose data is viewed by applying the GCT, but which have been 
studied independently of the GCRP.  




Chapter 4: In Search of Insight on 
Goal Ambiguity II 
4.1 Introduction  
There should by now be an understanding of the use of, or the need for a TOF. The link 
between research on goal ambiguity and a TOF was explicated, along with the reason for 
evaluating case studies that apply the GCT for insights on goal ambiguity.  
The content of the previous chapter suggests that case studies within which the GCT is 
applied do not succeed in delivering insight into goal ambiguity. However, the sample of 
studies was limited to those conducted within the bounds of the GCRP. The aim of this 
chapter is similar to that of the previous chapter. Insights produced by applying the GCT to 
organisational contexts are compiled by doing an analysis of each of the studies within the 
sample. This chapter’s purpose is to draw from case studies that were not produced through 
the GCRP itself.  
The studies will be analysed in the same way as in the previous chapter as in the previous 
chapter. The method through which the sample was compiled was discussed in the 
introductory chapter.  
4.2 Account of the case studies and their conclusions 
4.2.1 Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (by John Kingdon) – 
Study 9 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
Through this study, which comprises a total of twenty-three case studies, Kingdon seeks to 
answer the following questions: 1) why do some subjects rise on the political agenda while 
others are neglected; and 2) why do some policy alternatives receive more attention than 
others? The research was designed to capture the development of public policy over time. 
The focus falls on cases of agenda setting within both health and transportation services, 
which in turn form part of the larger federal government of the United States (2003: 4).    




The GCT is considered to have the potential to provide answers to the questions, as the 
federal government clearly exhibits the characteristics of an organised anarchy (2003: 85). 
Due to this, other theoretical approaches to describing agenda setting behaviour have been 
found inadequate (Kingdon, 2003: 19). These alternative approaches include rational choice 
processes, incremental processes and the idea of tracing the origin of a particular issue 
(Kingdon, 2003: 71-83). 
The GCT is the point of departure, but it has been altered in significant ways so as to 
accommodate the specific empirical context. The specific streams differ, but the logic 
remains that of the original theory (Kingdon, 2003: 84-86). Three process streams are 
envisioned: problems; policies or policy proposals; and politics. The first two streams are 
portrayed as heavily influenced by individual participants, whereas the last stream largely 
comprises participants at a more collective level. The streams need to be understood as 
flowing, or functioning, separately; however, the coupling of the streams is what leads to 
agenda or policy change. Kingdon creates an additional concept, policy windows, to refer to 
times during which a change in policy is particularly likely (2003: 87-88). This concept could 
be seen as a specific form of choice opportunity, in the wording of the original model.       
Information was gathered via interviews that took place in four sessions between 1976 and 
1979. A total of 247 lengthy interviews that consisted of open ended questions were 
conducted. From the results of these interviews, along with the analysis of government 
documents, popularised and specialised accounts and academic writings, the author 
developed 23 case studies that were used to test the modified version of the GCT (Kingdon, 
2003: 4-5). The data is structured and discussed according to the theory’s various streams. 
Conclusions and classifications 
Kingdon found that (2003: 196 – 206): 
1. Issues travel to the agenda via the problem stream, the politics stream and via certain 
visible participants. 
2. The means through which conditions are brought under the attention of those that set 
the agenda, as well as the way in which conditions come to be understood as 
problems, determine which problems will ultimately reach the agenda.These means 
include indicators, focussing events and feedback on current initiatives.Conditions 
that violate societal values, conditions that suffer in comparison to other countries as 




well as conditions that are placed within certain categories are viewed to be 
problematic. 
3. Problems also fade from the agenda, due to other problems occupying the attention of 
those that set the agenda, or change in the condition(s) that highlighted the problem.  
4. Events within the politics stream are powerful agenda setters. Some elements within 
this stream, such as national mood, are more powerful than other elements.Consensus 
within this stream is reached via bargaining rather than through persuasion.    
5. Subjects are more likely to reach the agenda if they are advocated by publically 
visible participants.  
6. Alternatives are developed within the policy stream, mostly by less visible 
participants.  
7. Streams function independently, and are most likely to be joined as result of a 
pressing problem or an event within the politics stream.This intersection brings about 
policy change.   
8. The process is not essentially random.Patterns emerge due to general constraints on 
the system, rules within each of the streams as well as the rules that dictate the 
intersection of streams.  
The data is qualitative, and the analysis also takes place in a qualitative fashion. The GCT is 
applied as a process theory. The data is thick as multiple perspectives are brought to bear on 
it. The discussion on data collection indicates that triangulation is present. However, due to 
the way in which observations are analysed and taken at ‘face value’, it is argued that this 
study qualifies as belonging to a positivistic theoretical frame.   
4.2.2  ‘Inside the Industrial Policy Garbage Can: Selective Subsidies to 
Business in Canada’ (by Michael M. Atkinson and Richard A. 
Powers)  – Study 10 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
Atkinson and Powers aim to determine how bureaucrats respond to the problems associated 
with the implementation of selective assistance programs to businesses (1987: 208). The 
argument presented is that these programs pose distinct challenges as they mix economic and 
political frames of thinking. Politicians, or bureaucrats in public organisations, become 
responsible for activities that essentially take place in a free market, but they lack the 
economic rationale that underlies market mechanisms, therefore it is difficult to determine 




when and where to intervene (1987: 208). However, following a political rationale is often 
not a viable option either. Political aims are very often expressed in terms that are vague 
when it comes to implementation (1987: 209). Despite the lack of clear goals, the nature of 
the program determines that only a select few businesses will receive assistance, and 
therefore bureaucrats play an important role in choosing who gets subsidised (1987: 208).    
The authors argue that given the nature of the assistance program and given the lack of a 
viable rationale, the decision making process starts to fit the GCT. The garbage can process 
in turn leads to unexpected decision outcomes (1987: 209). The GCT is thus relates to the 
empirical context, in that certain traits of an organised anarchy are embodied.  
The study focuses on the Industrial Regional Development Program, which was introduced in 
Canada in 1983. In a superficial way, the objectives of the program were clear. However, the 
authors report that: “From the outset…the pattern established by disbursements under this 
fund suggests that politicians and bureaucrats followed criteria not provided for in the formal 
descriptions” (Atkinson and Powers, 1987: 209).  The authors do not report on how they 
sourced the data on the case, although it appears to be secondary data derived from archival 
material, media reports and other academic texts.  
Conclusions and classifications 
Atkinson and Powers conclude that (1987: 215): 
1. GCT is consistent with the outcomes of the choices.  
2. There was a difference between the explicated criteria and the criteria used to award 
funding. 
3. The criteria used often corresponded to those of previous subsidy programs.   
4. Different criteria were relied on as a result of the demanding nature of the choices that 
had to be made.  
5. Choices were found to make high demands on bureaucrats’ commitment and 
ingenuity.   
The data and the analysis are predominantly qualitative. Quantitative data does play a role as 
the disbursements are expressed in monetary terms. However, these classifications are based 
solely on interpretation, or inference, as the authors do not comment on their data or methods 
for collecting it.  The GCT is seen more as a variance theory, based on the fact that the 
outcomes of decisions are emphasised. The study recognises ambiguity and the effects 




thereof, but symbolic order is not explored. The study falls more within a positivistic frame 
than an interpretivist frame. The data is thin, as only one theoretical perspective is brought to 
bear on the data. Even this perspective, the GCT, is not engaged with in depth.  
4.2.3 ‘The Lid on the Garbage Can’ (by Barbara Levitt and Clifford Nass) 
– Study 11 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
Levitt and Nass seek to integrate the GCT with institutional theory to explain why garbage 
can-like processes do not yield the random outcomes that the theory predicts (1989: 190). 
The study takes place within within the context of editorial decision making in the industry of 
textbook publishing. Garbage can processes are understood to produce heterogeneous 
outcomes because of temporal order being dominant and because of the loosely coupled 
relation between decisions and outcomes (1989: 190 - 191). 
Structured interviews, consisting of open-ended questions, were conducted with the editors of 
the ten best-selling textbooks in the fields of sociology and physics, in order to determine 
whether the GCT is suitable within the specific empirical context (1989: 191). It was 
established that the theory is appropriate as the interviews indicated that editors experience 
their environment as serendipitous, and because they described experiences that overlap with 
the three characteristics of organised anarchies. Unclear preferences, for example, are 
detected via statements regarding the different verdicts around success and failure depending 
on the point in time at which the judgement is made (1989: 192).  
In order to determine the extent to which outcomes are homogenous, a quantitative technique, 
optimal matching, was used. The homogeneity is represented by the degree to which topics in 
textbooks overlap as well as the degree to which the order in which they appear in the volume 
overlaps. For the quantitative analysis, the authors chose to include data from the ten best-
selling introductory publications in the fields of sociology and physics38. These publications 
were identified by interviewing editors and publishers, rather than using actual sales statistics 
(Levitt and Nass, 1989: 200-203)39.      
                                                
38 It is assumed that the authors are referring to the best-selling textbooks in the U.S., as this detail is not 
specified.    
39 It is not clear how they determined an “initial” list of best-sellers that prompted them to interview specific 
editors (or how the list of editors to interview was otherwise obtained).  




Conclusions and classifications 
Levitt and Nass found that (1989: 303-205): 
1. Garbage can-like processes are present within the technical core of the industry but 
the outcomes produced are homogenous.This is a result of paradigms within the field 
imposing constraints on the strategies used to produce the decisions.  
2. Since the institutional environment imposes normative constraints on the components 
of the GCT, one could engineer for homogenous outcomes by opening up the 
technical core to the normative influences of the environment. 
3. Within similar contexts, managers should avoid close supervision techniques as they 
would be sub-optimal strategies that are difficult to execute accurately and shouldopt 
for techniques similar to open-ended environmental scanning, that would anticipate 
and facilitate serendipitous events.     
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods are utilised within this study. Data is 
both qualitative and quantitative; the same applies to the way in which the analysis is 
conducted. It is noteworthy that although the main theoretical frame within which this article 
is situated is a positivistic one, the results suggest that an interpretivist process is both useful 
and necessary when studying decision making. In terms of testing for the GCT, this seems to 
have been done as though the theory contains elements of both process theory and variance 
theory. The data has integrity as a variety of collection methods were used to extract the data 
and multiple, diverse theoretical frames are used to make sense of the data. 
4.2.4 ‘Exploring the garbage can: a study of information flows’ (by F. 
Collins and P. Munter) – Study 12 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
Collins and Munter aim to study the behavioral implications of informal information systems 
in organisations (1990: 269). More specifically, the aspects that were focused on include role 
ambiguity, job characteristics and the work unit communication process (Collins and Munter, 
1990: 270). Informal systems are different from formal systems in that inputs and outputs are 
not standardized and hardly regular (Collins and Munter, 1990: 269). The authors argue that 
since we live in an information age, and since it has been established that informal 
information in organisations matters, more research needs to be done to look into the nature 
and implications of these systems (Collins and Munter, 1990: 270). In fact, so little is known 
that instead of testing for a hypothesis, the authors aim to contribute by using case studies to 




establish hypotheses that may afterwards be tested for in subsequent studies (Collins and 
Munter, 1999: 270). 
The GCT is the main theoretical frame used in the study. The fact that the theory is expressed 
in a general manner, and that experimental demands are fewer leads to the model being 
appropriate in this context (Collins and Munter, 1999: 272). Multiple standard instruments 
are used to gather and analyse data. Four diverse organisations were studied. The Draft and 
MacIntosh questionnaire is used to determine the differences between the information flows 
in the respective organisations. This questionnaire is targeted at unit information processing 
and the organizational factors that impact job characteristics (Collins and Munter, 1990: 272).  
Apart from this questionnaire, having the different groups in each organisation fill out two 
more questionnaires also contributed to the data. One questionnaire was on role stress and the 
other on respondents’ efficiency, as judged by themselves. All managers kept information 
logs. These logs coded communications into problems, solutions or general – a la GCT. The 
managers also had to report on the direction of the communication, e.g. from manager to 
another or from others to the manager (Collins and Munter, 1999: 274). Part of the data is 
thus structured according to garabage can elements. 
As for the analysis of the data path analytic techniques were used to establish the 
relationships between the communication variables, and also between the variables in the 
data on role stress and efficiency (Collins and Munter, 1999: 274).     
Conclusions and classifications 
Collins and Munter conclude that (1999: 276 – 277):  
1. The first hypothesis that should be studied is that both problem senders and problem 
solvers are important in terms of problem identification. 
2. The second hypothesis that should be tested for is that both general and problem type 
communications might lead to solutions being identified.  
3. The third hypothesis is that, as is the case with solution identification, general as well 
as problem related communications are important.  
4. The fourth hypothesis is that role stress is an important factor in the problem-general-
solution linkages in communication.  
5. The GCT provided sufficient structure for their purposes. 
6. The implications for practice, is that managers should endorse general 
communications (within reason). 




7. Communications flows can be improved by focusing on reducing role stress.  
Even though some of the data is qualitative initially, the quantitative techniques used for the 
analysis turns it into quantitative data, which in turn is compared and analysed again. The 
different means of collected contribute to the level of integrity of the data. The GCT is used a 
variance theory. This is argued due to the emphasis on experimental demands and the way in 
which variables are made to relate and analysed on the basis of outcomes. This study fits 
comfortably within a positivistic theoretical frame: the emphasis on quantitative analysis and 
the lack of recognizing symbolic order contributes positively to this classification.  
4.2.5 ‘The Garbage Can Model and the Study of Policy Making: A 
Critique’ (by Gary Mucciaroni) – Study 13 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
In this study, Mucciaroni seeks to illustrate the shortcomings of Kingdon’s adaption of the 
GCT by showcasing the theory’s indeterminacy within empirical cases of tax reform and 
deregulation (1992: 459). Furthermore, the article is aimed at evaluating the utility of using 
the GCT to understand changes to the items on the agenda. Specifically, the author sets out to 
determine whether the attempt to capture the ‘cloud-like’40 qualities of decision making, 
renders the theory indeterminate (1992: 462).     
The selection of tax reform and deregulation as an instance against which the theory is tested 
is not arbitrary: they are both significant at a federal level and they both exhibit the 
irregularity and unpredictability that may be understood as the cloud-like aspects of political 
affairs (Mucciaroni, 1992: 462-463). The author reports that the empirical data is made up of 
interviews conducted in Washington in 1988, as well as empirical studies from two other 
publications on tax reform. In addition to these two publications, two more publications are 
used to form the empirical base of deregulation policy. The author provides no other detail on 
the interviews conducted (Mucciaronit, 1992: 436).  
It is argued that for the theory to be tested, the abstract formulation that the three streams’ 
intersection determines the items on the agenda, must be made more concrete. This is done 
by formulating middle level propositions, so that the relation between the variables becomes 
clearer. An example of such a proposition is that “the salience of problems entailing diffuse 
                                                
40 This is a metaphorical expression borrowed from Karl Popper, as quoted by Almond and Genco (1977), to 
refer to the irregularity, disorderliness and unpredictability that often characterises political phenomena.    




economic burdens and discontent with government generally, lead to efforts to reduce 
policies with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs” (Mucciaroni, 1992: 464). The author 
develops a series of these propositions that merge the details of the empirical situation with 
the conceptual framework. The historical data is then discussed in terms of the relations 
between the variables in the theory.  
Conclusions and classifications 
Mucciaroni found that (1992: 482): 
1. The GCT could not predict the items on the agenda due to a) the high level of 
generality of the original formulation, b) neglecting structural influences and c) 
overemphasising the independence of the various streams. 
2. The theory must be adapted in order to be less ‘cloud-like’, so that accurate 
predictions may ultimately be produced.  
The nature of the data used is secondary and qualitative; the analysis is also qualitative. As is 
the case with most studies that form part of the sample, the distinction between whether the 
study belongs to an interpretivist or positivist theoretical fame is complicated. However, due 
to the emphasis on predictive capacity and generating testable hypotheses, as well as the way 
in which observations are analysed, it may be concluded that the research fits better within a 
positivistic frame. The GCT is clearly understood to be a variance theory. Consequently, it is 
tested for in a way that fits within this view: the theory should be able to explain and predict 
the changes in the items on the agenda. The data is thick as the two theoretical perspectives – 
the original GCT and Kingdon’s adaption – along with the author’s way of relating the 
abstract formulations to the empirical context, are brought to bear on the data. 
4.2.6  ‘A Load of Old Garbage: Applying Garbage Can-theory to 
Contemporary Housing Policy’ (by Anne Tiernan and Terry Burke) 
– Study 14  
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
This study is aimed at testing the applicability of Kingdon’s (2003) reformulation of the 
GCT. The theory is applied to housing policy in Australia since the 1980’s. The authors seek 
to develop an understanding of why some issues receive attention from policy makers and 
some do not (2002: 85).  




‘Garbage can theories’ are referred to as a collective and are primarily understood to be 
opposed to the rational view of policy development. Kingdon’s reformulation portrays policy 
development as chaotic and random, and as producing a loose relationship between problems 
and the policy solutions that are intended to solve them (Tiernan and Burke, 2002: 85). Due 
to the fact that policy initiatives at the time did not seem to produce a betterment of the 
housing situation in Australia, the authors argue that Kingdon’s theory might be appropriately 
matched to the situation (Tiernan and Burke, 2002: 85). 
The authors go on to impose the components of the GCT on data on the housing situation in 
Australia. The solutions, or policies, the problems, and the politics within the situation are 
identified and discussed (Tiernan and Burke, 2002: 90-95). Their means of data collection are 
not explicated by the authors themselves. Proof for their claims take up the form of legal and 
official documents, data on socio-economic indicators, and research done by other 
researchers within the field of policy making or agenda setting. 
Conclusions and classifications 
Tiernan and Burke found that (2002: 95): 
1. Public housing in Australia has weakened due to the wrong policies being coupled 
with the wrong problems in the beginning of the 1990’s. 
The data, which is mostly qualitative, is analysed in a qualitative way. The GCT is used as a 
process theory of decision making. The data seems to be relatively thin. Two theoretical 
perspectives, the original garbage can and Kingdon’s adaptation, are employed; however 
these two frames are very similar. Data sources have to be inferred. Consequently, it is 
difficult to determine the level of representativeness. It is difficult to situate this study within 
either an interpretivist or a positivistic frame. The way in which causal forces and impact are 
discussed and elaborated makes it come across as having elements of an interpretivist view, 
but it is still largely positivistic. 
4.2.7 ‘Competing ideals and the public agenda in medicare reform: The 
“garbage can” model revistited in Canada’ (by Kalu N. Kalu) – 
Study 15  
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
Kalu aims to analyse the reasons for the stalemate with regards to medicare reform policy, at 
a certain stage in the U.S.A (2005: 23). The stalemate is being studied for two reasons. The 




first is that Medicare, or compulsory health insurance for elderly U.S. citisens, was 
implemented by the federal government for the first time in 1965, and thus has a long, but 
also contentious history in U.S. policy formation (Kalu, 2005: 24). The stance on the policy 
changed in 1995 – at a time by which the broader political environment, as well as the health 
system had undergone significant change. An increasing wave of privatisation, the perception 
of privatisation’s successes and concerns over the policy’s financial viability played 
respective parts in reconsidering medicare policy (Kalu, 2005: 26).  The National Bipartisan 
Commission on the Future of Medicare was created by Congress in 1997.  The commission 
was tasked with conceiving of reform that would secure the policy’s financial viability in 
future (Kalu, 2005: 27).  However, the commission could not reach a consensus regarding 
“the virtues of a medicare program modeled on a competitive market” (Oberlander in Kalu, 
2005: 29).  
The GCT is married to the case of the medicare reform due to the author’s understanding that 
the accommodation of conflicting preferences features at the theory’s core (Kalu, 2005: 29). 
The commission being made up of members of different parties introduces goal ambiguity 
(Kalu, 2005: 27-28). Kingdon’s adaption of the GCT is applied to the data and structured 
according to the different streams. The process through which the historical data was 
collected is not explicated.  
Conclusions and classifications 
Kalu concludes that (2005: 50-51): 
1. The commission failed at its attempt at reform due to ideological differences between 
the two parties: these differences lead to issues being framed differently. 
2. Ideological differences were observably pervasive in that they guided individual 
choices at certain nodes in the process. 
3. The GCT provides a basis from which to analyse the phenomenon, but cannot 
accurately describe the policy process as the role of deliberate actions by participants 
are not accounted for by the theory.  
The data and the analysis are qualitative. Only one theory is brought to bear on the data; this 
translates to the data being thin.  Again, despite ambiguity being recognised, the study would 
not fit well into an interpretivist frame. From all the studies in the sample, this one poses the 
biggest challenge in terms of fitting the authors’ approach into either process theory or 
variance theory. Chronological order does play a role, however, the dissection of the data 




according to the various streams does attest to variance theory. On the basis of the point of 
critique raised against the theory, it is argued that the authors expected the theory to function 
as a variance theory of decision making. Methodology cannot not be commented on, since it 
is not made explicit.  
4.2.8 ‘A ‘Garbage Can Model’ of UN Peacekeeping’ (by Michael Lipson) – 
Study 16 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
Lipson attempts to explain the change in the approach to peacekeeping by the United Nations 
after the Cold War. The change in approach could be summarised as a dramatic increase in 
the number of peacekeeping missions that were undertaken by the UN Security Council, with 
a corresponding increase in the number of personnel deployed. Secondly, peacekeeping was 
attempted in situations where principles that applied during the Cold War would have meant 
peacekeeping would not be undertaken. Lastly, the very nature of peacekeeping changed as 
‘second generation peacekeeping was starting to be practiced: the UN now endeavoured into 
missions that were aimed at addressing intra-state conflict and nation building (Lipson, 2007: 
79).   
The GCT of agenda setting is employed to account for this change. Kingdon’s adaption of the 
GCT is thus the main theoretical frame that is imposed on the data (Lipson, 2007: 79).   
The theory is argued to fit the empirical context as the UN could legitimately be viewed as an 
organised anarchy, according to the author. The organisation is characterised by uncertain 
preferences largely due to the differences between the preferences of the member states 
(Lipson, 2007: 85), unclear organisational processes, and fluid participation in organisational 
decision making (Lipson, 2007: 80). In addition to exhibiting the characteristics of an 
organised anarchy, the environment within which the UN operates is also understood to be 
ambiguous. The theory, which is understood to describe a state of ambiguity, therefore fits 
well (Lipson, 2007: 86), but is adapted somewhat in order to accommodate an international, 
rather than domestic, context.   
The author discusses the data in terms of the components of the theory. The methodology 
surrounding the design choices of which publications and documentation to include in the 
study is not explicated. A series of empirical political studies as well as historical texts are 
cited.  




Conclusions and classifications 
Lipson found that (2007: 92 – 93): 
1. By categorising the data on the events according to the garbage can’s components, a) 
the end of the war may be understood as an opened policy window, whereas b) the 
intra-state conflict and the peacekeeping respectively may be seen as the problem and 
the solution that were coupled together.  
2. The garbage can is useful in terms of an enhanced understanding of the contingent 
nature of the process. 
3. The garbage can perspective may be utilised to infer general characteristics of a 
policy that would be likely to be adopted. 
The data and the analysis thereof are of a qualitative nature. It is difficult to conclude 
regarding the integrity of the data, because the research design is not made explicit by the 
author. Both Kingdon’s adaption and the original GCT are used in interpreting the data. The 
garbage can is utilised as a process theory. It is argued that due to the linear reasoning based 
on observed behavioural events, the study is largely positivistic.    
 
4.2.9 ‘Garbage-Can Decision Making and the Accommodation of 
Uncertainty in New Drug Development Work’ (by Styhre, Wikmalm, 
Olilla and Roth) – Study 17 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
Styhre, Wikmalm, Olilla and Roth discuss the non-linear nature of decision processes within 
innovation-environments. For the authors, this non-linearity translates to garbage can 
decision making taking place, despite the orderly nature of scientific research and despite the 
tightly controlled processes and guidelines. Identifying decision making within this sphere as 
garbage can-like is based on behavioural studies within pharmaceutical companies indicating 
that organisational politics are prevalent. In turn, the authors relate this phenomenon to a high 
amount of uncertainty within the domain of scientific innovation (2010: 134-135).   
The GCT is presented as an effective metaphor for how decisions are made in organisations. 
This is substantiated by the claim that most people who are experienced in terms of taking 
part in organisational decision making, can see the value in examining decisions in garbage 
can terms. The garbage can theory is linked to the companies in the pharmaceutical industry 




via an observed correspondence between decision behaviour in these firms and some of the 
characteristics of an organised anarchy, such as fluid participation. Furthermore, it’s easy to 
see that smaller cans (or decision situations) are situated amongst other cans and also within 
larger cans (Styhre et al., 2010: 137-138). The ties with the original garbage can theory do 
exist, but are weak.   
Since decision making within this environment is characterised by uncertainty and non-
linearity, the authors argue that participants are in need of ‘coping strategies’ with which to 
deal with emerging situations (Styhre et al., 2010: 138). The aim is to study the coping 
strategies employed within garbage cans. The authors explain that the term coping strategy is 
borrowed from psychology and that it refers to the capability of an agent to effectively handle 
emerging situations using skills, emotional responses and scripted performances (Styhre et 
al., 2010: 138).  
The case presented is that of decision making procedures around the development of a new 
drug in a large, multi-national pharmaceutical company, the pseudonym of which is 
PharmaCo. The company is said to operate in the US, the UK and Sweden. The decision 
making processes of three different clinical trial management teams – which operate at a 
middle-management level – were examined. Each of these teams was situated at a different 
branch of the company, but all were located in Sweden. Teams are reported to have consisted 
of ‘four functions’ and one project manager (Styhre et al., 2010:137). No information is given 
as to the actual number of participants within each team.  
The decisions made concerned confirmatory clinical trial studies that aimed to provide 
support for the benefits of a newly developed drug. The research team gathered data via 
participant observation during meetings and one hour long semi-structured interviews, which 
consisted at least in part of open ended questions. Interviews were conducted with three to 
five members of the three groups (Styhre et al., 2010: 139).  
Conclusions and classifications  
The authors found that (2010: 139 – 145): 
1. Their hypothesis regarding the garbage can-like nature of the middle management 
processes within the firm was correct. 
2. That four coping strategies are employed by the decision makers within middle 
management when faced with ambiguity:  




a. the tendency to work towards understanding politics within the organisation;  
b.  the gathering of information that might be used in making sense of decisions 
that have been taken;  
c.  the development of scenarios that are applicable to the various possible 
outcomes of a decision process;  
d.  the support of emotional work on the part of co-workers.   
   
The data is qualitative. The analysis is also qualitative. It is, however, difficult to tell whether 
the data constitutes a good representation as some of the relevant variables are not discussed. 
The data is thick as multiple theoretical perspectives are incorporated into the study. Two 
means of collecting data are employed: one would have been inadequate, but three would 
have attested to the merit of the research with more confidence. The GCT is applied more as 
a process theory (as opposed to a variance theory). The importance of sensemaking and 
interpretation within the empirical context is recognised by the authors, but their analysis is 
more positivistic than interpretivistic as it centres on observable behaviour. 
4.2.10 ‘Customer orientation and management control in the public 
sector: a garbage can analysis’ (by Fredrika Wiesel, Sven Modell 
and Jodie Moll) – Study 18 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
The authors aim to comment on the tendency to treat citisens as if they were customers, when 
providing them with public services.  More specifically, they study the effect of the customer 
focus on management control practices in a specific decision making process in a Swedish 
government agency (Wiesel, Modell and Moll, 2010: 551).  The setting is the Swedish Road 
Administration (SRA). The agency is responsible for road construction and maintenance as 
well as road infrastructure planning (2010: 556). 
The authors distinguish their attempt by stating that research within accounting management 
has responded to customer-orientation in one of two ways: 1) by adopting a critical theory 
perspective, from which the customer focus leads to the commodification of services and 
undermines democratic values; 2) by conducting empirical studies and using institutional 
theories to interpret the data (Wiesel et al., 2010: 552). The authors seek to combine these 
two approaches and they also aim to extend the insights that stand to be gained by employing 




the garbage can theory (2010: 552). The argument presented is that these two strands are 
consistent with the view that a customer focus in the public realm induces garbage can 
situations, as customer focus introduces obtrusive forms of power into decision making and 
action in public organisations (2010: 556). The two strands offer opposing predictions 
regarding the secondary effect of the customer centred control practices. Critical theory 
advocates that ambiguity will be reduced and that customer orientation will become 
institutionalised. Institutional theorists venture more nuanced claims by drawing attention to 
the limiting effect of structural constraints and the ideology that characterise public 
organisations (2010: 556).  
The specific decision process that is the subject of analysis concerns the attempt to immerse 
later control practices into Total Quality Management.  These control practices were intended 
to give extant control practices a more customer orientated focus (2010: 553). The new 
control practices came to light via the development of “customer programmes” (2010: 557), a 
project that was undertaken over the time span eight months (2010: 557).  
Data was collected over a period of three years. The collection process included 40 semi-
structured interviews, observations of 13 formal meetings, informal discussions with key 
players and the study of archival material. Feedback seminars were held to control for the 
accuracy of the observations and inferences (2010: 557). The data is structured 
chronologically. The GCT is brought to bear on the data in that it is presented as a series of 
interrelated choice opportunities (2010: 558).    
Conclusions and classifications  
Wiesel et al. conclude that (2010: 572 – 576): 
1. The customer programmes had little effect on the control measures, and resulting 
organisational action.  
2. This is due, in part, to the lack of explicit integration between the customer 
programmes and the existent vertical control practices.  
3. Critical theory perspectives are justified in that the customer focused control 
mechanisms did reduce the customer-orientated focus to its measurable aspects. 




4. The above mentioned did not result in a noticeable constraint on the multiple 
interpretations of what customer needs entail. This culminated in a garbage can 
situation. 
5. GCT accounts for the outcome in that the difficulty in integrating the new 
programmes was found to be due to the sheer complexity of managing ambiguity. 
6. The specific institutional arrangements will determine whether customer orientation 
initiatives will effect professional values and conduct.  
7. Garbage can processes moderate the potential power of novel control practices.  
8. GCT can be employed productively if problems and solutions are not treated as 
endogenous to organisations. The theory becomes potent as soon as attention is paid 
to the broader organizational context.  
9. The GCT is best applied along side other theoretical perspectives.  
The data as well as the analysis is qualitative. The garbage can is used in a way that is more 
consistent with process theories of decision-making. The variety that characterises the 
approach to data collection enhances the validity of the results.  Symbolic orders are 
recognised by the authors. Although these orders are not explored in depth, the integration of 
three theoretical perspectives to analyse the data brings about a thick description and makes it 
easier to locate the study within an interpretivist theoretical frame.   
4.2.11 From policing the garbage can to garbage can policing’ (by 
Pieter van Reenen)  – Study 19 
Aim, theoretical concerns and research design 
The author aims to produce an explanation for the failure of policing reform efforts in Latin 
American countries (Van Reenen, 2010: 459).  The GCT is utilised in this pursuit. It is 
argued that the theory is appropriate as the political environment in Latin American Countries 
resembles organised anarchy (Van Reenen, 2010: 461). 
The GCT is applied on two levels. The author refers to ‘policing the garbage can’ when 
discussing the effects of the garbage can nature of political decision making, and its 
subsequent effects on policing (Van Reenen, 2010: 463). ‘Garbage can policing’, in turn, 
refers the phenomenon where policing starts to manifest as garbage can processes.   




Multiple empirical studies on policing in Latin American countries form the data that are seen 
in terms of the GCT. The way in which the specific studies were selected is not explicated. 
The data is presented thematically, according to the distinction between the garbage can 
nature of political decisions that influence policing and the garbage can nature of policing 
activities themselves. The data is thus not structured according to the elements of the theory, 
nor is it structured according to chronological order of the events. Rather, what seems to be 
the author’s interpretation of important drivers, categories and results organizes the data. The 
discussion of the drivers and the results of garbage can policing and garbage can decisions on 
policing incorporates language associated with the theory (see e.g. 2010: 464). The author 
also refers to central propositions of the theory throughout the discussion. An example of this 
kind of reference is the following (2010: 464): “The police let the requirements of the 
situation guide them instead of formal arrangements. This is logical, as ‘garbage cans’ 
translate to tough conditions for proper policing…Formal decision-making with a view to a 
long terms solution of policing problems is…hard to find in the garbage can.”   
Conclusions and classifications  
Van Reenen’s final conclusions include that (2010: 475 – 476): 
1. Garbage can decision making, essentially, is a political problem. Or, in other words, 
garbage cans exist due to the failure of political processes to create order. 
2. Garbage can policing is a result of the nature of political decision making on the 
policing matters.  
3. Attempts at reforming the nature of policing should include structural change on the 
policy level, as well working at the culture within the police force. 
4. Radical political change is unlikely to be a solution in Latin American countries. 
5. It is more likely that policing would resemble garbage cans than that change would 
occur.  
The study makes use of secondary qualitative data. The analysis is also qualitative. Only one 
theoretical perspective, along with the author’s interpretation has been brought to bear on the 
data. It is difficult to determine whether the sample of studies used is adequate, as the greater 
domain – or population – is not sketched by the author. The garbage can is used more as a 
variance theory, than a process theory. Outcomes of decisions – by political actors, as well as 
members of the police, are emphasised. Symbolic orders are not recognized. Since it is 
obvious that the author categorises data, according to his interpretation of other studies, it 
makes sense to conclude that something of the interpretivist perspective is reflected. 




However, it has positivist elements in that phenomena are perceived and categorised at face 
value.  
4.3 Discussion of the findings 
Of the fourty-eight distinguishable conclusions accounted for in the previous sections, seven 
pertain to goal ambiguity. Another way of expressing the relationship would be to state that, 
out of the 11 texts that constitute the sample, three could produce insights on goal ambiguity. 
Once again, this result needs to be discussed in light of the traits of the studies, as well as the 
nature of the GCT. Also, the specific conclusions need to be discussed – even if there are 
very few, some or all of them might by profoundly significant within the frame of a TOF (as 
discussed in section 2.4). 
The characteristics of the various studies, along with certain quality measures and whether 
the study delivered insights on goal ambiguity, are presented visually in Figure C (on the 
following page). This representation is similar to Figure B in the previous chapter. One 
column has been added to indicate whether Kingdon’s adaptation of the garbage can is used 
to interpret the data. The different shade of green in the first row indicates that Kingdon’s 
study is distinct from the others as the results illustrated are actually representative of twenty-
three case studies. The red blocks indicate that those categories were not relevant to the 
















The studies that produced insights on goal ambiguity are studies number ten, seventeen and 
eighteen. Similar to the previous chapter’s findings, these studies have very little in common 
that is also unique to them. Based on the sample, however, one can see that a study 30% more 
likely to produce insights on goal ambiguity if the GCT is utilised as a process theory. But 
what of the studies that are not succesful by this metric? The inverse applies in that a study is 
less likely to be unsuccesful when the GCT is utilised as a process theory of decision making, 
albeit only marginally: three out of the unsuccesful studies showed signs of using the GCT as 
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result is not due to the sample being biased towards process theories, as the same amount of 
studies feature in the variance and process theory columns respectively. Thus there is an 
observable pattern, if not easily observable: the process theory interpretaion of the GCT is 
somewhat more likely to  deliver knowledge on goal ambiguity.    
What is more noteworthy, especially since the same pattern emerged from the previous 
sample, is that a study is 50% more likely to explicitly state or recognise the significance, or 
relevance, of interpretative order if the GCT was used as a process theory.     
A cluster of three conclusions from study number ten report on how, in a situation 
characterised by goal ambiguity, bureaucrats used goals they knew best, or that were familiar 
to them. The goal ambiguity, that is also reported to drain the bureaucrats emotionally and 
intellectualy, is thus overcome by the temporary suspension relatively new criteria. These 
conclusions relate to the theme of paying attention to intuitive responses. It extends a warning 
in that it cautions that goal ambiguity can take up different forms of employee energy. Also, 
from the perspective of a TOF, coping with ambiguity by reverting to previous states would 
not be an effective way of managing the strain. These conclusions thus alludes to a specific 
challenge that the TOF will have to overcome.    
The coping strategies introduced at the end of study number seventeen, also bring us closer to 
understanding how people within organisations handle the experience of ambiguity, of which 
goal ambiguity forms a part. These conclusions are the result of the authors incorporating 
theory on coping strategies into their study. The combination of the garbage can with another 
particular kind of theoretical frame thus proves useful in terms of creating knowledge on goal 
ambiguity. One of the four strategies that were present in PharmaCo’s trial management 
relates to the idea of a TOF in a way that is similar to the conclusions discussed in the 
previous paragraph. The study confrms that members of the organisation went through effort 
to find ways of dealing with emotional responses to non-linear decision processes. In other 
words, the emotional impact was recognised and addressed deliberatly.  
Study number eighteen’s conclusions regarding goal ambiguity are in keeping with those 
presented in studies ten and seventeen. Here it was found that when confronted with goal 
ambiguity and having to take action, people relied on norms to direct their action.  
Testing for emotional responses to the experience of ambiguity is thus necessary in order to 
build a TOF. Prescriptive rules should address ways in which members could handle and 




perceive emotional responses. It needs to be determined whether certain members of the 
organisation respond better to the experience of ambiguity than others; in this way, leadership 
will be able to engineer for certain members taking part in situations characterised by goal 
ambiguity while others are directed at functions and situations where pre-existent goals are 
clear.  
The current visible means of overcoming, or handling the experience of goal ambiguity will 
have to be researched from the perspective of a TOF. Depending on which norms are relied 
on, this way of coping might be fruitful if acting before thinking is pursued.  A big part of the 
rationale for a TOF is goal ambiguity’s propensity to facilitate innovation. With this in mind, 
the reliance on known, familiar criteria when confronted with goal ambiguity is probably an 
effect that will have to be countered by a TOF.  
Based on the results discussed at the end of the previous chapter and on the results of the 
second leg of the study discussed above, it is clear that empirical applications of the GCT 
were relatively unfruitful in terms of contributing knowledge on goal ambiguity that is 
actionable within the frame of a TOF. Before it is concluded that the theory itself is of limited 
use for researchers interested in goal ambiguity, the theory as well as the nature of the studies 
in which it has been applied need to be discussed critically.          
4.4 Critical discussion 
An exploration of the reasons why the GCT was unsuccessful at studying ambiguous goals in 
the case studies in the sample will aid the development of a prescriptive framework for future 
research. By pointing out the factors that inhibit the theory’s capacity to produce rich 
descriptions on ambiguous goals, researchers may be equipped with knowledge of which type 
of theory and methodology is needed to research ambiguity in a meaningful way.  
4.4.1 Critique of the garbage can theory 
Bendor et al. (2001) provide the only systematic critique of the GCT and its lineage. This 
critique will be built on by incorporating other sources that have also commented critically on 
the theory.  
Bendor et al.’s critique centres on the incompatibility of the verbal theory, or “the basic 
ideas” (Cohen et al., 1972: 2-3), and the FORTRAN simulation model that accompanied the 
introduction of verbal theory (this distinction was discussed in the introduction chapter, 




section 1.4.1.2).  The fundamental philosophy is criticised for not being good science, as its 
claims are not falsifiable (Bendor et al., 2001: 170). Certain aspects of the critique are 
vulnerable. These aspects will be pointed out.    
4.4.1.1 Critique on the verbal theory  
Bendor et al. report that the two versions of the theory are generally not treated as distinct and 
that this confusion, amongst other things, prevents the theory from making orderly scientific 
progress (Bendor et al, 2001: 187). The former part of the statement is substantiated by the 
difficulty experienced during the course of the current research effort. Testing for the verbal 
theory is complicated by the fact that the verbal theory and the implications of the first 
simulation model have been conflated by numerous researchers: Pinfield (1986: 366); Levitt 
and Nass (1989: 190); Moch and Pondy (1977: 255); Weiner (1976); Crecine (1986); 
Weissinger-Baylon (1986). The confusion with regard to the primary nature of the theory is 
exhibited when Bromiley refers to the garbage can as a ‘perspective’, an ‘approach’ and a 
‘framework’ within a single study (1986: 122, 139).  
Bendor et al. argue that progress can only be made by developing a causal logic which the 
original formulation of the theory lacks (2001: 187). Five points of critique against the verbal 
theory are aired, three of which are relevant for the current purposes. 
The incorporation of a micro theory and the intendedly rational actor 
Firstly, Bendor et al. argue that the theory should not be referred to as a theory of choice, as 
what it actually describes is a process and a structure. ‘Choice’, for the authors, implies 
decision making in which individuals take part actively, yet their macro theory is not 
complemented by a micro theory that describes what drives individual decision making 
(Bendor et al., 2001: 171). The lack of a micro theory is also noted and listed as a drawback 
by Hughes (1986), Weiner (2007) and Pinfield (1986).   
The last point of critique aired by Bendor et al. clearly relates directly to the first point, to the 
extent that they should have been discussed within the same argument. I refer to the point that 
the GCT’s rejection of the key tenet of the Carnegie School, namely the idea that individuals 
are intendedly rational, leads to the loss of the rigorous methodology associated with the 
behavioural tradition of the Carnegie School (Bendor et al., 2001: 274). For these authors, the 
theory forms part of the institutional school of organisation theory, rather than being part of a 
behavioural tradition in researching choices (2001: 174). Relaxing the assumption of 
exogenous goals, which is typical of micro theories within the behavioural tradition means 




that it becomes impossible to theoretically predict behaviour and to generate falsifiable 
implications (Bendor et al., 2001: 171-172). Mucciaroni (1992) and Pinfield (1986) agree 
with Bendor et al. that the theory does not generate falsifiable claims. Mucciaroni argues that 
the formulation of the theory comes close to being a truism. The variables are deemed too 
vague and all-encompassing. As a result, the concepts function merely as categories 
according to which data can be organised (1992: 463-464). Pinfield’s critique is that the 
confusion around the level of analysis leads to applications of the theory varying to a large 
degree (1986: 366). 
Lipson (2007) and Moch and Pondy (1977), on the other hand, attest to the exact opposite in 
that their empirical studies have showcased the predictive capacity of the GCT. While Moch 
and Pondy argue that the theory does generate falsifiable hypothesis (1977: 355), upon closer 
inspection all the statements they list are implications derived from the computer simulation, 
not the verbal theory.   
One can argue that the lack of a micro theory is a significant factor in explaining the 
empirical studies’ lack of insight into goal ambiguity. Ultimately, the way in which decision 
making entities – either individual participants or organisational units – perceive their 
preferences or goals needs to be incorporated into a theory that aims to describe 
circumstances characterised by goal ambiguity.  
However, it not argued here that the Cohen and colleagues should have incorporated rational 
choice presuppositions on the level of the participants. However, some assumptions regarding 
goal finding behaviour or perceptions around goals needed to be incorporated if the theory 
was aimed at describing goal ambiguity. Selznick supports this notion in stating that the 
understanding of social situations will only be achieved once methodological individualism is 
incorporated (1996: 274). This statement should not have to undermine the importance of 
macro phenomena. It indicates that larger phenomena are “produced in and 
through…behaviour of individuals” (1996: 274). Langley et al. express the same idea by 
stating that theories the GCT dehumanises the process by not recognising that decision 
makers are actors that become inspired, and have insight and memories which they utilise in 
the process of making decisions (1995: 268).   Kalu has voiced a similar point of critique 
(2005: 51). 




More importantly, Selznick also argues that individual behavoirs include individuals’ 
perceptions of self and of others and that this behaviour need not conform to rational actor 
models (1996: 274).  
Allowing for the inter-dependence amongst streams 
Secondly, the central idea of the component streams being independent is criticised. Bendor 
et al. point out that people are the carriers of problems and solutions and that the streams 
therefore cannot be treated as independent (2001: 172). The same critique is aired by Weiner 
(1976). This is relevant to goal ambiguity because, as is the case with the need for micro 
theoretical assumption, it argues for participants being awarded a more prominent role in the 
decision making process. By viewing the streams as more dependent on participants, the 
possibility to study problems’ and solutions’ effects on goals is born. This approach was 
taken by Collins and Munter (1999). Their study on the behavioral aspects of informal 
information systems, shows that the GCT may be applied succesfully if the relationship 
between the streams is reenvisioned.  
Shallow portrayel of organisational structure and the concept ‘organised anarchy 
Two points of critique that are valid, but that are less relevant to goal ambiguity is that the 
portrayel of organisational structure as well as the definition of ‘organised anarchy’ is vague. 
As for organisational structure, its origin, its design and the ways in which it changes are left 
unaccounted for. (2001: 172-173). This point has its predecessors: Padgett (1980); Carley 
(1986); Masuch and LaPotin (1989:43); Langley et al. (1995).  
The problem with ‘organised anarchy’ is that Cohen et al. are not clear as to whether some or 
all of the characteristics of an organised anarchy need to be present for a situation to be 
classified as such. This brings about confusion as to which circumstances the theory aims to 
describe. In addition to the relation between the characteristics being unclear, the meanings of 
the distinct properties, goal ambiguity being one of which, are also not clear (2001: 173-174). 
This could be relevant to the research aims of this thesis. Mapping the different ways in 
which goal ambiguity may be understood enables a researcher to focus on a specific area. It 
could be problematic that conceptual nuances are not made explicit. However, other points of 
critique are more relevant to the aim of developing a prescriptive framework for research on 
goal ambiguity.  A definition of goal ambiguity was established in the introductory chapter. 
Admittedly, this definition is broad, however, this leaves scope for development as more 
research on the phenomenon is done.   





From this discussion the essence of the critique is the absence of active decision makers. The 
lack of a micro theory, the problems around the absence of intended rationality, as well as the 
streams being more interdependent than the theory claims, all relate to the role of the decision 
maker. These points of critiqe shed light on the theory’s inability to deliver insight on goal 
ambiguity, with the exception of the remark on inteded rationality. If the aim is to build a 
TOF with the sought after insights on goal ambiguity, the assumption of intended rationality 
cannot be reintroduced.  
4.4.1.2 Metaphor versus theory 
A point that illuminates Bendor et al.’s critique on GCT, but which is not addressed within 
their critique, is that Bendor et al. recognise that some researchers refer to the GCT as a 
metaphor (2001: 171). Bendor et al. do not provide examples of studies where this is the case, 
however the following studies serve as examples: Dyckman refers to the garbage can as an 
image imposed on organisational activity (1981: 296); Anderson and Fischer (1986) have 
referred to the theory as a metaphor and have related this to the difficulty of testing for the 
empirical accuracy of the theory. Other authors have also explicated their understanding of 
the garbage can as a metaphor: Anderson (1983), Styhre et al. (2010), Elström (1983) 
Langley et al. (1995: 262).  
Bendor et al. state that although the comparison to a metaphor is not unjustified, accepting 
the theory as a metaphor shields it from criticism (2001: 171). A metaphor is a literary device 
that is evaluated in a different way to social scientific theory (Bendor et al., 2001: 171). The 
authors argue that it is clear enough that the verbal theory was intended to contribute to social 
theory and therefore should be treated accordingly (Bendor et al., 2001: 171).  
The point of critique (addressed in 4.4.1.1) regarding the rigor of the methodology relates 
directly to the unwillingness to accept that the GCT could be viewed or even utilised as a 
metaphor. This stance toward the GCT as a metahphor opens up the ideological tensions not 
only between Bendor et al. and Cohen et al, but also explains why other researchers have 
experienced the same set of ideas in radically different ways.  Cohen et al. claim to to want to 
study ambiguous goals and its effect on organisational processes (1972: 1). Bendor et al.’s 
critique on the lack of methodological rigor, would be valid, if the aim were to develop a 
behavioural model that could be tested for in a quantitative way. However, this was not 
Cohen et al.’s intention. This exact point is made by Olsen in an article that serves as a 




response to Bendor et al.’s critique. Olsen refers to Bendor et al.’s suggestions of 
incorporating rational principal agent assumptions as regressive, as it is unaligned with the 
aims of the GCT (2001: 191-192). He goes further in stating that Bendor et al.’s narrow view 
of what constitutes “valuable…science” (2001: 191), namely formal modelling,  prevents 
them from taking part in the development of garbage can ideas (2001: 194). It is important to 
note that despite the explication that understanding organisational effects requires moving 
beyond functional-instrumental terms (2001: 195), Olsen does not suggest specific tools, 
concepts or models, that would help the researcher to venture beyond this view. 
The ‘conversation’ between the authors makes it clear that Bendor et al. and Cohen et al. hold 
contradicting ideas of what constitutes proper scientific knowledge about decision making in 
organisations. From Bendor et al.’s emphasis on the falsifiability of theoretical claims and 
rejection of the garbage can as being similar to a literary device, it may be inferred that these 
theorists are situated at a more positivistic side of the spectrum. Olsen, on the other hand, 
emphasises the garbage can ‘spirit’ as one that challenges functionalist, instrumental ideas 
surrounding decision making in organisations (2001: 192). He goes as far as stating that by 
viewing decisions as purely instrumental, researchers would not be able to contribute to 
garbage can ideas (2001:194). Claiming that understanding is enhanced by incorporating 
institutionalist ideas implies that he values the inquiry into symbolic orders. Valuing 
symbolic order, in turn, suggests more of an interpretivist theoretical frame.  
There is another tension, or conflict, regarding the way in which the theory is perceived, 
namely between applying the theory as a variance theory or as a process theory of decision 
making. Understanding this tension may yield insight into why the garbage can’s applications 
have largely failed at delivering insights on goal ambiguity.  
The depiction of the characteristics of the studies in Figure B (chapter three) shows that the 
GCT is mostly used as a process theory within the publications that form part of the GCRP. 
Figure C (chapter four) depicts that studies done independently have utilised the theory as 
process and variance theory to similar degrees..From this it can be inferred that the theory has 
the curious propensity to be applied as a variance theory and process theory. This dual 
propensity may have been predicted when one considers the following statement found in the 
original garbage can article: “In the garbage can model… a decision is an outcome or 
interpretation of several relatively independent streams” (1972: 2-3)41 Depending on which 
                                                
41 The emphasis is my own.  




one of the two is given more weight, the theory may be used as either a variance theory or a 
process theory.  
Many studies in the sample use qualitative data and view GCT as a process theory, but none 
of these studies make use of the models that traditionally accompany process theories of 
decision making. Narrative models should be included into the attempt to understand the data 
(Poole and Van de Ven, 2010: 544-549). The opportunity for using narrative models is 
illustrated by the high correlation between studies that apply the theory as a process theory, 
and those in which the authors recognise the importance of symbolic order, as pointed out in 
discussions on both samples.    
It is not being argued that viewing or using the GCT as a variance theory is incorrect or 
inappropriate. It is rather argued that using it as a process theory is best accompanied by 
sophisticated methods and theories for studying narratives. Additionally, it is argued that the 
sample shows that where the GCT is utilised as a process theory, if by a small margin, the 
chances of gaining insight on goal ambiguity are bigger. Furthermore, process theories of 
decision making are in keeping with Olsen’s appeal (2001) to move away from a purely 
instrumental view on decision making, as the decision process is in sharper focus than the 
decision outcome. Since narratives and discourse are necessarily and obviously tied to human 
communication, interaction and interpretation, Selznick’s appeal (1996) to focus on the 
individual’s maneuvers will be adhered to. 
Based on the results and these premises, a normative framework for studying goal ambiguity 
will now be formulated.   
4.4.2 A normative framework for studying goal ambiguity in future  
Based on the analysis of the nature of the 19 studies, as well as the critical discussion of the 
theory’s traits, suggestions may be made as to how to study goal ambiguity in such a way that 
it would lead to a TOF: 
1. Data needs to be interpreted using theories that allow for or incorporate active 
decision making entities, and which recognise that these entities engage goals, despite 
not engaging them in the way conceived of by rational choice theory. 
2. Consequently, if the GCT is used to interpret data, an additional theoretical 
framework that fits the above criterion needs to be used alongside the GCT. 




3. Using the GCT as a process theory might be useful for studying goal ambiguity, as 
long as methods and theories for studying narratives are incorporated in the analysis.  
4. Goal ambiguity needs to be studied in its capacity as a phenomenon that causes 
emotional strain, amongs other forms of strain, and emotional responses, in members 
of the organisation. Ambiguity may be coped with, or managed, in ways that counter 
what needs to be achieved through a TOF.  
5. Other themes that need to be researched in order for a TOF to be developed include: 
symbolic expressions (such as metaphors), tactile or visual experiences, the role of 
identity (that of the focal decision maker and the people he or she cooperates with), 
the idea of enacting the world, as opposed to having to predict its state.  
4.5 Summary 
Empirical research applying the GCT and conducted by researchers who are independent of 
the GCRP was studied. These studies were shown to have delivered very little knowledge on 
goal ambiguity that is actionable within the process of building a TOF.  
The studies’ failure to produce insights on goal ambiguity was discussed in light of the traits 
of the studies as well as the critique against the GCT. In as far as the attributes of the theory 
itself go, it was argued that the theory’s ignorance toward active decision making entities has 
a negative impact on its capacity to provide insights on ambiguous goals. Furthermore, the 
application of the theory as a process theory of decision making, without combining it with 
theories and methods for understanding narratives, is unlikely to deliver insights on goal 
ambiguity. Therefore, these methods and theories should be used in combination with the 
garbage can when it is used to understand, or unpack, the process through which a certain 
decision has come to be made.   
In terms of the sparse insight on goal ambiguity that was found, a TOF is likely to include 
theories on emotional responses to goal ambiguity as well as prescriptive theories for 
managing these responses in ways that to not counter the aim of a TOF. 




Chapter 5: Conclusions 
5.1 Main Conclusions 
This thesis attempted to establish how research on goal ambiguity in organisational decision 
making should be done if the aim is to develop a TOF. Case studies applying the GCT were 
scrutinised to infer which type of study – in terms of both approach, or methodology, and 
themes - is more or less successful at delivering insights on goal ambiguity.  
The GCT, originally developed fourty years ago, is a particularly influential descriptive 
theory on organisational decision making. In the process of drawing conclusions on whether 
the theory is capable of delivering insights on goal ambiguity, the theory itself is looked at 
through a critical lens. By dealing with both GCT and the notion of a TOF, the content of the 
thesis is relevant for both descriptive and normative theories on organisational decision 
making.  
Although the idea for the development of a TOF was presented in the 1970’s, very little 
empirical work has since been done to breathe life into the original fomrulation of the 
framework. The paucity of attempts has been ascribed to rational choice theory, along with its 
emphasis on clear, pre-existent goals, being deeply entrenched in a modernist approach to 
viewing both the world and knowledge on it. However, this thesis presents the argument that 
fostering ambiguous goals could very well be intelligent behaviour in a multitude of different 
spheres. Decision makers operating within conditions of goal ambiguity are in need of 
prescriptive tools and models with which to improve processes and judgements. These tools 
will either not come to exist at all or will have a slim chance of being effective if research on 
organisational decision making does not produce insights on goal ambiguity.  
To develop prescriptions for research on goal ambiguity that would be useful in developing a 
TOF, case study data on organisational decision making was harvested for insights on the 
topic. The result of this harvest aimed to inform thematic prescriptions. It also aimed to 
identify patterns in the characteristics of the studies, so as to develop a normative framework 
for the approach and methods of future research on goal ambiguity. The extent to which these 
aims have been achieved will now be discussed by referring back to the research questions 
listed in chapter one.  




5.1.1 What is the state of the art regarding a technology of foolishness? 
It was shown, in chapter two, that few attempts at contributing to a TOF exist. There are 
plenty of examples of research that delves empirically and conceptually into the idea that goal 
ambiguity might be intelligent behavior. However, these attempts have not yet delivered a 
coherent normative framework for inducing action under conditions of goal ambiguity. 
The research on a TOF that does exist adresses the following themes: the role of symbolic 
expressions (such as metaphors), the facilitative role of tactile or visual experiences, the role 
of intuition and emotional expression in the decision making process, the role of identity (that 
of the focal decision maker and the people he or she cooperates with), the idea of enacting the 
world, as opposed to having to predict its state. 
5.1.2 What is the connection between goal ambiguity and a TOF?  
The argument for ambiguous goals’ potential to be an artefact of intelligent behaviour was 
made in chapter two. It was also shown that circumstances within which goals are ambiguous 
are plentiful and widespread. Decision making entities within these environments require a 
theory through which this form of intelligence may be developed and refined. A TOF would 
serve this purpose. Thus research on goal ambiguity that is geared for delivering particular 
insights is needed to build a TOF.    
5.1.3 What can we take to constitute the GCRP? 
For the purpose of ordering the case studies that were analysed, a distinction was made 
between studies that form part of the GCRP and case studies that were done independently of 
this programme. The constituency of this research program was discussed in chapter three. 
Bendor and his colleagues were the first to attempt a definition of what constitutes a garbage 
can research programme. Their definition included the following publications: 1) the original 
1972 article, ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice’; 2) Ambiguity and Choice in 
Organisations (1976); 3) Ambiguity and Command (1986); 4) ‘The New Institutionalism: 
Organisational Factors in Political Life’ (1984); and 5) Rediscovering Institutions 
(1989).  Leadership and Ambiguity (1974) is not included in the grouping.  
The various texts were analysed with a focus on isolating the GCT’s role and influence 
within each of the larger texts. Criticism by Selznick was considered. Subsequently, this 
definition was altered for the purpose of this thesis. Multiple measures or indicators were 
considered: references to the original article, the theory’s components featuring as taken for 




granted within some of the texts, overlapping themes, purported causal relationships between 
publications, the way in which the theory is brought to bear on the data within the various 
empirical studies and the way in which the garbage can, amongst other ideas and theories, is 
used to construct a new theory.  The consideration of these factors yielded the following 
understanding of what constitutes the GCRP: 1) the original 1972 article, ‘Garbage Can 
Models of Organisational Choice’, 2) Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations (1976), and 3) 
Ambiguity and Command (1986). This understanding is supported by Cohen et al. in their 
recent review on the GCT’s legacy (2012: 23). 
5.1.4 Did the GCRP produce insights into goal ambiguity through the 
application of the theory to empirical data?  
The content of chapter three clearly illustrates that the case studies that apply the GCT and 
which form part of the GCRP have produced very little insight pertaining to goal ambiguity. 
Two of the studies, out of a sample of eight, yielded knowledge on goal ambiguity. However, 
these conclusions relate situational characteristics, more specifically deadlines and response 
times, to goal ambiguity. It is recognised that while these insights might be used in future 
research on goal ambiguity, they do not fit in with the three prominent themes that currently 
characterise research on a TOF. 
5.1.5 Did studies that impose the theory empirically, but have been 
conducted in a way that is independent of the GCRP, produce 
insights on goal ambiguity? 
Case studies that apply the GCT but have been done independently of the GCRP have also 
produced few insights on the topic of goal ambiguity, as shown in chapter four. Three of the 
sample of eleven studies generated knowledge on the relevant phenomenon.  The conclusions 
that drawn in study number ten report that when people are faced with ambiguous goals  they 
are inclined to reduce the ambiguity by focussing on the goals that are familiar, or known to 
them. Ambiguity is reduced, since the experience thereof is both emotionally and 
intellectually taxing. The conclusion in study seventeen report on how members of the 
particular organisation invested effort into dealing with emotional responses to non-linear 
decision processes. Study eighteen reported on similar issues: goal ambiguity was overcome 
by relying on norms, or ideological predispositions. In terms of a TOF, these findings are 
congruent with the themes identified in chapter two, more specifically they pertain to 
addressing the role of intution or emotional expression. Testing for emotional responses to 




the experience of ambiguity, and developing was to avoid its effects that could counter the 
aims of a TOF should thus form part of future research on goal ambiguity.     
5.1.6 What is the dominant character of these studies, or applications? 
As shown by figures B and C (in chapters three and four respectively), the dominant 
approach is that of qualitative data and qualitative analysis. The GCT was shown to have 
been viewed as both process theory and a variance theory of decision making. Overall, the 
process theory view is adopted by more studies than the variance theory view, however, 
utilisation as a process theory is especially dominant within the GCRP itself. The studies 
done independently are divided in half when it comes to this distinction.    
Despite the process theory view being dominent, the studies exhibit the presence of a 
positivistic theoretical frame. The researchers categorise data according to the components of 
the GCT, and occasionally other theories, but take the observations at ‘face value’ and 
continue to present the categorisation and the discussion thereof as the full analysis. Quite 
often, the importance of interpretation and symbolic order is recognised (this is more likely to 
happen where the garbage can has been used as a process theory), however no interpretivist 
models or methods are used.  
Most studies have incorporated collection methods that contribute positively to the integrity 
of the data. Similarly, most researchers have utilised more than one theoretical body through 
which to view the data. It may thus be concluded that the lack of insights on goal ambiguity 
is not as a result of low quality research.   
5.1.7 Can we deduce the characteristics of studies that are both more 
and less likely to produce insights on goal ambiguity? 
Based on the results of the analysis of the nineteen studies – eight discussed in chapter three 
and eleven discussed in chapter four – it may be concluded that a qualitative approach to 
studying goal ambiguity, which is situated within a positivistic theoretical frame, is unlikely 
to generate insights on goal ambiguity that can be put to use in building a TOF. It may also be 
concluded that the GCT, without the aid of models that consider, or incorporate, the role of 
active decision making entities, is unlikely to produce insights on goal ambiguity. The 
incorporation of the role of decision making entities should and need not imply the re-
introduction of rational choice assumptions when viewing and understanding these entities’ 
behaviour.  




Finally, it may be concluded that applying the GCT as a process theory is more likely to 
produce insights on goal ambiguity than using it as a variance theory, provided that methods 
and theories that are equipped for studying narratives are incorporated in the analysis.  
5.2 Contributions 
5.2.1 Contributions to the literature on the garbage can theory 
This thesis contributes to the literature on the garbage can by having shown that the GCT, by 
not providing for the influence of active decision making entities, has a limited capacity to 
produce insights on goal ambiguity. This knowledge aids the understanding of ways in which 
the theory may be most effectively and appropriately used.  
It also contributes by arguing, conceptually, that the theory may be seen as a process theory 
of decision making, à la Poole and Van de Ven (2010). The establishment of this relation 
means that existing knowledgeon how process theories should be employed and how they 
should be evaluated, may be brought to bear on the GCT. This will enhance its capacity to 
produce actionable knowledge.  
The third contribution is the aggregation of conclusions which have been reached by applying 
the theory during empirical research. This aggregation, or collection of conclusions, may be 
put to use in order to test for other aspects of the GCT. 
Finally, by thoroughly analysing the only definition, or understanding, of what constitutes a 
GCRP, this thesis contributes to understanding the nature and the lineage of one of the most 
prominent models in the history of studying organisational decision making. Furthermore, the 
critical analysis of Bendor et al.’s definition of the GCRP has led to the explication of the 
intricate relations and differences between writings on the garbage can and writings on (new) 
institutionalism. This explication enhances the understanding of both schools.     
5.2.2 Contributions to the literature on a technology of foolishness 
This thesis’ contribution to a TOF is a normative framework for conducting research on goal 
ambiguity: 
1. Data needs to be interpreted using theories that allow for or incorporate active 
decision making entities, and which recognise that these entities engage goals, despite 
not engaging them in the way conceived of by rational choice theory. 




2. Consequently, if the GCT is used to interpret data, an additional theoretical 
framework that fits the above criterion needs to be used alongside the GCT. 
3. Using the GCT as a process theory might be useful for studying goal ambiguity, as 
long as methods and theories for studying narratives are incorporated in the analysis.  
4. Goal ambiguity needs to be studied in its capacity as a phenomenon that causes 
emotional strain, amongs other forms of strain, and emotional responses, in members 
of the organisation. Ambiguity may be coped with, or managed, in ways that counter 
what needs to be achieved through a TOF.  
5. Other themes that need to be researched in order for a TOF to be developed include: 
symbolic expressions (such as metaphors), tactile or visual experiences, the role of 
identity (that of the focal decision maker and the people he or she cooperates with), 
the idea of enacting the world, as opposed to having to predict its state.  
5.2.3 Limitations of the study 
The overall impact of the study is limited by the fact that only a sample of case studies done 
independently of the GCRP were analysed. It has been argued that these studies are 
representative (in chapter one), however, a good representation is still only a representation 
and therefore has limited accuracy.  
Additionally, the theoretical perspective of the garbage can is not presented as the only way 
through which research that can contribute to a TOF may be done. The argument for why this 
particular theory presents a viable way was made in chapter one. However, other theoretical 
frames may certainly prove fruitful, as illustrated by study seventeen. This study applied a 
theoretical frame pertaining to coping strategies.  
Furthermore, different types of empirical studies may be used in an attempt to gain 
knowledge on goal ambiguity. Case studies tend to provide answers to ‘how’ and ‘why’-
questions, as the focus is directed at interactions within ‘real’ situations. However, as Black 
points out, they are not particularly well suited when researchers attempt to formulate or 
justify greater generalisations (1999: 48).   
The last limitation pertains to the categories imposed on the studies in order to to analyse and 
evaluate them. Although these categories were appropriate and useful, there are more nuances 
to empirical studies and the theoretical frames within which they fit.   




5.3 Suggestions for future research  
The suggestion for future research is to pay heed to the normative framework suggested by 
this research. This framework is discussed in chapter four and in section 5.2.2. of this chapter.  
Observing behaviour  and categorising these observations solely according to the components 
of a model for decision making that does not incorporate active decision making entities has 
been proven highly unlikely to deliver insights on goal ambiguity. Where versions of the 
GCT are used in future, these theories should:  
1. Be complemented by models that do incorporate the influence of active decision 
making entities, or incorporate this influence themselves. 
2. Be applied as process theories and should by implication incorporate theoretical 
tools that are appropriate for studying organisational narratives, such as discourse 
analysis.      
These suggestions imply that decision theorists will have to study the symbolic, or 
interpretative, order that is present within organisational decision making with tools that have 
been designed to study these orders, instead of attempting to analyse and understand these 
orders by exclusively employing behavioural models and tools.    
In terms of themes that need researching, researchers that seek to contribute to a TOF should 
focus on: symbolic expressions (such as metaphors), tactile or visual experiences, and/or the 
role of intuition and emotional expression in decision making processes, the role of identity, 
and the idea of enacting the world, thereby determining its nature.  
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